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Preface 
his publication is the product of a joint venture between CEPS and the 
Economics and Foreign Policy Forum (EFPF), a recently-founded 
research institute in Istanbul. We have created a research team that 
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conclusions. It seems that many contributions to the heated debate on 
Turkey’s suitability as a candidate for EU membership only take into account 
the EU’s point of view. This study is an attempt to correct this imbalance. 
This book was written by a group of four authors, two from CEPS and two 
from EFDF, but it is based on the results of a major research project 
involving a much larger team consisting of over a dozen researchers from 
both institutions (see biographical notes on pp 114-115.) The results of this 
research have been published in a new series of EU-Turkey Working Papers 
(listed at the end of this book) that are available for free downloading from 
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times verbatim, from the individual working papers. We thank the other 
participants in the project for their valuable contributions. 
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work. Financial support from Akbank, Coca Cola, Dogus Holding and 
Finansbank in Turkey and the Istanbul office of the Open Society Institute 
was crucial in allowing us to conduct this research. The Libera Università 
Internazioniale degli Studi Sociali (LUISS) also contributed to this research 
effort by financing the contribution by Marco Airaudo, LUISS Fellow at 
CEPS for the academic year 2003-04. 
Daniel Gros 
Director of CEPS 
Brussels, September 2004 
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Introduction 
he European Union has just completed its biggest expansion ever. 
Even as it is digesting the 10 new countries that joined in May 2004, 
the EU is confronted with a new challenge: Should it now start 
accession negotiations with Turkey? This issue is highly controversial in 
European opinion, since it is perceived to raise fundamental issues about the 
principles and identity of the European project, as well as more pragmatic 
matters of its governability. In this contribution to the debate, we attempt to 
provide an objective overview of the political and economic issues that arise 
when one discusses the candidacy of Turkey for membership in the EU. 
Our starting assumption is that it is likely that accession negotiations would 
start during 2005, but that they would last for quite some time, with 
membership materialising only around 2012-15. We therefore take a long-
term perspective and explore particular areas in which the EU and Turkey 
could cooperate during the long interim negotiating period. We find that 
there are a number of areas where closer cooperation would be appropriate, 
with the exact form of this cooperation varying from one area to another. It 
ranges from ‘virtual membership’ to ad hoc cooperation. ‘Virtual 
membership’ might be most appropriate in the area of foreign and security 
policy where the EU and Turkey have highly convergent interests and where 
Turkey could constitute an important asset for the EU. It could also apply to 
the Customs Union that Turkey shares with the EU, but which now gives 
little voice to Turkey in EU policy-making fora. Close cooperation would 
also be required in the area of justice and home affairs, both to ensure the 
necessary level of trust and to provide Turkey with the appropriate flexibility 
in applying the Schengen acquis.  
A comparison with the latest enlargement that culminated in the accession of 
10 new countries in 2004 is instructive. The main issue with the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) was the creation of market economies 
and their integration with the EU economy. In most cases the political 
aspects of the Copenhagen criteria were more easily dealt with. In the case of 
Turkey the situation is somewhat different. Turkey has had a market 
economy for decades and, through the customs union agreement with the EU 
it is already on the way to becoming a virtual member of the internal market. 
It is not so much the institutional nature of the economy that is of concern, 
but the fact that it has been crisis-prone and that Turkey is large, compared 
individually to the new member countries. The Turkish economy also 
appears to have great dynamism and growth potential. Will the process of 
accession allow the Turkish economy to combine dynamism with stability? 
What will Turkish accession mean for the European budget? These are the 
key questions that will arise during the negotiations on economic matters.  
T 2 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
In the political domain there are two broad areas that will be at the heart of 
the negotiations process. First, there will be continued emphasis on the full 
implementation in everyday life of the comprehensive democratic reforms 
enacted in Turkey over the last three years. The democratic progress made by 
Turkey has been truly impressive. It is a relatively recent progress, however, 
and other episodes show that the process is still fragile and subject to 
possible backsliding. The second area of political focus concerns the often-
overlooked opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU 
and Turkey, even in advance of accession. Foreign and security policy would 
be the most important area where this could and should happen, given that 
Turkey is likely to constitute an invaluable asset in making the EU’s policy 
towards the entire region surrounding Turkey more effective. 
This book deals with the political aspects of Turkish-EU relations first and 
then turns to economic issues. The political and economic domains are, of 
course, closely interlinked. Economic growth and greater prosperity will 
defuse political tensions and allow the democratic process to function 
without excessive conflict. The deepening of democracy and the full practice 
of all democratic freedoms in everyday life will, in turn, stabilise 
expectations and increase the degree of confidence in the future of Turkey’s 
economy, triggering more investment and more rapid growth. 
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Chapter 1 
The Evolving Nature of the EU and Turkey 
1.1  Which Union would Turkey enter? 
Just as Turkey is a very different country today from what it was when it 
signed the Association Treaty with the European Community in 1963, the 
European Union of the first decade of the 21
st century has become a very 
different community of nations compared to what it was 40 years ago. 
Moreover, the tremendous global changes that have taken place since the 
early 1990s – including the end of the cold war, which had limited the 
European Community to ‘Western’ Europe, and the acceleration of the 
globalisation process driven by the revolution in communications technology 
– are leading Europe to debate visions of its own future in a transformed 
world. The passion and intensity with which future Turkish membership in 
the EU is debated in the countries of the European Union are to a great extent 
due to the much larger debate on the essential nature of the European project 
itself. What kind of European Union is likely to or should exist in the second 
decade of our new century? Does ‘Europe’ have obvious or natural 
‘borders’? What will be the international system of which Europe will be a 
part? Which vision of Europe should constitute the framework within which 
Turkish membership is best discussed and analysed? 
The first vision, in its extreme form, would see the emergence of a ‘European 
super-state’ with a supranational level of government as a clear ‘federal’ 
centre of authority. This vision reproduces the ‘Westphalian’ nation state at 
the European regional level. The central European political institutions 
would acquire new competences and they would also be strengthened by a 
serious deepening of some presently-thin competences. They would be able 
to exercise these competences over a well-defined territory. This new 
European ‘super-state’ would be equipped with common military and police 
forces to assure the internal and external security of the European federation. 
There would be a coincidence of legal, administrative, economic and military 
regimes. As such there would be a categorical and long-term distinction 
between the inside and the outside. Essential sovereignty would be 
reconstituted, having passed from the national state to the European super-
state level. 
The second, very different vision of the Europe of the 21
st century is one of a 
community of traditional nation states, having formed a common economic 
market, but retaining sovereignty at the national level in most domains. 
Cooperation in this ‘Europe of nations’ could extend beyond trade and the 
acceptance of standards facilitating the functioning of a single market, into 
some areas of social policy, border control and coordination of foreign aid 
activities, but would stop well short of a common fiscal policy, a unified 4 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
foreign policy or common defence arrangements. For those who share this 
vision of Europe, the EU has already gone too far in the direction of political 
integration. For these traditional sovereignists, it is time to rein in the 
authority of the European institutions and certainly to prevent further erosion 
of the prerogatives of the traditional nation state. 
The political, institutional and economic ‘reality’ of Europe, as it has evolved 
and as it is developing, does not really fit either one of these ‘extreme’ 
visions. The euro, for example, exists and the countries that have adopted it 
are unlikely to return to their old national currencies. This has led to a 
common European monetary policy, designed and implemented by a ‘supra-
national’ European Central Bank. A lot of sovereignty beyond the domain of 
trade alone is already being shared by all or a subset of the European member 
countries. On the other hand, it is very hard to argue that we are witnessing 
the emergence of a ‘European super-state’, in any traditional sense of the 
term nation. In terms of languages, traditions and a sense of belonging, the 
‘old’ countries persist, and both local and traditional national feelings may 
even be strengthening as a reaction to economic globalisation. 
There is need for a third, ‘post-modern’ vision of Europe, more appropriate 
to the 21
st century, which combines elements of the other visions but which 
breaks away from the traditional modes of thought formed in the past which 
are no longer relevant. This third vision would see a Union developing as a 
set of overlapping circles, with a multi-level system of governance. Within 
the overall framework of the European Union with some well-defined 
competencies, there would be flexible forms of enhanced cooperation, with 
some member countries going further in integrating various policies than 
others. The borders of the European Union would be well-defined at any 
moment of time, but would not need to be frozen or fixed forever. Its 
institutional structure may have to be quite complex, reflecting the multi-
level nature of governance and the variable degrees of integration. If this 
complexity is in harmony with the underlying social, political, cultural and 
economic realities, it will be more ‘functional’ than a system of contrived 
simplicity. Some social scientists seek precedent or inspiration in history to 
describe the nature of this complexity. As expressed by one political 
scientist, medieval Europe’s system of rule reflected a ‘patchwork of 
overlapping and incomplete rights of governments’ in which ‘different 
juridical instances were geographically interwoven and stratified, and plural 
allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties and anomalous enclaves abounded’.
1 
A Union in excess of 30 member states might come to look like an 
                                                 
1 John Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity”, World 
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increasingly post-modern equivalent of such a system.
2 Its sovereignty would 
be different from that of a Westphalian nation state, and its institutions would 
be multiple and interlocked in a complex web of interdependencies. While 
historical analogies can be illuminating, this post-modern Europe would be 
one that tries to meet the challenges of globalisation and the technological 
and cultural realities of the early 21
st century. It would be a Europe that 
recognises the need to utilise regional, national and global approaches to 
solve the security and economic problems that confront us. 
The Union that Turkey would join will most likely be such a ‘post-modern’ 
Europe rather than a new continental Westphalian super-state. Due to the 
fundamental nature of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, the Union is 
already characterised by increasing degrees and forms of diversity of 
institutional arrangements. Despite the impressive transformation observed in 
the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, considerable 
divergence persists between the old and new members.
3 The single market 
will enlarge, but still with long transition periods before the full achievement 
of the four single market freedoms. Moreover, although EU institutions 
remain reluctant to admit it, the Union already includes overlapping circles 
constituted by inside and outside actors. The UK, Sweden and Denmark 
remain outside the eurozone. It is doubtful that all the new member states 
will succeed in acceding to monetary union soon after 2006, although the 
new member states and remaining candidates (including Turkey) will no 
doubt strive to be in all of the EU’s policies, for fear of being treated as 
second-class members. Different concepts of European economic areas 
beyond the EU’s formal membership exist already, and become more 
numerous and diversified. For example, Norway and Switzerland are part of 
the European Economic Area, and, already since 1996, Turkey participates in 
a customs union with the EU. In the area of Justice and Home Affairs, non-
EU countries such as Norway are included in the Schengen system, 
participating in the relevant EU Councils albeit without voting power. 
However, member states such as the UK have chosen not to participate. 
Finally the United Kingdom’s decision in May 2004 to ratify the 
Constitution by referendum is already provoking contingency thinking about 
what to do if the result there, or in other member states, were negative. 
Finally, the EU’s present efforts to develop a European Neighbourhood 
Policy represents a means (albeit still embryonic) to dilute the gap between 
                                                 
2 See James Caporaso, “The EU and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory and 
post-modern”,  Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, p. 
2951. 
3 See Jan Zielonka, “How new enlarged borders will reshape the European 
Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3; 2001, pp. 507-536.  6 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
full membership and EU external relations. The Commission’s recent 
Strategy Paper extends the geographic coverage of this initiative potentially 
to all the European members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus – and to 
the whole of the Mediterranean basin, i.e. to all Barcelona Process states, 
although it does not include two of Turkey’s neighbours, namely Iraq and 
Iran.
4 
The precise form and effectiveness of the emerging system remains 
uncertain. Regardless of its precise nature, however, the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation within the EU and greater diversity in the forms that 
multi-level governance takes, rather than representing a liability, may act as 
an important asset to the new European Union of the 21
st century. Diversity 
within the Union not only would entail greater cultural, social and political 
wealth within the EU. It would entail also that the differences between EU 
member states and non-member states would be less clear-cut. This in turn 
could aid the Union in constructively developing its relations with the 
‘outside’, making use of the commonalities and special ties that exist 
between some member states, and some neighbouring countries or areas of 
the world where strong cultural ties exist with one or more of EU member 
states. As the geographical sections below argue, this would be especially 
true in the case of Turkey and its neighbours. So long as common interests 
prevail, Turkey’s specificities could considerably enrich the possibilities for 
an effective and substantial European foreign policy. Naturally this does not 
detract from the complexity of developing a workable institutional set-up to 
conduct external relations with non-member countries. This indeed remains 
the major challenge posed by enlargement in general.  
1.2  Which Turkey would enter the Union?   
Turkey emerged as a new nation in the 1920s, sharply breaking with the 
imperial Ottoman past in terms of its institutions and social organisation. 
From the very beginning the new Republic was oriented towards modernity 
and Europe, the two being closely linked in the minds of the republican 
Kemalist elite. This was a time in which militant nationalism in Europe and 
the Stalinist version of communism in Russia were in the ascendant. The 
Turkish Republic, probably in part due to the painful wars of the 19
th and 
early 20
th centuries and to the devastation many communities had suffered in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, developed a rather moderate version of 
nationalist ideology. From the start Kemalist ideology emphasised the need 
to concentrate on economic development within the Republic’s borders, 
                                                 
4 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper, 
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discouraged any revanchist adventurism or dreams of a new empire, made 
peace with all its neighbours, notably Greece and tried to build a modern 
‘Westphalian’ nation state. This healthy moderation, rejection of imperialism 
in all its forms and fear of new military adventures helped Turkey stay out of 
World War II until 1944, despite heavy pressure coming from all sides, 
notably Nazi Germany. From 1944 on, Turkey entered the stage of world 
politics as an ally of the Western powers, a founding member of the United 
Nations, a member of NATO and a member of the Council of Europe. 
Turkey’s focus on Europe and the association Turks tend to make between 
Europe and modernity actually predate the Republic. Already in Ottoman 
times, particularly during a period of reforms in the mid-19
th century, the 
Turkish-Ottoman elites very much looked towards Europe as ‘the’ example 
of modernity. A good part of the empire was of course in the Balkans, and 
many modern-day Turkish citizens are descendants of people taking refuge 
in Turkey from the wars and turmoil in the Balkans. Moreover, even in 
Ottoman times, Turkey was part of the ‘European Concert of Nations’, 
although it progressively weakened under the burden of empire, and was 
unable to transform the Ottoman system of decentralised government with 
the emergence of 19
th century ethnicity and language-based nationalisms. 
Eight decades after the creation of the modern Turkish nation state, Turkey 
now wants to start membership negotiations with the European Union. 
Between 70 and 80% of the electorate supports EU membership. At the same 
time, memories of the infamous Sèvres Treaty, which tried to put an end to 
the very existence of Turkey at the end of World War I, are still very much 
alive. There is a tension between the still very strong sense of the ‘nation-
state’ and its sovereignty and the recognition that Europe is moving beyond 
the ‘nation-state’ as traditionally defined, towards the kind of ‘post-modern’ 
type of multi-level governance we discussed above. Combined with the will 
to share the prosperity and the advanced form of democracy with other 
Europeans, there is also some fear rooted in past conflicts and some doubts 
about how exactly sovereignty-sharing will work. Such doubts are not unique 
to Turkey, of course, and can be found in almost every European country, 
from France to Poland. They are still quite strong in Turkey, however, 
despite the overwhelming desire to join the Union. This may seem 
paradoxical, but it is at the core of Turkish attitudes and needs to be 
understood as such. The elites and the people are willing to give up some of 
their sovereignty if they can be assured that they will gain shared European 
sovereignty in exchange. This is why any talk of a special status or special 
association is totally unacceptable in Turkey. It brings up visions of unfair 
treatment, of losing sovereignty without gaining a say in European affairs. 
At the start of the 21
st century, Turkey, like many nation-states is struggling 
with the challenges of globalisation, with the need to balance local and 8 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
national feelings of belonging with the interdependence that the modern 
world economy has created, and with meeting expectations of much greater 
prosperity in the face of persisting poverty. A Turkey that would be a 
member of the European Union would feel much more confident that it can 
meet these challenges and needs. Together with its European partners it 
could search for the right balance between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, 
between local autonomy and supra-national governance, between being 
proud of one’s past and looking towards a more global future. The fact that 
the overwhelming majority of Turkey’s citizens are Muslim makes these 
challenges more interesting and complicated, but it also makes success in 
meeting them all the more rewarding. Turkey wants Europe, as a 
contemporary framework, that will help all Europeans overcome the fear of 
conflict, and turn diversity, including cultural and religious diversity, into 
something to celebrate and cherish. Turkey itself needs the European 
framework to feel more comfortable with its own diversity and to attain the 
level of national security and prosperity that it has been longing for.  
  | 9 
Chapter 2 
Democracy and Human Rights
∗ 
n seeking accession to the European Union, Turkey is voluntarily 
subscribing to the standards of democracy and human rights that have 
been formulated by the Union with increasing precision as its 
enlargement process extended beyond Europe’s well-established democratic 
core. At the level of principles these were established at the European 
Council meeting in June 1993, and became known as the ‘Copenhagen 
criteria’. Amongst these, the political conditions were: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.  
With the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, the 
monitoring of their performance according to the Copenhagen criteria 
became a major exercise in specifying and enforcing the EU’s political 
conditionality. It is often said that for these states, the overthrow of the 
communist regimes and preparation for accession to the EU was all about 
‘returning to Europe’, an idea that was readily understood and accepted by 
the population. According to this perception, the communist period of half a 
century from the end of the Second World War to 1989-90 had been no more 
than an anomalous interlude in their European history. Historical truth is 
more complex, however. The old Czechoslovakia was in fact the only 
country among the new member states to have had a significant experience 
of western-style democracy in the pre-communist period. All others are 
‘discovering’ democracy simultaneously with the process of accession to the 
EU. The same had been true of Spain and Portugal. It is too often forgotten 
that most European nations were able to build stable democracies and a zone 
of peace only after they finally decided to join forces and to build the ‘new’ 
European Community.  
Turkey – its political elite, with the full support of public opinion – has 
decided that it wants to join this same political, economic and social 
community and zone of peace. The European Union for its part understands 
that the accession of Turkey would be a political act of huge importance for 
itself as well as Turkey. It has therefore to inform itself about the political 
origins of the Turkish application and to understand the nature of the current 
political transformation underway there. This effort at understanding has to 
be based on the premise that Turkey’s accession should be decided on fair 
                                                 
∗ This chapter is based on the longer report by Senem Aydin and E. Fuat 
Keyman, European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy, 
EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 2, August 2004 (available at www.ceps.be). 
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and objective grounds, namely the standard admission criteria, and more 
particularly not on grounds of geographical or cultural essentialism, since 
this would mean that the process had no point.    
2.1  From republican origins to democratic transformation 
In his classic study of modern Turkey, historian Feroz Ahmad observes: 
Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was 'made’ in the image of the Kemalist 
elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders 
and the old regime.
5  
In the process of this ‘making’, the objective of the Kemalist elite was to 
reach the contemporary level of civilisation by establishing the political, 
economic and ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an 
independent nation-state, the fostering of industrialisation and the 
construction of a secular and modern national identity. The leaders of early 
republican Turkey thus accepted the universal validity of Western modernity 
as the way of building modern Turkey. The making of Turkey was thus based 
upon both an independence war against Western imperialism and an 
acceptance of Western social and political norms as the embodiment of 
modernity. 
More precisely the conceptualisation of the Turkish Republic as nation-state 
manifested itself in: i) the transition in the political system of authority from 
personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations; ii) the shift in the 
understanding of the universal order from divine law to positivist and 
rational thinking; iii) the shift from a community founded on an ‘elite-people 
cleavage’, to a community based on a nation and on ‘a people’ forming that 
nation; and iv) the transition from a religious community to a secular nation 
state. These transitions were regarded by Mustafa Kemal as the pre-condition 
for Turkey to live as an advanced and civilised nation in the midst of 
contemporary civilisation. The Kemalist elite attempted to remove from 
political discourse the notion of a religious state and the constraints it was 
perceived to put around a resolute quest for modernity in all aspects of life.  
The idea of the state adopted by the Turkish republic in the 1920s and 1930s 
was by no means abstract. It was a reaction to two fundamental problems, 
which had caused the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
6 First, the Ottoman 
state was identified with the personal rule of the sultan, which eventually led 
                                                 
5 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London: Routledge, 1994. 
6 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, North Humberside: The Eothen 
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to its inability to compete with the European nation-state system. Second, the 
non-secular nature of the Ottoman state was regarded as the primary obstacle 
to progress in Ottoman society. There was therefore a need to create a nation-
state distinct from the person of the sultan, and secular enough to allow the 
pursuit of modernity in science, technology, social relations and economics 
without being constrained by conservative traditions. This meant a 
reconstruction of the idea of national sovereignty. The state was thus viewed 
not as an arbitrary institution, nor an expression of class interest, but as an 
active agent that reshapes the nation to “elevate the people to the level of 
contemporary civilisation”.  
The Turkish elite also took seriously the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 
‘European miracle’ – that the reasons behind Western advancement could be 
located precisely in Western cultural practices. The new Turkish republic 
understood modernisation not just as a question of acquiring technology, but 
as something that could not be absorbed without a dense network of cultural 
practices, which made instrumental thought possible. The commitment to 
political modernity had to be supplemented with a set of cultural practices in 
order to ground “the articulation of reason and capital via the nation-state”, 
or the institutional and discursive construction of national identity. 
Republicanism, nationalism, étatism, secularism, populism and revolutionary 
reformism were the six principles of the act of modern governance. 
Republicanism defined the nation-state as impersonal rule, which was 
contextualized as national sovereignty empowered by nationalism. Etatism 
was designated to foster capital accumulation and industrialisation through 
import-substitution policies carried out by newly created state economic 
enterprises (SEEs). These principles reflected what one could call an 
ideologically “centrist” stance of Mustafa Kemal. The new republic endorsed 
the basic principles of private ownership and markets, rejecting Soviet-style 
socialism. At the same time, however, it laid the foundations of a mixed 
economy with a leading role for the public sector, at a time when there was 
practically no private capital accumulation in Turkey. The Republican 
principles also indicate the significance of nation-state building for 
nationalist discourse. Ataturk’s nationalism rejected the idea of a class-based 
society, stressing the “unity of the people”, playing down ethnic, religious or 
socio-economic differences.  
A new phase in the life of the Turkish republic began in 1945 with the 
transition to the multi-party system, and, later, in the 1960s with the rise of 
the Left. As a result it was no longer possible to define the Turkish political 
landscape purely on the basis of the secularist versus anti-secularist axis. 
With the multiparty system, the emergence of the liberal vision of 
Westernisation and modernisation presented a serious alternative to the state- 
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unavoidable in the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, with the rise of the 
Left, the emergence of a more socialist or social-democratic vision 
challenged the non-class-based image which had been used to define Turkish 
society as an organic totality. 
It was by then clear that Turkish modernisation should involve some 
elements of economic and political liberalism, but this did not alter the 
leading role of the state and its role vis-à-vis society. The effective 
instruments of formal democracy were established with the transition to 
multi-party and parliamentary democracy in Turkey. There were now free 
and very competitive elections, and the opposition parties were able to 
criticise the governing party or the governing coalition. The military coups of 
1960 and 1980 were both short-lived with relatively smooth transitions to 
civilian rule, in contrast to conditions prevailing in many other middle-
income countries, in Latin America, for example.  
It is important to remember, however, that the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were a period of intensified competition and global conflict between the 
American-led “West” and the Soviet Union and its allies. Turkey was a 
frontline state in this conflict and experienced the ideological and political 
ramifications of this competition. As was the case in neighbouring Middle 
Eastern countries, religion was used as a bulwark against the perceived threat 
of communism. As elsewhere in the world, the global conflict had a domestic 
impact which was not helpful in fostering the development of fully 
democratic institutions. Both the East and the West at times encouraged non-
democratic forms of action to foster their strategic objectives. In post-1980 
Turkey, moreover, the fear of Soviet influence led the state and the secular 
elites to encourage religious education and traditional-conservative ideology 
as an ‘antidote’ to communism. Some believe that it was at that time that the 
ground was prepared for the emergence of a much more powerful socio-
political movement taking its inspiration from political Islam. The post-1980 
military regime incorporated Islamic elements in its discourse and opened up 
the domestic market to Islamic capital to secure popular support. The 
outcome was the weakening of the very conditions of the existence of 
Kemalist nationalism and radical secularism.  
In the economic domain, the 1980s brought about a change in approach, the 
impact of which was deeply felt at each and every level of Turkish society. 
The strategy of import substitution had reached its limits when Turkey faced 
a tightening of the chronic foreign exchange constraint it had experienced 
during most of the Republic’s history. In response, from 1980 onwards, the 
strategy of industrialisation decisively shifted from import-substitution to 
export-promotion, and much more emphasis was placed on market forces. In 
the 1980s, after a radical realignment of the exchange rate of the Turkish lira, 
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manufactured exports. This economic transformation had political 
consequences. Export promotion meant adaptation to the international 
division of labour and much greater integration into the world economy and 
its norms and rules. It is therefore interesting to note that economic pressures 
resulted in a situation where military intervention triggered a degree of 
liberalisation that was not at all foreseen by those that had led the 
intervention. 
The 1980s and 1990s transformed Turkey from a country with a small, 
protected and domestic market-oriented industrial sector, to a country with a 
much larger, export-oriented and competitive industry. This economic 
transformation went hand in hand with the rapid migration to the cities, the 
emergence of both large urban slums and an urban middle class. 
Urbanisation, differentiation and industrialisation, in an increasingly 
outward-oriented economic structure, made traditional methods of ‘control’ 
by the state increasingly difficult. A much more ‘democratic’ social structure 
developed during these decades, although the tensions between the 
underlying social and economic forces and the institutional superstructure 
were not easily resolved. Nonetheless, there was no ‘rupture’ during this 
difficult transition period and, while there was much political instability, 
quite damaging also to economic growth, Turkey ended the 20
th century with 
a more robust democracy and a much stronger civil society. 
2.2  Driving forces of Turkish development and 
democratisation in the 2000s 
In interpreting the continuous efforts since the year 2000 that aim at 
consolidating and deepening Turkish democracy, one can observe five 
driving forces, which are both international and national in nature. These 
have led the political and state elite to come to terms with the fact that 
democracy is not only a normatively good system of governance, but also 
serves as a valuable strategic and political means for Turkey – as well as any 
country – to be strong and stable in its homeland and in its international 
relations.  
The development of Turkish-EU relations since 1999. As elaborated in more 
detail below, Turkey-EU relations have gained in ‘certainty’ since the 
Helsinki summit of 1999, when Turkey obtained the status of a candidate 
country for full membership. This has forced the political and state actors to 
focus on democracy, since the candidate country status was requiring Turkey 
to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. Turkey’s efforts to make a number 
of important legal and constitutional changes before the Copenhagen summit 
of 2002 was enough only to get a conditional date, that by the end of 2004 
the EU would decide to begin full accession negotiations without delay on 
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continues, and Turkey has taken additional far-reaching measures to 
consolidate its democracy and ensure the beginning of negotiations. What is 
important here is that the more that Turkey-EU relations have gained 
‘certainty’ over time, the more Turkish politics have come to terms with the 
fact that democracy is the only game in town. 
The February 2001 financial crisis and the requirements of stabilisation. 
When the Turkish economy collapsed in February 2001, due to a financial 
crisis of the type seen in many emerging-market economies, generating 
devastating and tragic impacts on the country, the need to restructure state-
economic relations became very apparent. Although the crisis appeared to be 
economic and financial, it was in fact a crisis of governance, which occurred 
as a result of the populist, clientalist and corruption-producing nature of 
Turkish politics in the 1990s. For this reason, the economic programme 
called the “Transition Programme towards a Strong Economy” by the reform 
team that took over the reins of the economy in March of 2001, which was 
prepared and launched with the support of the IMF and the World Bank as 
well as with the approval of the European Commission, had as its first aim to 
restructure the economy and the relations between the state and economic 
actors. By establishing a transparent rules-based system, it took away from 
political actors the ability to seek and generate rents by making arbitrary 
decisions in the microeconomic sphere. The disasters of the 1990s had made 
it clear that without a strong and stable economy, Turkey faced drastic 
problems, for which the viable solution is to truly democratise both the state 
and its governing relations with society. Thus, the need for upgrading 
institutions also became apparent in the economic sphere, where not only the 
ordinary people who suffered severely from the economic crisis but also the 
economic actors had come to believe that a rules-based and much more 
transparent system of governance is necessary for economic stability and 
sustained growth.  
The November 2002 elections. On the evening of 3 November 2002, as the 
final vote count came in, an electoral earthquake shook Turkish politics. The 
three parties that had formed the coalition government after the 1999 
elections obtained together no more than 15% of the national vote! 
Individually these three parties as well as two opposition parties, failed to 
pass the 10% national threshold and found themselves left outside the 
parliament. This electoral punishment was so dramatic that the winner of the 
1999 elections, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), lost almost its entire 
constituency. Other parties found themselves thrown out of the Parliament by 
losing more than half of their electoral support.  
The winner of the election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
received 34.2% of the popular vote, gained 66% of the parliamentary seats 
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Party (CHP), with 19.4% of the popular vote and 34% of the parliamentary 
seats, became the single opposition party in Parliament. The election results 
demonstrated popular feelings that the ineffective and non-transparent form 
of governance based on economic populism, clientelism and opportunistic 
political compromises and alliances that could be broken at any moment had 
run its course, and that a stable government with institutional and societal 
support was necessary to allow Turkey to fulfil its economic potential and 
deepen Turkish democracy.  
The Iraq war in 2003 and Turkey’s global and regional role. The September 
11
th terrorist attacks in the US have generated consequences for the world 
much beyond the killing of around 3,000 innocent people. These effects have 
even gone beyond the political aims expressed by the al Qaeda network, to 
create a ‘clash of fundamentalisms’ in world politics in the name of the 
struggle against ‘American imperialism’ in particular, and Western 
modernity in general. The declaration of the US-led global war on terrorism, 
aiming at redefining international politics on the basis of the normative and 
strategic primacy of security issues as opposed to global social justice 
problems, has not only concretised itself as war. It also unearthed the 
underlying problems of the key international institutions, such as the UN and 
NATO, created a split among European countries, slowing the process of 
greater political integration and attempted to divide the world in a simplistic 
way between those who are friends of the US and those who are against the 
war on terrorism. Thus, the gruesome terrorist attacks on September 11
th and 
the responses to it have created an international political atmosphere in 
which there is an attempt to force everyone to choose between security and 
liberty, hegemony and autonomy and state-centric nationalism and 
democratic cosmopolitanism.  
Turkey has not been immune from this process, and this became clearer as 
the US embarked on its war against Iraq. Turkey found itself subjected to 
military and political demands from the Bush administration to allow 
American troop deployment in its southeastern regions. Turkey’s rejection of 
this demand, with its famous parliamentary decision of 1 March 2003, 
temporarily created big problems in Turkey-US relations. The fact that 
relations quickly improved shows, however, that Turkey retains crucial 
strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East and that 
any policy in and towards that area, be it a US policy or a European policy, 
will always be quite dependent on Turkish support. Viewed from the Turkish 
perspective, the conflict in the Middle East destabilises its south, prevents an 
expansion of economic relations and trade and increases the price of oil, of 
which Turkey is a major importer. Turkey, even more than other countries, 
has a major interest in peace in the Middle East and will continue to do 
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disputes destabilising the area, foremost among them the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Turkey has a clear convergence of interest on Middle Eastern issues 
with the European nations.  
The role of civil society. In addition to these international and national 
changes, there have been strong societal calls for the further democratisation 
of relations between the State, society and the individual. Since 2000 most of 
the civil society organisations have made such calls, and in doing so have 
shown their support of Turkey-EU relations. Strong economic actors, such as 
the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSİAD), the 
Independent Industrialist and Businessmen’s Association (MUSİAD) and the 
region-based and province-based Industrialist and Businessmen’s   
Association (the SİADs) have supported Turkey’s entry into the EU and 
initiated lobbying-based activities for this end. The same is true for the major 
labour unions. Both employer and worker organisations, throughout the 
1990s, have voiced the need for the deepening of democracy in Turkey, 
which we are now witnessing. They recognise the role of the EU as 
international anchor and framework for the political and economic reforms.  
Similarly, a number of civil society organisations and think tanks operating 
in various fields have worked in their own ways for further democratisation 
and modernisation. Civil society has become an important element of 
Turkish politics not only through its discourse of democratisation but also by 
its associational activities.  
All these developments – the end of the cold war, the need to build a rules-
based economic governance, Turkey’s relations with the international 
financial institutions, the single-majority government and the decision by the 
AKP to make entry into Europe one of its major objectives, the increasing 
global and regional role of Turkey and the increasing importance of civil 
society – are together making Turkish modernity more societal, liberal, plural 
and multi-cultural. They are also transforming Turkish democracy into a 
more consolidated, substantial and deepened democratic mode of 
governance. The current Turkey-EU process with the possibility of an 
imminent beginning of negotiations and the political conditionality attached 
to the process takes place against this background.  
2.3   The EU-driven political agenda  
By making basic norms of liberal democracy the sine qua non condition for 
membership – its most important possible incentive and reward , the EU has 
– developed its policy of ‘conditionality’ as an instrument to help transform 
the governing structures, economy and civil society of the candidate 
countries, initially of Central and Eastern Europe. The major instruments of 
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‘monitoring’.
7 Hence, the EU institutions decided on whether or not to give 
the green light to the different stages along the accession process which, in 
the case of Central and East European countries, consisted of privileged 
access to trade and aid, signing and implementing enhanced association 
agreements, the starting of accession negotiations, the opening and closing of 
31 chapters of the acquis, signing of the Accession Treaty, ratifying the 
Accession Treaty and finally, entering the EU.
8 Benchmarking and 
monitoring were undertaken by yearly ‘Progress Reports’ outlining the steps 
taken by the candidate countries in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, and 
‘Accession Partnerships’ listing short and medium-term recommendations to 
achieve that end. The Commission has also supported these mechanisms 
through a significant amount of financial aid and technical assistance. This 
has allowed the EU to offer resources and legitimisation to some actors and 
constrain the behaviour of others in the domestic sphere. It has influenced the 
democratisation process of candidate countries primarily by empowering 
reformist elements in society and by altering the domestic opportunity 
structure.
9         
The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 caused a significant shift in the 
EU’s policy towards Turkey by declaring it a candidate country and by 
including Turkey in the same formal mechanisms used for the Central and 
East European countries to guide and measure progress on the Copenhagen 
criteria. The European Commission published the first Accession Partnership 
in March 2000, which was followed by the preparation of the Turkish 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis by the Turkish 
authorities in April  2001.  
Immediately following the approval of the National Programme, the silence 
on political reform was broken with a record number of 34 amendments 
made to the Constitution in October 2001. The amendments were not 
restricted to political rights, but extended over a large area of socio-political 
life. Although most of these amendments dealt with matters of detail or were 
simply changes in language that did not create a new legal situation, some of 
them were real constitutional reforms, such as the shortening of pre-trial 
detention periods, the limitation of the death penalty to times of war and 
                                                 
7 Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 8, No. 6, 2001, pp. 1013-1031. 
8 Gergana Noutcheva et al., “Europeanisation and Secessionist Conflicts: 
Concepts and Theories”, in Bruno Coppieters et al. (eds), Europeanisation and 
Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery, Ghent: 
Academia Press, 2004, pp. 1-50. 
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terrorist crimes, changes that made the prohibition and dissolution of 
political parties more difficult, and expansion of the freedom of association 
and strengthening of civil authority in the National Security Council. 
Another important amendment concerned the abolition of Article 15, which 
banned constitutional review of acts passed during the National Security 
Council regime established after the 1980 intervention. Those acts, many of 
which contain significant anti-democratic elements, can now be challenged 
in Constitutional Courts. After the constitutional amendments, the new Civil 
Code entered into force on 1 January 2002, introducing significant changes 
in the area of gender equality, protection of children and vulnerable persons.  
There followed three ‘Harmonisation Packages’
10 in the wake of the 
Copenhagen European Council of December 2002. These not only aimed to 
translate the preceding constitutional amendments into action by harmonising 
Turkish law with them, but also introduced further reforms particularly in the 
fields of human rights/protection of minorities, freedom of expression and 
freedom of association. The most notable of these were the easing of 
restrictions on broadcasting in and the right to learn ‘different languages and 
dialects traditionally used by citizens in their lives’, namely Kurdish. These 
measures culminated in the Copenhagen decision of December 2002, that ‘if 
the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay’.  
This decision was received with considerable disappointment in Turkey as 
general expectations had been raised in the country by the political elites as 
well as by the media that the decision to actually launch accession 
negotiations with Turkey would have been taken at that Summit. However, 
contrary to some theories circulated by the more fervent eurosceptics in 
Turkey, this disillusionment has not led to a slowdown in the reform process, 
nor has it led to the abandonment of the ‘EU Project’– as it is often referred 
to in Turkey. In fact just the opposite happened. The Copenhagen Summit 
has fostered a ‘sense of certainty’ in EU-Turkish relations by giving a 
specific date for the assessment on whether to begin the accession 
negotiations.
11 Even though the year 2004 was a conditional date, it was 
nevertheless a significant step forward, as it provided Turkey with the 
                                                 
10A term of reference for a draft law consisting of a collection of amendments to 
different laws, designed to amend more than one code or law at a time, and 
which was approved or rejected in a single voting session in the Parliament. 
11 Ziya Öniş and E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges”, 
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prospect that full EU membership was a real possibility.
12 In the meanwhile, 
the EU also decided to significantly increase the amount of financial 
assistance to Turkey. Pre-accession financial assistance would reach €250 
million in 2004, €300 million in 2005 and €500 million in 2006, to “help 
Turkey prepare to join the EU as quickly as possible”.
13 
The strengthening of the credibility of EU conditionality was immediately 
reflected in the subsequent reform packages adopted by the Turkish 
government. Four comprehensive sets of democratic reforms entered into 
force in the year 2003, aiming to improve the most criticised aspects of 
Turkish democracy, such as limits to freedom of speech and expression, 
freedom of association, torture and mistreatment along with the strong 
influence of the military on domestic politics.  
With the two democratisation packages that entered into force in January 
2003, the Law on Political Parties was further liberalised, the fight against 
torture strengthened, freedom of the press further expanded, the procedures 
for setting up associations eased and the restrictions applying in the 
acquisition of property by non-Muslim community foundations abolished. 
Retrial of cases on the basis of the decisions taken by the European Court of 
Human Rights was also made possible, paving the way for the retrial of some 
former Kurdish politicians, such as Leyla Zana.  
The sixth reform package that entered into force in mid-July 2003, became 
famous for the lifting of the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, and 
included expansion of the freedom of speech, abolition of the death penalty 
and expansion of broadcasting rights in Kurdish. It was the final set of 
democratic reforms, however, which entered into force at the end of July 
2003, that attracted the most attention due to its emphasis on strengthening 
the civilian control of the military, as well as the additional measures to fight 
against torture and protect the exercise of fundamental freedoms. 
In May 2004, there was another set of amendments to the Constitution, some 
of which consisted of harmonising the Constitution with the previous 
democratisation packages. However, more significant amendments clearly 
establishing civilian primacy in the National Security Council, reform of the 
judiciary and extending guarantees for the freedom of the press were also 
approved by the Parliament. The subordination of domestic law to 
                                                 
12 E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: 
Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State”, in Mehmet Ugur (ed.), 
Europeanization and the Nation State, London: Routledge, 2004. 
13 European Union European Commission Representation to Turkey, “EC 
Funded Programmes in Turkey: 2003-2004”, December 2003 (accessible at 
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international laws recognised Turkey in the area of fundamental rights and 
liberties was also now secured in the Turkish Constitution. The eighth 
democratisation package adopted in July 2004 resolved yet another long-
criticised issue, repealing the provision that allowed for the nomination of a 
member of the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) by the Secretariat General 
of the National Security Council.  
The new Penal Code and the Law on Associations, currently pending in the 
Turkish Parliament, are also expected to be adopted before the Commission 
issues its report in October. Although most of the new provisions contained 
in the new Penal Code are of a nature to enhance Turkey’s harmonisation 
with European norms and practices in this area, the proposal by the AKP 
leadership for an amendment to criminalise adultery was met with serious 
concern both at the domestic level and also by EU leaders and the European 
public opinion. (At the time of writing the outcome is unclear.) Box 2.1 gives 
further background, noting that the removal of adultery as an offence in the 
legal code of Western countries has been an ongoing process during the 
whole of the twentieth century, with some countries adopting liberalising 
reforms only in recent times.  
 
Box 2.1 European and Turkish legal codes on adultery 
For an historical perspective on the present public debate, the Turkish legal 
code was originally adopted by the Kemalist regime in 1926. The context was 
not then connected to matters of Muslim culture, for the text was a quasi-
literal translation of the Italian legal code at that time. The Turkish legal code 
of 1926 has since been amended 60 times. Rulings by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court in 1996 and 1998 effectively annulled the provision on 
adultery on the grounds that it discriminated against women in the sense that 
adultery was a punishable offence for women but not for men. 
  The Turkish Parliament is currently (mid-September 2004) in the closing 
stages of legislating on an entirely new legal code, which contains many 
reforms in a modernising direction. In August and September 2004, the 
government began to discuss with opposition parties the idea of an 
amendment that adultery be re-established as a criminal offence, with both 
men and women to be punishable. This led to protests from Turkish civil 
society and NGOs, with controversy also stirred in European political circles, 
with the outcome uncertain at the time of writing. The removal of adultery as 
an offence from the legal codes of Western countries has been progressively 
underway for most of the twentieth century. The instances that have only 
relatively recently seen abolition in the late twentieth century include Italy 
(1969), Portugal (1974), France (1975), Spain (1981), and Austria (1997). In 
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Notwithstanding this incident, most of the reforms in the past were passed 
immediately after or before crucial European Council meetings, displaying 
once again the clear drive of the prospect of membership.    
In addition to legislative changes, the government has also taken specific 
steps geared towards securing effective implementation, the most notable of 
which was the establishment of Human Rights Boards in cities and provinces 
as well as a special Reform Monitoring Group jointly headed by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior and composed of various 
representatives of selected ministries and government bodies.  
As the prospect of EU membership and the associated conditionality became 
more ‘real’, it became impossible to separate the domestic and international 
spheres from each other. By helping to create a ‘strong language of rights’ in 
the country, the EU started to play an important role in furthering the change 
in state-society relations and provided added legitimacy for civil society 
organisations calling for a more democratic Turkey and demanding 
recognition of cultural and civil rights/freedoms.
14 Similarly, the EU has also 
provided increasing legitimacy for the governing party AKP’s heavy 
emphasis on democracy and the protection of individual rights and freedoms, 
as was reflected in the speed of political reforms after the Party came to 
power in November 2002. Democracy as advocated by the EU became the 
‘catchword and the strategy through which the former Islamists seek to 
change the system at the same time as they change themselves’.
15  
Another reason that facilitated compliance by Turkey was the perceived 
decrease in the costs of these measures for the military/security 
establishment, which used to be particularly high in the 1990s. This was 
specifically the case for reforms related to cultural rights. The political costs 
of compliance were reduced with the virtual end of Kurdish terrorism in the 
late 1990s, reducing previous fears and strengthening the view that national 
unity can best be preserved through further democratisation, rather than via 
military means.  
2.4  Policy conclusions  
Recent years have clearly seen substantial improvements in Turkey’s 
democracy. Nobody today questions whether the basic institutions of 
government – the parliamentary legislature, the government and presidency – 
                                                 
14 See E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, “Globalization, Civil Society and 
Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses”, Citizenship Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 2003, pp. 219-233. 
15 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “The Electoral Victory of Reformist Islamists in 
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are functioning democratically. Turkey’s democracy has matured and 
deepened. Reforms recently undertaken have been addressing long-criticised 
aspects of the country’s political system, particularly the role of the military 
in politics, respect for human rights, cultural and minority rights and the 
judicial system. Yet while in legislative and institutional terms a lot has been 
achieved, there is still much to be done regarding implementation.  
For example, in the field of torture and ill-treatment by the police and in 
penal establishments, there are still legislative measures to be taken, the most 
significant of which are the lifting of the statute of limitations for such 
crimes, removal of law enforcement officials from active duty pending the 
outcome of investigations and abolishing the practice of giving a copy of 
medical reports to security officers. Annulment of Article 159 of the Penal 
Code and a comprehensive reform of the Law on Political Parties would 
constitute fundamental steps in further expanding the freedom of expression. 
With respect to the freedom of association, the draft Law on Associations 
introduces the legislative remedies for long-standing obstacles regarding 
government approval mechanisms and cooperation with foreign associations. 
The draft, however, does not touch upon the broad authority of the Interior 
Ministry and government officials to inspect premises and records of 
associations. This would require further legislative action in the next stages 
of the reform process. 
The issue of the protection of minorities is no longer a ‘taboo’ subject in 
Turkish political life. There are serious efforts to improve the lives of 
minorities in Turkey. Regarding non-Muslim minorities, the remaining 
problems in the field of property rights for community foundations and 
religious freedoms are resolvable through the correct and full application of 
the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. Other groups, particularly the 
Kurds, would benefit greatly from the extension of cultural rights such as the 
granting of local broadcasting rights, the introduction of optional language 
classes in public schools upon demand and the lifting of restrictions on 
expressions of cultural identity. In order to ensure effective implementation 
of such measures, it is also necessary to undertake a gradual shift from the 
traditional interpretation of the Turkish state to a redefined notion of political 
community, which requires a more inclusive and truly civic concept of 
citizenship. 
The guarantor of the rule of law and of reform process, the judiciary, has also 
undergone significant reforms, the most notable of which was the recent 
abolition of the State Security Courts that have in the past dealt with crimes 
against the state. Future reforms should focus on ensuring proper training and 
working conditions for the members of the judiciary, and ensuring its full 
independence from the executive. Implementation here is a major challenge 
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The process of change already extends throughout society, from the 
policemen who are actually now following the newly opened Kurdish 
languages courses, to the civil servants who revise the implementing 
regulations, the military which decreases its spending upon the request of the 
civilian power, the judges and the public prosecutors who give increasing 
references to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the majority of 
the citizenry who support the European integration process. Further training 
and education coupled with the continued and credible application of EU 
conditionality would secure the path of reform which in the eyes of many is 
as revolutionary as those achieved by Mustafa Kemal and his followers in the 
1920s and the 1930s. 
Given the pace of reforms in the last three years, the remaining legislative 
and institutional tasks could be achieved in a relatively short period of time 
by the Turkish authorities. What requires more energy and more time are 
efforts geared towards changing the mindsets of some public officials, in 
particular in the police force and in parts of the civilian and military 
bureaucracy. The behaviour of middle-level officials in Turkey as elsewhere, 
is conditioned by years of habit. Some of this behaviour was formed during 
the cold war and during periods of strong perceived threats to the Turkish 
state and Turkish society. Conditions today are very different, and the formal 
beginning of negotiations with the EU will provide further stability.  
In the case of Turkey, the progress achieved so far suggests that for the 
existing reforms to be entrenched and further proceed, the EU should follow 
the same path as for Romania and Bulgaria. It is generally recognised that the 
EU opened negotiations with these countries before they perfectly respected 
the Copenhagen political criteria, with still high degrees of corruption and 
malfunctioning in public administrations.
16 Also one may bear in mind the 
case of Latvia, where according to a report by the European Parliament in 
February 2004 there remain significant problems regarding the situation of 
its Russian minority even at the time of accession. The opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey on the grounds of ‘sufficient progress’, to be 
followed by regular assessments of compliance with the political criteria 
upon closing of a certain number of previously agreed chapters, is plausible, 
and in line with recent practice.  
In the case of Turkey, the adoption costs of the ultimate transformation that 
will occur on the path to eventual accession still seem to be perceived as high 
by some sections of society, in particular those who sense a possible loss of 
                                                 
16 Michael Emerson, Has Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria?’, 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 48, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 
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privilege or control.
17 The costs are perceived to arise from the pooling of 
sovereignty, decentralisation and increased recognition of multiple identities, 
which comprise the defining traits of European integration. These processes 
come into direct conflict with the authoritarian visions of nationalism based 
on a single all-encompassing identity, and lead the members of the anti-EU 
coalition to regard major political reform along these lines as a major threat 
to the unity of the nation.
18 Although such resistance was also present in a 
majority of the Central and East European countries, the levels are higher in 
the Turkish context due to ‘historical legacies and the peculiarities of her 
nation-building experience’.
19 There is much greater continuity in the 
existing socio-political structure in the Turkish case, making it more difficult 
to achieve some of the reforms from within the existing structures.
20  
A credible and consistent policy of stressing the common European norms is 
thus necessary to empower reformist elements in Turkish society. In cases 
where the incentive of membership offered by the EU requires the adoption 
of principles perceived as threatening for some privileged groups, the only 
means for the EU and Turkish reformers to bring about change are through 
direct democracy promotion and mobilisation at both elite and the mass 
level. As an example, this indeed worked in the case of Slovakia, in 
overcoming the resistance of the Mečiar leadership.
21 In addition, the EU 
also needs to continue offering aid and assistance to pro-democratic forces in 
Turkish society and to build transnational networks for change. Close and 
direct links with civil society and the reformist forces will help accelerate 
further progress. Determined attempts to change the perceptions of parts of 
the elite and to stress the security and prosperity-enhancing nature of the 
reforms, would also prove beneficial. All these measures would be helpful in 
fostering ‘socialisation’ into common European norms and values.  
                                                 
17 Frank Schimmelfennig et al., “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The 
Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2003.  
18 Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the 
State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, 
No. 1, 2003, pp. 9-34. 
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20 See Nils Muiznieks and Ilze Brands Kehris, “The European Union, 
Democratization, and Minorities in Latvia”, in Paul J. Kubicek (ed.), The 
European Union and Democratization, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 31-55.  
21 See D. Kevin Krause, “The Ambivalent Influence of the European Union on 
Democratization in Slovakia”, in Paul J. Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and 
Democratization, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 56-86. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | 25 
 
We conclude with a suggestion based on two words – fairness and 
objectivity. For the decision about Turkey’s readiness for the full accession 
negotiations to be taken fairly, it has to have an objective basis, which can 
only mean the capacity and willingness of Turkey to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria. Turkey’s place in Europe should not be based on religious or 
geographical references. Instead, Turkey’s identity and its compatibility with 
the Europeans norms of democracy and economic modernisation should be 
judged on the basis of an objective, historical and analytical reading of 
modern Turkey.  
The history of modern Turkey since 1923 has been one of modernisation and 
democratisation. However, this history has had, and continues to have, its 
problems in linking together modernity and democracy. Yet Turkey’s 
profound political identity as a secular parliamentary democracy appears 
indeed to be compatible with European norms of democracy and liberal 
economy. That is evidenced in the fact that the more Turkey has attempted to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria, the more it has consolidated its democracy and 
made its modernity liberal, plural and multi-cultural. Turkey has achieved 
this in a short period not only because of the strong political will to do so, but 
also because it had already established the institutions and norms of 
democracy and modernity. 
In this sense, we suggest that, rather than catering to culturalist and 
essentialist discourses prevalent in Europe, which privilege religion and 
geography over universal norms of democracy and a rules-based market 
economy, the principle of fairness and objectivity should be the basis of the 
EU’s decision about Turkey. Fairness and objectivity have the potential to 
create a reciprocal relationship between Turkey and the EU, in which both 
parties have mutual benefits. While accepting Turkey as a full member of the 
EU would demonstrate that the process of European integration and its 
enlargement operates on the basis of universal norms rather than religion or 
geography, the project of Europeanisation in Turkey makes a significant 
contribution to the process of democratic consolidation and societal 
modernisation.  With its secular modernity and the Muslim cultural traditions 
of the majority of its population, Turkey can contribute to the reshaping of 
the political identity of Europe as a multi-cultural space governed by the 
universal norms of democracy and a modern socially-caring market 
economy. With the strengthening of such a political identity, Europe will for 
its part, help reshape international relations in the direction of more 
democratic world governance, which our extremely dangerous post-
September 11
th world today needs more than ever.  
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Chapter 3 
Justice and Home Affairs
∗ 
t is only in the last two years that Turkey has started to focus its attention 
on justice and home affairs (JHA) issues, with adoption of the second 
Action Plan in March 2003, followed by the revised National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which took additional steps towards 
harmonisation in the area. The Turkish government had already in June 2002 
formed a Task Force composed of representatives from the military, Ministry 
of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary of Customs and the 
Secretariat General for European Union Affairs. Working groups within this 
Task Force were set up to start legislative scrutiny, arrange for studies as 
well as study visits with respect to border protection, irregular migration, the 
Schengen visa regime and asylum.
22 Since then, the Task Force has produced 
Strategy Reports in these areas that were in turn negotiated and discussed 
with the European Commission in Ankara. Subsequently, the government 
prepared proposals for twinning projects prepared in these areas, with 
training programmes and resources for administrative capacity-building 
financed by the EU. A joint EU-Turkey consultative mechanism has also 
been put into place to oversee the harmonisation process.  
Subsequent to the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EC-
Turkey Association Council of 11 April 2000, set up eight subcommittees 
under the Association Committee,
23 one of which deals with JHA policies. 
This subcommittee has met five times.
24 The meetings have been forums 
during which views are exchanged and Commission officials raise questions 
concerning legislative screening and progress with respect to work on 
harmonisation.  
                                                 
∗ This chapter draws on the longer report by Joanna Apap, Sergio Carrera and 
Kemal Kirişci, Turkey in the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, EU-
Turkey Working Paper No. 3,  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August 2004.  
22 The European Commission provided considerable expert assistance to the 
working groups, through an existing “unallocated institution building” project. 
Administrative Cooperation and study visits were organised for Turkish officials 
to Germany, Poland and Finland as best practice member states with the 
assistance of the European Commission.  
23 Decision No 3/2000 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 11 April 2000 
on the establishment of Association Committee subcommittees (2000/378/EC). 
24 These meetings were held on 6-7 March 2001, 2-3 July 2001, 20-21
 March 
2002, 19 June 2002 and 15 December 2003. 
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3.1  External border protection and migration control 
Turkey has 2,949 km of land borders and 8,330 km of sea borders. An 
important proportion of the land borders are characterised by mountainous 
terrain. Traditionally, the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian borders were porous and 
particularly vulnerable to smuggling and banditry well into the 1970s. 
Subsequently, in the 1980s and 1990s, these borders became conduits for 
PKK terrorists operating out of neighbouring countries. As a result, they 
have been heavily militarised and a good part of the Syrian border is mined. 
However, a significant improvement in relations between Syria and Turkey 
over the last year has culminated in a decision early in 2004 to start to 
remove the mine fields. It is now in particular the Iranian border that is 
vulnerable to irregular migration. A large proportion of illegal transit 
migrants usually are smuggled into Turkey across this border. It is also via 
this border that most of the asylum seekers arrive in Turkey. An important 
proportion of asylum applications in Turkey are lodged in the city of Van 
near the Iranian border. The Iraqi border on the other hand has seen two 
major mass influxes of refugees. In 1988 subsequent to the Halapja incidents, 
close to 60,000 Kurdish Iraqis sought refuge in Turkey followed by another 
almost 450,000 after the end of the first Gulf War. A very large proportion of 
these refugees eventually returned to Iraq.  
On the other hand, the Soviet border until the end of the cold war was tightly 
sealed with minimal movement of people. Currently, the border with Georgia 
and Azerbaijan’s Nakichevan province is open and lively, while the one with 
Armenia that is separated by a river remains politically and physically 
closed. During the cold war, the Bulgarian border too was tightly controlled 
and heavily fortified on both sides. However, subsequent to the collapse of 
the communist regime in Bulgaria, relations between the two countries 
improved very quickly. By the mid-1990, both countries had reached 
agreements for the demilitarisation of the border regions accompanied by 
efforts to de-mine the border. Currently, the Bulgarian border is an extremely 
busy border as Bulgaria constitutes the main transit path for Turkey’s 
commercial relations, as well as for the seasonal movements of Turkish 
immigrants in Europe. The border with Greece from the early 1960s had 
become tightly controlled too, with militarised no-go zones on both sides of 
the border as the relations between the two countries deteriorated. However, 
since relations between the two countries entered a period of rapprochement 
in 1999 the border has started to be demilitarised and traffic, both 
commercial and private, has increased significantly. 
Turkey has also an exceptionally long sea border. The Aegean is a 
particularly difficult sea to control because of the nature of the coast and the 
large numbers of islands that dot the sea. This provides an ideal environment 
for illegal migrants trying to make it to Europe. They attempt to use the 28 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
multitude of little ports and isolated coves along the coast to catch a passage 
to the Greek islands with the help of human smugglers. The Aegean is also a 
rough sea which explains why occasionally boats overloaded with illegal 
migrants sink and tragedies occur.
25 The Mediterranean Sea, itself is a major 
conduit between the Afro-Asian world and the European Union for the 
movement of illegal migrants. However, compared to the Aegean Sea, the 
Turkish coast along the Mediterranean Sea is relatively easier to control and 
incidents of human smuggling and accidents involving boats carrying illegal 
migrants are much less frequent. The Black Sea coast of Turkey does not 
appear to be used for human smuggling and illegal migration purposes.  
The east and southeastern land borders of Turkey to a depth of 50 kilometres 
is controlled by the land forces of the Turkish military except for a short 
stretch near the city of Van that is controlled by the Gendarmerie.
26 They are 
responsible for the actual patrolling and the physical protection of the 
borders against infringements. The coast guard on the other hand is 
responsible for patrolling the sea coast. It is the coast guard that is 
responsible for detecting, tracking and interdicting boats carrying illegal 
migrants.
27 The Interior Ministry’s General Directorate of Security is 
responsible for managing 103 border-crossings while the Under Secretariat 
of Customs processes formalities with goods. 
Turkey has long been known as a country of emigration. Yet, Turkey has, 
like the Ottoman Empire, a long history of immigration. Government 
statistics indicate that from 1923 to 1997, more than 1.6 million persons 
immigrated to Turkey.
28 The founders of the modern Turkish state were 
concerned about creating a homogenous sense of national identity in an 
                                                 
25 For a detailed study of transit migration and smuggling of migrants with 
specific coverage of the personal experiences of irregular migrants and the 
special place of the Aegean Sea, see A. İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey, 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva (2003). 
26 The Turkish Ministry of Interior, the General Directorate of Security (police 
forces) carry out the passport controls as well as the entry-exit checks in the 
country. According to estimations provided by the Turkish Ministry of Interior, 
national police at the border gates (land border, sea and airport border gates) 
number about 10,000.  
27 The Coast Guard is equipped with 80 coastal guard boats and 341 Contour 
boats. Between 2000 and 2003, Turkish authorities with the assistance of the 
Coast Guard intercepted 118 boats carrying illegal migrants. Statistics obtained 
from the Foreigners Department of the MOI. 
28 K. Kirişci, “Coerced Immigrants: Refugees of Turkish Origins since 1945”, 
International Migration, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996.  JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS | 29 
 
otherwise ethnically and culturally diverse country.
29 Exclusive priority was 
given to encouraging and accepting immigrants who were either Muslim 
Turkish speakers, or who could easily melt into a Turkish identity such as 
Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks and Tatars from the Balkans. The 
period of government-supported immigration into Turkey lasted until about 
the early 1970s. However the last major wave of immigration occurred 
unexpectedly in 1989, when close to 310,000 Turks and Pomaks were 
expelled from Bulgaria by the Communist regime. While a third of these 
refugees returned soon after the regime change in Bulgaria in 1990, the rest 
acquired Turkish citizenship. With Bulgarian membership in the EU 
expected by 2007, many are now returning to reclaim their Bulgarian 
citizenship.  
Since the early 1990s, Turkey has been witnessing new forms of 
immigration. These include students from a variety of countries as well as 
nationals of EU countries who have officially sanctioned presence in Turkey 
with proper residence and work permits. EU nationals include individuals 
engaged in professional activities and their families particularly in Istanbul, 
as well as European retirees in some of the Mediterranean resorts. They, too, 
constitute a relatively new phenomenon in terms of immigration into Turkey, 
and their numbers are estimated at 100,000-120,000.
30  
A critical aspect of border protection and control for the EU is the problem of 
illegal migration. The arrival of large numbers of irregular migrants into 
Italy, France and the UK in the late 1990s enhanced the urgency to act at the 
EU level, even before the events of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004. 
Turkey has attracted considerable attention as a transit country for illegal 
migrants as a point of departure for boats carrying these smugglers. 
There is also a form of irregular immigration involving nationals of 
neighbouring countries and transit migrants. Turkey allows nationals of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and the 
Central Asian republics to enter the country quite freely either without visas 
or with visas that can easily be obtained at airports and other entry points. A 
large number of these people are involved in small-scale trade.
31 However, 
                                                 
29 K. Kirişci, “Disaggregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, July 2000. 
30 B. Kaiser, “Life Worlds of EU Immigrants in Turkey”, in Emrehan 
Zeybekoğlu and Bo Johansson (eds), Migration and Labour in Europe: Views 
from Turkey and Sweden, İstanbul: Şefik Matbaası, 2003. 
31 See İçduygu as well as S. Erder, “Global Flows of Huddles: The Case of 
Turkey” in Zeybekoğlu and Johansson (eds), Migration and Labour in Europe: 
Views from Turkey and Sweden, İstanbul: Şefik Matbaası, 2003. 30 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
some overstay their visas and illegally work as household help, sex workers 
and labourers, especially on construction sites and in the tourism sector. 
According to government statistics there were 477,849 such persons 
apprehended between 1995 and June 2004. Few of these individuals actually 
attempt to go to Europe via Turkey. If anything, Turkish officials have 
argued that the liberal Turkish visa policy and the possibility for many 
nationals of these countries in the 1990s to engage in suitcase trading 
relieved the pressure on EU countries from the influx of migrants from these 
countries.  
Starting in the mid-1990s, there was a growth in the number of irregular 
migrants using Turkey as a transit route. These people were mostly nationals 
of neighbouring countries in the Middle East such as Iraq, Iran and Syria, as 
well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Turkish government came under 
massive pressure from a number of EU member countries to curb this transit 
migration. In accordance with the Association Partnership (AP), Turkey is 
expected to introduce a series of measures to combat irregular migration, 
including the construction of reception centres and signing readmission 
treaties with countries of origin, and to start negotiating a readmission treaty 
between Turkey and the EU.
32 Furthermore, Turkey in 2001 joined the 
Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders 
and Immigration (CIREFI). Since then it has been sharing data with this 
Centre and participates in bi-annual meetings of the Centre. It also 
cooperates with the Early Warning System with respect to sudden surges in 
illegal migration movements and forged or stolen documents. The High 
Level Working Group (HLWG) on Turkey completed its Strategy Report to 
Support the Migration Management Action Plan in December 2003, laying 
out objectives and tasks. Twinning projects, one on asylum and immigration 
and another on combating trafficking in human beings, have been signed 
involving Austria, Denmark, Germany and United Kingdom.  
The number of irregular migrants apprehended by the authorities was 
steadily increasing until their numbers peaked in 2000 with almost 95,000 
                                                 
32 The Accession Strategy for Turkey under Co-operation in the field of Justice 
and home affairs notes “Continue to strengthen the fight against illegal 
immigration and negotiate a readmission agreement with the European 
Community”, p. 17. On the other hand the JHA Council meeting of 21-22 April 
2002 that approved the criteria for readmission and new readmission treaties 
“asked the European Commission to submit separate draft negotiation mandates 
for readmission agreements with China, Turkey, Algeria and Albania”; see the 
Criteria for the identification of third countries with which new readmission 
agreements need to be negotiated – Draft Council Conclusions, Council of the 
European Union, 7990/02, Brussels, 16 April 2002, approved by the JHA 
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arrests. Since then the trend has turned steadily downwards, apparently 
reflecting the efforts of the Turkish authorities to stem the flow of illegal 
transit migration. Furthermore, the number of irregular migrants apprehended 
by the Italian authorities and alleged to have reached the Italian coast via 
Turkey has fallen from 6,093 in 2001 to 2,117 in 2002 and 177 in 2003. 
These statistics also indicate that between 2000 and 2003, 157 ships carrying 
irregular migrants were intercepted, 118 of which were stopped by the 
Turkish authorities. The 2003 Progress Report does indeed acknowledge that 
the trend in illegal migration via Turkey has shown a decrease.
33  
Part of the wider problem of irregular migration in Turkey has also been that 
of trafficked persons – especially women. Turkey has become both a transit 
and destination country for prostitution by foreign nationals. Some of the 
women involved in this trade are actually trafficked.
34 In December 2000, 
Turkey was among the first group of countries to sign the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime and its two additional protocols 
including the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking.
35 More 
importantly as part of the August 2002 reform package, the government 
introduced new articles to the Penal Code criminalising human smuggling 
and trafficking.
36 Most strikingly the Interior Ministry officials together with 
the Gendarmerie were able to make arrangements with a non-governmental 
organisation, Human Resources Development Foundation (Insan 
Kaynaklarını Geliştirme Vakfı-IKGV), and the Directorate General of the 
Status of Woman to provide social assistance to victims of trafficking until 
their return to their countries of origin could be arranged. This is a 
commendable example of cooperation between government and civil society.  
In an effort to prevent the abuse of the acquisition of Turkish nationality by 
marriage, the government amended Article 5 of the Citizenship Law in June 
2003 and introduced the requirement of a minimum of three years of 
probation before Turkish nationality can be obtained. Previously, the law 
permitted women to acquire Turkish nationality automatically. This had led 
to considerable abuse.  
The EU is expecting Turkey to adopt a series of measures to enhance the 
protection of its borders. Most importantly the EU wants to see the 
                                                 
33 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf. 
34 For an extensive and thorough study of this problem see S. Erder and S. 
Kaska,  Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Women: The Case of Turkey, 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2003. 
35 Official Gazette, 29 March 2003, No. 25052. 
36 Data obtained from www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/istatistik/suc_turu.htm (on 2 July 
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replacement of the current border control and management system with an 
integrated civilian-professional unit with a capability to detect forged and 
false documents. The strategy foreseen in the NPAA on external borders 
needs to be highlighted. The Task Force on Asylum, Immigration and 
External Borders for the preparation of the overall strategy for alignment 
with the EU acquis on border management finished its work in the year 
2003. The outcome foresees the creation of a new body wanted by the EU 
within the Ministry of Interior for all border protection issues, including 
coast guards, composed of non-military, professional law enforcement 
officials. The strategy equally identifies the key legislative and institutional 
amendments, as well as infrastructure and training programmes, under which 
a proper alignment with the Schengen acquis would take place. The 
European Council at its meetings in Feira in June 2000 and Göteborg in June 
2001 stressed the importance of any applicant countries’ capacity to 
implement and enforce the acquis communautaire. The Council further 
emphasised that this goal involves fundamental efforts by every applicant in 
strengthening and reforming their administrative and judicial systems. 
3.2  Readmission agreements and asylum
37 
Turkey is also expected by the EU to sign readmission agreements with 
neighbouring and other countries that are sources of illegal migration. So far 
Turkey has signed such agreements with Syria in 2001, Kyrgyzstan in 2003 
and Romania in 2004.
38 Under the agreement with Syria, Turkey has 
returned to Syria 794 illegal migrants and readmitted to Turkey 18 migrants. 
It is negotiating agreements with Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, 
Libya, Lebanon, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Turkey has proposed to negotiate readmission agreements with 15 other 
countries, but without responses.
39 The negotiation of so many agreements 
simultaneously is a taxing exercise, especially since the partner governments 
have little incentive to cooperate. 
                                                 
37 Analysis in this section is based on interviews with officials from the Ministry 
of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and internal documents. 
38 These agreements were published in the Official Gazette: Syria, Law 4901, 
Official Gazette, 17
th June 2001, No. 25148; Greece, Law 3914, Official Gazette, 
24 April 2002, No. 25148; and Kyrgyzstan, Law 5097, Official Gazette, 17
th 
February 2004, No. 25376. The one with Romania has not yet been ratified and 
put into force. 
39 As of June 2004, these countries are: Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, 
Georgia, India, Israel, Iran, Morocco, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and 
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In addition, in March 2004, Turkey reluctantly accepted to start to negotiate 
an agreement with the EU itself. However, officials have expressed 
resentment with respect to the level of pressure they have come under to start 
these negotiations. They fear that Turkey will become a dumping ground for 
unwanted immigrants by the EU, given the great difficulties in negotiating 
agreements with many source countries of illegal migrants. They fear a 
situation where the EU would be able to send back illegal migrants to 
Turkey, while Turkey would become a dumping ground in the absence of the 
means of ensuring their return to their countries of origin.  
In the meantime Turkey did sign in November 2001 a bilateral readmission 
protocol with Greece. Since the agreement came into force, Greece has 
provided Turkey with a list of more than 14,101 illegal migrants that they 
would have liked to send back to Turkey. Of the 2,416 accepted by Turkey, 
Greece handed 1,006 persons, including 270 Iranians and 736 Iraqis, who 
subsequently were repatriated to Iran and Iraq.
40 The Turkish side asked 753 
illegal migrants of 28 nationalities to be readmitted by Greece, of which only 
19 Somalis have been accepted. The problems of implementing readmission 
agreements are serious, even where it involves two neighbouring countries 
with reasonably good relations. 
Turkey, like its predecessor the Ottoman Empire, has long been a country of 
asylum. Turkish asylum policy is currently based on the Asylum Regulation 
of November 1994
41 and the geographical limitation with which it originally 
signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
42 according 
to which Turkey grants full refugee status only to asylum seekers fleeing 
‘events’ in Europe. However, it does extend temporary protection to asylum 
seekers coming from elsewhere, mostly Iran and Iraq. In accordance with the 
                                                 
40 The readmission and repatriation of Iraqis were suspended between when the 
war in Iraq started, March 2003, and June 2003. 
41 “The Regulation on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Mass Influx 
and Foreigners Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to 
Seek Asylum from a Third Country” Official Gazette, 30 November 1994, No. 
22217. 
42 Turkey signed the Convention with a geographical and a time limitation as 
expressed in Article 1.B(1)(a). Turkey lifted the time limitation with the adoption 
of the 1967 Protocol. These instruments were published and became part of 
national law with Official Gazette, 5 September 1961, No. 10898 and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees in July 1968 published in 
Official Gazette, 14 October 1968, No. 13026. 34 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
Settlement Law of 1934, immigration and refuge to Turkey is restricted only 
to individuals of “Turkish descent and culture”.
43  
As Turkey prepares for pre-accession, there are a number of challenges.
44 
For example, Turkey is required to lift the ‘geographical limitation’ to the 
1951 Convention, which Turkey has committed itself to do so. However the 
issue is very sensitive. The nightmare scenario of Turkish officials is that the 
‘geographical limitation’ would be lifted before there was any assurance of 
Turkey’s EU membership. A related issue is burden-sharing. Turkish 
officials are concerned that Turkey because of its geographical location risks 
becoming a buffer zone or a dumping ground for the EU’s unwanted asylum 
seekers and refugees, since Turkey is often the ‘first country of asylum’, 
which is crucial for the determination of responsibility.
45 Turkish officials 
would expect to see burden-sharing mechanisms beyond what the current 
Refugee Fund has to offer.
46 The balance between protecting Europe from 
illegal migration and the protection of the right to asylum is going to be a 
critical test of the credibility for the EU itself in Turkey as well as in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood.
47  
3.3 Visa  policy 
One of the areas that will have to experience drastic changes if Turkish law 
and practice is to be harmonised with the Schengen acquis is Turkey’s visa 
policy. The current visa policy of Turkey has three broad categories of entry 
into Turkey: first countries whose the nationals can enter Turkey without 
visas, second those who must obtain visas from Turkish consulates prior to 
arriving in Turkey and third those who can buy a visa at the frontier or port 
of entry, subject to a simple security check, known as ‘sticker visa’ (bandrol 
in Turkish). This latter practice is counter to EU/Schengen rules.  
                                                 
43 Official Gazette, 14
th June 1934, No. 2733. This law has since been heavily 
amended and currently there is a new settlement draft law at the Turkish 
parliament but the basic articles that define who can be an immigrant and refugee 
remain unchanged. 
44 For a discussion of this issue see Kirişci (2003). 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18.2.2003 published in Official 
Journal of the European Union, 25.2.2003, L 50/1. 
46 Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Refugee Fund 
COM(1999) 686, 14.12.1999. Council Decision 2000/596/EC on 28 September 
2000 adopting a proposal establishing the European Refugee Fund. 
47 Tampere Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999 called for an 
“absolute respect of the right to seek asylum” and agreed that the development of 
the Common European Asylum System would be based on “the full and 
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The current Turkish visa policy is very much the legacy of the late Turgut 
Özal, a former prime minister and president,
48 who believed in the virtues of 
functionalism and interdependence in international relations. As the cold war 
started to come to an end in the late 1980s, he advocated the idea of the 
Black Sea economic cooperation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union there 
also emerged a group of new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia with 
close linguistic and cultural ties to Turkey. The ‘sticker visa’ practice 
evolved against this background. Özal’s foreign policy was also marked by 
his determination to expand Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. In an 
effort to draw tourism and investment especially from Gulf countries and 
Saudi Arabia, visa requirements were relaxed, as also later for business 
people from the member states of the Economic Cooperation Organisation 
(ECO).
49 
This liberalisation of the visa system encouraged the development of an 
informal import and export activity known as ‘suitcase trade’. This took the 
form of large numbers of people, firstly from Russia, but also from the 
Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania, Moldova and Central Asian 
republics, travelling to Turkey by chartered planes or ships, to sell and buy 
their ‘suitcase’ full of products. It is estimated that this trade rose from about 
$ 4-5 billion a year during the early 1990s to a peak of $10 billion in 1995.
50 
The economic recession in Russia in 1998 adversely affected this trade while 
the trade involving East European countries fell to a trickle with EU pre-
accession. The volume of suitcase trade has roughly levelled at $3 billion a 
year. While ‘suitcase trade’ has now diminished in importance, regular 
tourism business with the former Soviet states has steadily grown. Russians 
in particular have become the second largest group of tourists entering 
Turkey, and are recognised as high-spenders. It is also generally accepted 
that Turkey’s flexible visa policy has encouraged business contacts and 
reciprocal business investments.  
                                                 
48 For a comparative analysis of Turgut Özal’s foreign policy and traditional 
Turkish foreign policy see S. Özel, “Of Not Being a Lone Wolf: Geography, 
Domestic Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East” in G. Kemp and 
J.G. Stein (eds), Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995. See also W. Hale, Turkish Foreign 
Policy, 1774-2000, London: Cass, 2000, pp. 164-165 and p. 205. 
49 The member countries of ECO are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
50 Figures obtained from M. Eder et al., Redefining Contagion: The Political 
Economy of the Suitcase Trade Between Turkey and Russia, International 
Research Exchange (IREX), Black and Caspian Sea Research Programme, Final 
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Table 3.1 Entry into Turkey of persons from the former Soviet Union, 1964 to 
2003 
   1964 1980  1990  1996  2003 
Russia -  -  -  1,235,290  1,285,825 
Central Asia                
Kazakhstan -  -  -  31,373  65,748 
Kyrgyzstan -  -  -  8,052  14,185 
Tajikistan -  -  -  3,087  3,591 
Turkmenistan -  -  -  5,035  16,685 
Uzbekistan -  -  -  13,558  19,527 
Subtotal -  -  -  61,105  119,736 
S. Caucasus                
Armenia -  -  -  5,345 23,596 
Azerbaijan  -  -   -   100,249  173,165 
Georgia  -   -  -   116,709  158,750 
Subtotal  -   -  -   222,303  355,511 
Western CIS                
Belarus  -   -  -   474  30,056 
Moldova  -   -  -   8,290  54,137 
Ukraine  -   -  -   93,794  214,415 
Subtotal  -     -  -   102,558  298,608 
Total (FSU)  414  40,015  222,537  1,764,556    2,059,680 
World total   229,347  1,057,364  2,301,250 8,538,864  13,461,420 
Source: Compiled from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of the Turkish 
Ministry of the Interior and State Statistical Institute, Annual Reports. 
The politics of the cold war meant that Turkey lost contact with communities 
in the Soviet Union, with which it had close historical and cultural ties, such 
as Turkish-speaking communities, Tatars, Azeris, Circasians, etc. As Table 
3.1 reveals, in 1964 there were only 414 entries from the Soviet Union into 
Turkey. By 1970 the figure had increased to a still modest 40,015. The 
unwinding of the cold war helped to increase contacts and 1990 saw more 
than 220,000 entries. But then after the introduction of the ‘sticker visa’ 
system in the early 1990s, the number of entries from the former Soviet 
Union soared, reaching a peak of 2.8 million entries out of a world total of 
8.5 million. For Turkey, the collapse of the Soviet Union had opened up a JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS | 37 
 
vast world from the ‘Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall’ economically, 
socially and culturally. 
If the Schengen visa system were rigidly applied, Russian citizens (including 
many belonging to ethnic groups with cultural affiliations to Turkey) may 
well be the hardest hit, since reaching Turkish representations within Russia 
will be hindered by the vastness of the country.  
The removal of travel restrictions has also helped to increase contacts 
between Turkey and the Balkan countries. The lifting of the visa requirement 
for Greek nationals in 1988 resulted in a huge increase from minimal levels 
in the 1960s and 1970s, reaching 368,425 movements in 2003. Significant 
increases also took place across most Balkan countries, with the total rising 
from a mere 60,000 in 1980 to almost two million in 2003.  
The Middle East is the only neighbouring region of Turkey where the 
implementation of a flexible visa system does not appear to have made a big 
difference, with the exception of Syria and Iran. Turkey and Syria have long 
had a policy of allowing their nationals from the border region a degree of 
flexible access to each other’s territory within a 50 kilometre zone to pursue 
family business, etc. with an ‘administrative letter’ issued by local 
authorities. There has been a similar story with Iran, but on a much bigger 
scale, with almost half a million entries from Iran in 2003, which is not an 
insignificant foreign policy, as well as commercial matter, from the point of 
view of reducing the isolation of Iranian society from the West. See Table 
3.2.  
Yet, there are also downsides to this flexible visa policy. Labour unions as 
well complain about the increase in the number of illegal workers in 
Turkey.
51 A cold reminder of the consequences of flexible border control 
arrangements came after the two terrorist attacks in Istanbul in November 
2003, with subsequent police investigations revealing that the terrorists and 
their aides had travelled frequently to Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Russia. 
                                                 
51 There were reports that in Istanbul alone, there were 750,000 illegal workers 
(see Radikal, 9 February 2001). Under pressure from the unions and the public 
the then Minister of Labour Affairs and Social Security, Yaşar Okutan argued 
that illegal workers were taking away jobs from Turkish citizens and that a 
legislation was being drafted to introduce fines (Radikal, 30
 December 2001). On 
21 December 2002, Radikal also reported that a new law was being drafted that 
would institute fines and put the number of illegal foreign workers at one 
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Table 3.2 Entry of persons into Turkey from the Middle East and the 
Balkans, 1964 to 2003 
* Includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
** Statistics for Serbia & Montenegro are sometimes referred to as the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. 
Source: Compiled from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of the Turkish 
Ministry of the Interior and State Statistical Institute, Annual Reports.  
 
The Accession Strategy for Turkey requires Turkey to adjust its visa policy 
to the standards of the Schengen visa regime and to adopt the Schengen 
negative list. The NPAA provides a schedule for the adoption of the relevant 
EU acquis by the end of 2005. In this respect, Turkey aims to abolish visa- 
free travel for those countries that are on EU’s negative list by the end of 
2004. Turkey started to align its practice with the EU in September 2002, and 
   1964  1980  1990  1996  2003 
Middle 
East                
Iran 12,796  42,082  219,958  379,003  484,269 
Iraq 3,919  14,046  13,372  14,137  29,940 
Syria 9,996  26,384  113,959  92,033 154,108 
Gulf states*  -  -  43,088  40,029  43,503 
Pakistan 1,961 4,800 7,347  12,410  12,336 
Subtotal 28,672  87,312  397,724  537,612  724,156 
Balkans                
Albania -  -  1,924  20,971  32,682 
Bosnia -  -    -  12,115  35,119 
Bulgaria 693  26,523    -  139,648  1,007,535 
Greece 3,042  19,477  203,720 147,553 368,425 
Macedonia -  -  -  41,269  117,819 
Romania -  -  352,034  191,203  184,182 
Serbia-
Mont.  - -  -  44,600  186,423** 
Yugoslavia 5,661  13,817  296,843  -  - 
Sub Total  9,396  59,817  854,521  597,359  1,932,185  
         
Total above   38,068   147,129   1,252,245  1,134,971   2,656,341 
World total  229,347  1,057,364 2,301,250  8,538,864  13,461,420 JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS | 39 
 
currently is short of matching the negative list with six countries. These 
countries are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Morocco 
and Tunisia. Turkey is committed to complete the process for all the 
remaining countries except Bosnia and Macedonia by the end of the year. 
There is a reluctance to terminate the visa-free arrangements with these two 
countries because of close historical and cultural ties with these two 
countries including the presence of Turkish minorities.  
Turkey is expected to end the ‘sticker visa’ practice in the near future. 
Currently, Turkey allows for the nationals of 30 countries to benefit from this 
practice. The EU considers this practice as one that seriously undermines 
effective border control. Instead the EU requires Turkey either to adopt a 
visa-free regime for those countries that are not on the negative list of the 
EU, or alternatively introduce the practice of obtaining visas from Turkish 
consulates in the country of origin.  
Turkey is also expected to renew its passports and introduce features to 
Turkish passports to prevent them from being forged. Currently, Turkish 
passports are considered to be particularly vulnerable to forgery. The 
government submitted to the Turkish Parliament a draft law in January 2004 
that aims to amend the Passport Law No. 5682 of 15 July 1950, to be able to 
meet Turkey’s commitments arising from the NPAA and align it with the 
requirements of the EU acquis.  
Many officials see the introduction of the new measures required by the EU 
as positive for improving border control and security. However, unless the 
EU changes its policy, Turkey will become the only country that will be 
implementing the EU’s negative list while being on the list itself.
52 Turkish 
business people and students bitterly complain that these restrictions put 
them at a disadvantage in relation to their counterparts in the EU. Student 
organisations point to the inconsistency in the processing of visa applications 
among EU consulates and the administrative difficulties raised. Business 
people report that they feel unfair competition from their EU counterparts 
who are able to travel to Turkey freely. The EU practice of lifting or easing 
of visa requirements for the nationals of candidate countries that have 
adopted the EU acquis  and practice with respect to visas has not gone 
unnoticed by Turkish officials and politicians, most strikingly in the case of 
neighbouring Bulgaria. After the EU lifted visa requirements for Bulgarian 
                                                 
52 A prominent international judge and professor of international law Rona 
Aybay reported complaints about a practice by the British and German 
Consulates of stamping the note “visa rejected” in some passports of Turkish 
nationals and argued that this could constitute a violation of international law and 
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citizens,
53 the Turkish government lift the visa requirement for Bulgarian 
nationals in June 2001, leading to a tripling of entries from Bulgaria from 
380,000 in 1996 to over a million in 2003. 
There are also costs attached with the adoption of the Schengen visa regime. 
The introduction of visa requirements will impose a major administrative and 
financial burden on Turkey. As already noted, during the course of 2003 
there were approximately 1.3 million Russians and half a million Iranian 
nationals entering Turkey. Issuing visas for such a large number of people 
will present a major burden on Turkey’s representations abroad as both 
countries are currently on the Schengen negative list. However, the greatest 
consequence of the new visa system would be that it may lead to a significant 
fall in the number of people coming to Turkey.  
Lastly, the adoption by Turkey of the Schengen acquis on visa requirements 
may well aggravate the problem of irregular migration into Turkey as well as 
through it. This could be the case for example for Chechens who currently 
are able to enter Turkey without difficulties, but who face widespread human 
rights violations in their homeland. A similar case could be made for Iranian 
nationals. Iranians constitute the largest number of asylum applicants in 
Turkey.  
3.4 Policy  conclusions 
Looking ahead there are five key issues that are crucial to the Turkey-EU 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.  
Border control. Turkey should continue with its efforts to put into place a 
professional border control administration in close cooperation with the EU. 
A second generation of twinning projects could foster the exchange of border 
guards between Turkey and member states, or in due course with the 
proposed EU Border Management Agency. Such initiatives would also 
constitute an important confidence-building measure, besides being 
mechanisms for the exchange of expertise and know-how. Turkey also needs 
to continue its efforts to build up a capacity to detect and combat passport 
and document forgery. Further twinning projects could be applicable here 
too. In the long term, the EU should consider policies that would make it 
possible for the agents of the new border administration in Turkey to be 
seconded to spend time on existing EU borders and with the Border 
Management Agency when it becomes operational.  
Readmission Agreements. The EU is pushing for a readmission agreement to 
be concluded without delay. Turkey is concerned about signing such an 
agreement with the EU before it has readmission agreements in place with 
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those source countries for irregular immigrants who transit through Turkey. 
Nonetheless, after resisting signing readmission agreements with third 
countries and with the EU for some time, Turkey has now signed four 
agreements, and is negotiating many further agreements. Nevertheless, 
Turkey’s leverage on third countries in these negotiations is limited. There is 
a need for active support from the EU, which would be a valuable 
confidence-building measure between the EU and Turkey, and facilitate the 
conclusion of their mutual readmission agreement. The conclusion of a 
readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU should also be the 
occasion to clarify the prospects and criteria for easing and eventually lifting 
visa requirements on Turkish nationals. The EU should devise a facilitated 
Schengen visa system as soon as possible for priority categories of Turkish 
nationals, especially Turkish students and business people.  
Irregular migration and asylum. The legislative basis for a more effective 
policy to counteract illegal migration has been already put into place within 
the Turkish legal system, as acknowledged by the European Commission. 
However, the rights of asylum-seekers in this context are also a concern for 
EU officials. Turkey is being asked to offer protection to asylum-seekers 
more universally, as until now it offers protection only to asylum-seekers of 
certain nationalities. Turkey expects the EU, the UNHCR and non-
governmental organisations to develop a ‘burden-sharing’ mechanism in this 
context, which would encourage Turkey to lift the geographical limitations to 
its own policy. In the meantime, Turkey should continue with its efforts to 
train its various forces and bureaucracies dealing with irregular migration, to 
bring its performance in line with best practice. While developing its asylum 
law and taking efforts to mobilise support for ‘burden sharing’, Turkey needs 
to consider further measures that would allow the possibility for local 
integration for some of the recognised refugees. The securitisation of 
immigration issues in Europe and the pressure put on Turkey to combat 
illegal transit migration risks jeopardising the improvements being made in 
Turkish asylum policy. This could lead inadvertently to a paradoxical 
situation whereby the EU on the one hand assists in significantly improving 
in Turkey’s asylum practices, but on the other hand undermines these gains 
as potential asylum-seekers risk being deported without having their case 
fairly heard. Without a mechanism for burden-sharing in place, the main EU 
legislative provisions on asylum, which call for asylum applications to be 
treated by the first safe country of entry into the EU, may lead to Turkey 
becoming a ‘dumping ground’, rather than a member state sharing benefits 
and responsibilities equitably. 
Schengen rules and neighbourhood policy. The standard policy of the EU is 
to require all acceding states to apply the Schengen regime ‘in full’ upon 
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Schengen rules at its external frontier, although in a ‘two-step procedure’ it 
will become a full Schengen member with removal of internal frontier 
controls only at a later date following a positive evaluation by the EU 
Council. However, the Schengen acquis is not a static compendium of rules, 
but continues to evolve in a rather dynamic manner. This factor is crucial for 
Turkey.  
In particular there is a growing realisation within the EU of the need to make 
the system more ‘friendly’ and more ‘flexible’, especially for its new 
neighbours. The new external borders of the EU should not become a barrier 
or a new wall to social and cultural interchange, regional cooperation and 
trade. The adverse impact on Ukraine as a result of Poland and Slovakia 
suddenly becoming compliant with Schengen visa rules, with the number of 
border crossings of Ukrainians having been literally decimated in the last 
three years, is not an example the EU should expect Turkey to follow. 
Belatedly the EU now considers a proposed regulation to facilitate ‘local 
border traffic’ (within 50 km of frontiers), and the EU has also begun 
discussions with Russia and Ukraine with a view to a facilitated visa regime, 
with the long-term objective of abolishing visas. These important examples 
of the possible evolution of the Schengen system reinforce the case for the 
EU to work out a careful sequencing for Turkey’s compliance with the entire 
range of JHA policies. Full adoption of the EU/Schengen list of countries 
requiring visas should be completed rapidly, but the ‘sticker visa’ system at 
port of entry for certain countries need not be precipitously scrapped. There 
are also several examples of ‘flexible border practice’ designed to meet the 
specific needs of individual member states, for example for Greece in 
relation to Albania, Portugal in relation to Brazil, and Spain in relation to 
Morocco. For Turkey the system should find ways for the huge tourist and 
suitcase trade with its neighbours to continue (almost 2.5 million Russians, 
Ukrainians, other CIS citizens and Iranians now enter Turkey each year). 
One way of doing this would be to retain the current Turkish visa system of 
issuing visas at the border (the so-called ‘sticker visa’) in the immediate 
future, given that Turkey’s accession to the EU would in any case be unlikely 
to occur within a decade, and full membership of Schengen would take an 
additional number of years. New developments in security technology and in 
the Schengen system may allow the ‘sticker visa’ to become a more secure 
and safer regime, yet also be consistent with the EU’s efforts to surround 
itself with a ‘ring of friends’ under its European Neighbourhood Policy.  
Promoting mutual trust in EU-Turkey relations. Finally, all the above should 
contribute to the vital general objective of building ‘trust’ between Turkey 
and the EU, to replace the existing apprehension on the part of the EU to 
have Turkey’s eastern border as its external border. These concerns are often 
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standards in JHA as the rest of the EU. However the transformation that 
Turkey has gone through in its domestic as well as foreign policy is pointing 
to what Turkey is capable of achieving once the will is there and the EU 
engages Turkey positively. Both sides need to pay attention to ‘confidence-
building’ to be able to address some of the more sensitive aspects of border 
control harmonisation, such as asylum policy, combating irregular migration, 
readmission agreements and Schengen visa rules. The cooperation achieved 
so far is impressive, with Turkish officials from a wide range of government 
branches spending an unprecedented amount of time working with their 
counterparts from EU member countries and the European Commission. 
Turkish officials are beginning to see their EU counterparts as partners in 
addressing what are after all common problems. The change that Turkish 
membership will bring to the EU’s geography will be indeed a fundamental 
challenge. Turkey for its part is putting into place the administrative 
mechanism to take on the challenge. 
 
 44 | 
Chapter 4 
Foreign and Security Policy
∗ 
ven if Turkey begins accession negotiations in 2005, full membership 
would occur probably only around a decade later. Turkey needs to 
pass and implement key reforms and negotiate 31 chapters of the 
acquis. The EU needs to ratify and implement its Constitution and absorb at 
least 12 new member states. None of this excludes, however, that the EU and 
Turkey might begin to integrate their foreign policies in the pre-accession 
period. Such integration could both yield important benefits to Turkey and to 
the EU, and it could serve to accelerate Turkey’s membership into the Union.  
This process has already begun with Turkey’s association with the EU’s 
nascent security and defence policy (ESDP). But this is only a small 
beginning compared to the conceivable agenda. The intuitive reasons for this 
idea are twofold. First, Turkey’s neighbourhood has become the main source 
of the EU’s security concerns, as stated in the EU Security Strategy. EU-
Turkey integration in the foreign policy realm would also allow an extended 
reach of the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy. Second, Turkey 
offers several specific assets for helping the EU address its concerns and 
objectives, ranging from the concrete realities of location and logistics, 
through to matters of culture and ideology. In policy operational terms, 
Turkey has the role of geographic hub for regional cooperation, it becomes a 
secure energy transport hub for Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian oil and 
gas and it is well situated to become a forward base for the EU’s security and 
defence policies. Turkey also has valuable human resources to complement 
those of the EU for cooperation programmes, ranging from business know-
how to language skills relevant for its wider neighbourhood. 
4.1  Outline of the arguments 
Every enlargement of the EU has brought with it wider dimensions and 
capabilities for the pursuit of EU foreign policy interests and objectives. For 
example, the British brought an extended field for EU development aid, the 
Spanish and Portuguese strong interests in Latin America, the Nordic 
members brought forward a ‘northern dimension’ concept, and most recently 
the accession of Central and Eastern European countries triggered the new 
                                                 
∗ This chapter is based on Turkey as Bridgehead and Spearhead – Integrating 
EU and Turkish Foreign Policy, by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, EU-
Turkey Working Paper No. 1, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August 2004 (available at www.ceps.be). The authors are grateful for helpful 
conversations with many officials of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
although views expressed in this chapter are only attributable to the authors. 
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neighbourhood initiative. With Turkey’s accession, the EU’s new borders 
would reach Syria, Iraq, Iran as well as all three South Caucasus states. 
Turkey’s accession would potentially enhance the credibility of EU policies 
towards the wider set of Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans and 
Mediterranean regions. It would contribute to a rebalancing of the Union’s 
focus towards its southern and southeastern neighbourhood, which would be 
entirely in line with the EU’s emerging security strategy, since this is where 
the EU’s manifest security threats now come from.    
The EU’s first tentative steps in 2003 and 2004 towards the development of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy are directed at the EU’s new neighbours 
that are not foreseen to become future members. The thinking in EU 
institutions is to offer incentives to add credibility to EU economic and 
political conditionality, aiming at domestic reforms in the partner states in 
line with European political norms. The conditional benefits on offer are 
expected to include progressively deepening participation in the EU single 
market. It remains an open question whether the future packages will be 
sufficiently valuable and credible to induce reform within third states, given 
that such reforms are often viewed as difficult if not threatening to particular 
domestic elites. In the aftermath of the Central and East European expansion, 
it becomes increasingly clear that despite the success of enlargement, the 
Union cannot indefinitely rely on this instrument as the means to positively 
induce transformation beyond its borders. Beyond Turkey and the Western 
Balkan countries, the Union is thus faced with the key challenge of finding 
an effective way of relating to the remaining post-Soviet states (Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia itself) as 
well as with the entire southern Mediterranean basin and the Middle East.  
Turkey’s arguments for it to be viewed as a foreign and security policy asset 
for the EU have been set out in the speeches of Prime Minister Erdoğan in 
January 2004.
54 The argument has several strands. In Box 4.1 we attempt to 
systematise them, adding some elements to those raised by the Prime 
Minister. We divide the arguments into those that are objective and tangible 
lines of foreign policy action, and those that are normative and subjective, 
yet highly political. 
At the level of concrete capabilities, Turkey’s accession has much to offer 
that could enhance the credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor in the 
wider Middle East region. Turkey is already the main hub for regional 
cooperation, both in institutional terms in the context of Black Sea 
cooperation and as an energy supply artery between the Caspian and Middle 
                                                 
54 Speeches on 26 January 2004 to the Council for Foreign relations, New York, 
and on 30 January 2004 to the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
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East suppliers and West European consumers. Its military capabilities and 
logistic location make Turkey an ideal forward base for the EU’s emerging 
security and defence policies, and its peoples have a rich set of cultural and 
linguistic assets that are relevant for the EU to engage more effectively in 
many of these future neighbouring states.  
Box 4.1 Turkey’s possible assets for EU foreign and security policy 
 
Objective factors 
– Turkey’s accession would lead to an extended reach of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
– Turkey’s neighbours would become direct neighbours of the EU. Turkey has 
the role of geographic hub for regional cooperation. 
– Turkey is a secure energy transport hub for Caspian, Middle East and Russian 
oil and gas.  
– Turkey is well situated to become a forward base for the EU’s security and 
defence policy, for military logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in 
the region.  
– Turkey has valuable human resources to complement those of the EU for 
cooperation programmes, ranging from business know-how to language skills. 
Normative arguments 
– Rather than representing values specific to particular cultures or religions, the 
Turkish case shows that democracy, secularism and human rights are universal 
values. 
– Turkey’s EU accession would demonstrate Europe to be an inclusive concept, 
with multi-cultural values, open to different religions.  
– Turkey’s transformation of its security and foreign policy culture, with less 
reliance on military power and greater emphasis on diplomacy and civilian 
instruments conforms with EU practices 
– Turkey’s accession would confirm the contribution of European integration to 
conflict resolution, with the reconciliation between the Turkish state and its 
Kurdish population, its rapprochement with Greece, and constructive role over 
Cyprus.  
Synergy 
– Combining this list of points could give a synergetic boost to the EU’s 
capabilities and credibility as foreign policy actor across the EU’s southern and 
eastern neighbourhoods.  
 
The normative arguments enter into the highly delicate issue whether or how 
to view Turkey as a model of modernisation and democratisation of FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY | 47 
 
neighbouring states of Islamic culture. Virtually all of the neighbours have 
their reasons to be reserved about excessive Turkish assertiveness in the 
region, be it the Islamic states that contest the secular political model, or 
those states that fear a renewal of pan-Turkic experiments, or others that are 
simply concerned about potential domination by the region’s largest and 
most successful economy and political system.  
Nevertheless, a Turkey successfully integrating with the EU may 
communicate a different, fresh and more positive message to the neighbours. 
It would mean a Europe that was coming to terms with multicultural 
integration, with its substantial communities of Islamic culture, as well as a 
Turkey that was coming to terms with the constraints of being contained 
within the highly democratic EU. For those in the region contemplating the 
pressures and hazards of modernisation and democratisation, the Turkish 
example is one of finding a way over a long historical period of decades, 
indeed almost a century.  
4.2  Instruments of Turkish foreign and security policy 
In the 1990s, Turkey took two seminal steps to give new direction to its 
foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours, adding to a third traditional 
dimension. First, in opting to develop rapidly and strongly its relations with 
the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s, Turkey organised complex 
programmes of economic, cultural and governmental assistance on a much 
larger scale than in the past. With the turn of the century, Turkey has also 
been developing its bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries. Second, 
it accompanied this development cooperation activity with a radical policy of 
openness for the virtually visa-free movement of people between the 
neighbouring states and Turkey (see Chapter 3 for a detailed account). Third, 
Turkey has retained a very substantial military capacity relative to those of 
any of its neighbours. All three of these elements now raise opportunities or 
at least policy issues in the context of integration with the EU.  
The potential opportunities and assets are manifest in the development 
cooperation and security domains. Turkey has human resource assets that are 
complementary to those of the EU, with the cultural links and understandings 
of Eurasia and the Middle East that could in principle be deployed alongside 
the financial and technical resources of the EU. Turkey has both military and 
police forces
55 that could make major contributions to the headline goals of 
the EU for its security and defence policy, and especially by way of 
resources that could be effectively deployed in South-East Europe and the 
wider Middle East.    
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Civilian instruments of cooperation.
56 When Turkey decided to mount its 
ambitious Central Asian policy initiative in 1992, it needed to create a new or 
strengthened administrative infrastructure dedicated to this purpose. The 
main steps here were seen in the creation in 1992 of the Turkish Cooperation 
and Development Agency (TIKA) for official assistance. TIKA has since 
2000 realised 380 projects in Balkan, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian 
states. In addition the DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board), which 
represents 490 leading Turkish companies, has established bilateral business 
councils with all of Turkey’s neighbouring states. Thus the range and logic 
of  these initiatives immediately extended beyond Central Asia alone, as seen 
also in the creation in 1992 of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), 
headquartered in Istanbul. 
While the Central Asian initiative proved overly-ambitious and was later 
scaled back, it nonetheless saw some substantial action. Already by early 
2003, over 7,500 students from the Turkic republics had been enrolled at a 
variety of Turkish educational establishments, mostly universities, out of an 
initial target figure of 10,000 decided only a year earlier. This alone is an 
impressive indicator of Turkey as civilian foreign policy actor. Turkey 
opened elite high schools in each of the Turkic republics, where the working 
languages are English as well as Turkish. In 1992 a Turkish-Kazakh 
University was founded. Other cultural initiatives of importance include aid 
for adoption of the Latin script in the Turkic republics, and television 
broadcasting channels in the Caucasus and Central Asia.   
Religious education was also an important line of development. Some 42 
imams were sent by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs to the 
Turkic world in 1992, and 600 students came to Turkey for religious 
education from 1991 to 1993 from Muslim communities in the former 
Yugoslavia, the North Caucasus and Tartarstan in Russia, Crimea in Ukraine 
as well as Central Asia. Theology faculties and colleges were opened and 
mosques built on a substantial scale. The objective of these initiatives was to 
move fast into the ideological and spiritual vacuum left by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, with support for moderate Islam, as opposed to the radical 
drive coming especially from Iran. The influence of these initiatives in 
transmitting cultural values, according to Idris Bal, “may be even greater 
than that of official Turkish policy”.
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Trade and investment multiplied fast from a low base, Turkey becoming the 
second investor after Russia in Central Asia, with hundreds of Turkish firms 
established with a much finer and more extensive microeconomic penetration 
than came from the West.  
More recently Turkey has hosted new training institutions or activities that 
relate to general Western priorities. For example, in 2000, the Turkish 
International Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC) was 
founded in Ankara, funded 50/50 by Turkey and the UNDP. This has trained 
450 officials from 37 countries so far (particularly from the Balkan, Black 
Sea and Central Asian countries). TADOC provides courses in Turkish, 
English and Russian and it is equipped with all the necessary translation 
services. It also fosters formal and informal networks of cooperation, 
primarily through the sharing of information.
58 This should provide also for a 
partnership with the EU’s European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) in Lisbon. In addition the Police and Military 
Academies are receiving considerable numbers of officer cadets from 
neighbouring regions, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia.   
The classic pre-accession period sees the EU supply large-scale assistance 
for the candidate state to comply with existing EU legislation and norms. The 
Turkish case presents itself with the additional aspect of a candidate state 
with a huge interface with Eurasia and the Middle East, which harbours 
Europe’s most serious security interests and concerns. Turkey’s potential as a 
logistical and institutional base for a wide range of cooperation programmes 
with this wide region is evident.  
For the future this invites the prospect of the EU adopting a double strategy 
in its pre-accession programmes of cooperation with Turkey: that of 
addressing Turkey’s own modernisation needs and the needs of the 
neighbouring states. It is now in any case the intention of the EU through its 
European Neighbourhood Policy to seek ways of progressive and partial 
integration of neighbouring states in line with European norms, standards 
and operating policies. Turkey offers thus the opportunity for the EU to 
obtain synergies and economies of scale in combining these two strategic 
developments alongside each other.  
Concretely this could mean that the EU’s multiple programmes of assistance 
(PHARE, TACIS, MEDA and the future Neighbourhood Instrument) could 
have operational centres and programmes in Turkey that could use many of 
the same institutional bases. This could concern many of the standard 
categories of programme for good governance, media, human rights, police 
cooperation, and technical cooperation in a wide range of economic and 
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public policy domains. The EU’s technical cooperation programmes in 
Central Asia have suffered from a lack of solid, experienced institutional 
facilities functioning in either of the region’s main languages (Russian or 
Turkic).  
Security and defence.  Turkey spends 2.4% of its GDP on military 
expenditures, compared to an average of 2% for the rest of the European 
members of NATO. Turkey’s military forces are by far the largest in NATO 
Europe by number of personnel, accounting for a quarter of the total, with 
514,000 enrolled (but with a large number of conscripts – 391,000). This 
compares with 210,000 for the UK, 260,000 for France and 296,000 for 
Germany. Turkey also has a substantial gendarmerie of 150,000, some of 
whom are effectively elite military troops. More specifically, Turkey has a 
significant cadre of career NCOs (non-commissioned officers), with 
considerable combat experience in difficult terrains. Compared to other 
NATO members such as the UK and France, Turkey has limited strategic lift 
capacity. However it has been most willing to deploy its assets. As of 2003 
Turkey had sizeable contingents in the ISAF in Afghanistan (1,400 troops), 
in SFOR II in Bosnia (1,200 troops) and in KFOR in Kosovo (940 troops). In 
Northern Cyprus the Turkish garrison is huge (approximately 35-40,000 
troops). 
Turkey is actively involved in NATO’s adaptation to its new challenges. 
Turkey has established the Headquarters of the 3
rd Corps in Istanbul as a 
High Readiness Force (Land) HQ. Additionally, one of the two Air 
Component Commands in the new NATO command structure (CC-Air HQ) 
will be located in İzmir in August 2004. Turkey has signed military 
cooperation and training agreements with 45 nations. In this regard Turkey 
makes an extensive use of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, 
with training support for the partner states. Turkey also undertakes training 
programmes in the military facilities of the Turkish armed forces on a 
bilateral basis, free of charge. The total number of personnel trained by 
Turkey amounts to almost 30,000, of which about a half were trained in the 
home countries by Turkish training experts, and about half in Turkey. 
Turkish training support within the NATO and partnership mechanisms are 
provided by the Turkish PfP Training Centre in Ankara, which was 
established in 1998, and was the first such centre recognised by NATO. 
Since its inception the Turkish PfP Training Centre has trained more than 
3,600 personnel from 50 NATO, PfP, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. 
In addition the Centre has established mobile training teams, which have 
provided training for about 1,000 personnel from a dozen countries. 
In Afghanistan, Turkey has participated in all phases of the ISAF operations 
from the beginning. During the ISAF-II operation in 2002-03, Turkey 
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personnel, and also operating the Kabul international airport. Turkey handed 
over the leadership to Germany and Holland in February 2003, but continues 
its participation with an infantry company and other resources including 
three Black Hawk helicopters.  
In October 2002, the EU reached an agreement with Turkey and other non-
EU NATO member states concerning these countries’ possible participation 
in EU military operations, and the use by the EU of NATO military assets 
and capabilities in such operations. This agreement took two years to 
negotiate, and was blocked for some time for two reasons of importance to 
Turkey. Firstly Turkey sought the maximum participation in the shaping if 
not taking of decisions by the EU. An elaborate consultative process was 
established involving the associated states in the workings of the EU’s 
Political and Security Committee and Military Committee. Secondly there 
were sensitive concerns over military aspects of the Greek-Turkish 
relationship in general, as well as the Cyprus conflict in particular. It was 
agreed that the EU would in no circumstances use its military against a 
NATO ally, and that NATO would in no circumstance act against the EU. 
The final deal reached at the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council 
also provided for the exclusion of Cyprus (and Malta), as non-NATO or PfP 
countries, from possible ESDP operations. Overall this difficult negotiation 
revealed the sensitivity in Turkey concerning the key difference between 
being a close associate versus a full member of the EU. 
A final area of possible and desirable cooperation concerns intelligence 
sharing. In June 2004, the EU announced that it would establish enhanced 
cooperation between its member states. Given that many of the targets of EU 
intelligence services have a Turkish connection (terrorism, narcotics and 
migrant trafficking, arms dealings and money laundering), cooperation with 
Turkish intelligence services would also be useful. In addition, Turkish 
intelligence has assets and contacts in some neighbouring countries, where 
EU intelligence is poorly represented. However fruitful cooperation would 
also require EU assistance to Turkish services (such as the gendarmerie, the 
police, customs and the coast guard) to counter traffickers attempting to 
reach the EU via Turkey. This would be the necessary EU step so as to 
prevent Turkey from acting alone as the gate-keeper of Europe.  
Energy supply security.
59 Turkey lies adjacent to countries or regions 
possessing some 71.8% of world gas reserves and 72.7% of world oil 
reserves. Turkey’s potential role as supply artery from these sources to the 
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EU market is of course much less than is represented by these figures, but 
they give nonetheless a first clue to the idea that Turkey could form part of 
the EU’s infrastructure of strategic energy supply security.  
The situation is rather different as between oil and gas. For oil the existing 
Iraq-Turkey pipeline (capacity 1.6 million barrels per day) and the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline under constructions (capacity 1.0 million barrels per 
day) together are of considerable significance in relation to total EU oil 
imports of 11.5 million barrels per day. In addition the Bosporus is currently 
seeing a further 1.4 million barrels per day of tanker traffic, which represents 
a serious environmental hazard, and for which several bypass pipeline 
options have been under discussion for years. Important as these oil supply 
channels are, the degree of energy supply security risk that they cover should 
not be overestimated, since oil is essentially a fungible product in a global 
market, and the world economy has learned to survive serious supply 
disruptions because of flexible supply and transportation structures. 
For gas however the issue of supply security, both in terms of physical 
supplies and their economic terms, is of a much higher order. The EU’s 
dependence on gas as an energy source is on a strongly rising trend, and the 
import dependence for gas (of EU-15) is projected to rise from 46% in 2002 
to 71% in 2030. International Energy Agency analyses have suggested that 
this growth in imports could by 2030 be distributed essentially between 
Russia (79 bcm), Central Asia (51 bcm), the Middle East (157 bcm) and 
West and North Africa (136 bcm). Turkey’s proximity to many of these 
suppliers comes more directly into play because of the rigidity of gas supply 
systems through pipelines, mitigated to an increasing but still limited extent 
by supplies of liquefied natural gas by sea tanker. As many as 10 gas- 
exporting countries are or may become interested in using Turkey as a 
pipeline transit route for their gas to reach the European market. These 10 
countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt) hold about 35% of world gas reserves, 
which is not so far from Russia’s gas reserves representing 45% of the world 
total. While Russia already has a pipeline supplying gas directly into Turkey 
(Blue Stream crossing the Black Sea), it currently excludes onwards supply 
of its gas to Europe, seeking to preserve to the maximum the market for its 
other direct supply routes into central and south east Europe. Russia, through 
Gazprom and some other trading companies, also seeks to retain control over 
the marketing of Central Asian gas exports through its pipeline system. It 
apparently derives considerable monopolistic profits from this at present, as 
evidenced by some fragmentary price information from the notoriously 
opaque international market. For example, while Turkey imports Russian gas 
at around $130/tcm, Turkmenistan apparently receives only a third or a 
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The strategic issue for the EU and Turkey in the energy policy domain is 
therefore both how the EU’s security of supplies might be augmented by 
diversification of pipeline supply routes through a completely safe transit 
region (i.e. within an EU that included Turkey), and how the EU could 
reduce the risks and costs of commercial dependence on a main supplier, 
such as Russia, that may be inclined to exploit opportunities for monopolistic 
market behaviour. Turkey is offering to do this by promoting the 
construction of gas pipelines networks for import from the east, transit, and 
export to the west. The EU’s particular interest in these projects is in the 
context of Turkey’s accession bid, is that accession would require Turkey’s 
compliance with EU gas market directives that set the rules to ensure 
competitive market conditions.    
Concretely, this becomes a matter of investment in the trans-Turkey gas 
pipeline network, first for the incoming pipelines from the exporting 
countries, then Turkey’s internal gas transit capacity, and finally the 
connections into the main EU market through south-east Europe. For 
incoming pipelines Turkey already has a connection with Iran with a 
capacity of up to 20bcm/year. There is now commitment by all parties to 
build a gas line alongside the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that would go 
as far as Ezurum in eastern Turkey, with a design capacity that could go up 
to 20bcm/year, assuring delivery of gas from Azerbaijan. Turkey is 
discussing with Iraq a project that might bring 10bcm/year of gas from 
northern Iraq into the system. There are also discussions underway with 
Egypt for a gas pipeline that might transit Jordan and Syria, to which Saudi 
Arabia could easily connect at some stage in the future, although this is not 
presently planned. There remains the aborted plan for a trans-Caspian gas 
line that would bring Turkmen gas to join the Baku-Ezurum pipeline. 
However, as already remarked, Turkmenistan seems to get poor terms of 
trade for its route through the Russian network. Finally there is the Blue 
Stream trans-Black Sea pipeline, which Gazprom insists should not be used 
for onward supplies into the European network, but this precisely begs the 
question when and how the Russian gas sector might be induced to run on 
market-competitive terms. Turkey’s own east-west transit capacity would 
have to be substantially augmented if the strategic supply artery vision were 
to be realised, and the Turkish Minister of Energy acknowledges this.   
Connections from Turkey into the continental European market are now the 
subject of intense activity. A first Turkey-Greece connecting pipeline of 285 
km is expected to be operational in 2006, which is of course of immense 
political significance in itself, apart from its potential capacity of about 
8bcm/year. A much larger project, called Nabucco, is being planned by 
Austrian, Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian partners (each with 
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feasibility study stage and might become operational in 2009. Finally there 
are feasibility studies underway to extend the Greek-Turkey pipeline with an 
underwater pipeline to the southern Italian port of Otranto. An alternative 
connection into Western Balkan markets is also being studied, but seems a 
much longer-term prospect.  
The EU energy Commissioner has recently commented on the Greek-Turkish 
project, saying that it “will not only bolster peace and stability in the region 
but also make it possible to supply new gas resources from the Caspian basin 
and Iran to the internal gas market of the enlarged EU and to the Balkans, 
thus improving security of supply for all stakeholders”. More generally 
Turkey does appear capable of becoming a major gateway for large volumes 
of gas supply to Europe, a fourth strategic artery with the supply routes from 
Russia, Norway and Algeria. Last but not least greater supplies through 
Turkey would increase pressure on Gazprom to operate on a commercially 
competitive basis, and thus also foster gas market reform in Russia, which 
will always remain a very major supplier.    
4.3 Priority  regions 
Eleven major theatres of operation may be identified as representing the core 
of the common foreign and security concerns of both the EU and Turkey. On 
the one hand, these consist of the set of Turkey’s neighbours, which may be 
taken as sub-regional groups or major states. On the other hand, these regions 
concern the two major powers that also have their own interests in these 
regions – Russia and the US.  
The idea is to review this set of ‘theatres of operation’ and to consider 
whether and how EU and Turkish interests and policies may be respectively 
convergent and complementary, or otherwise. In the cases reviewed below, 
first the interests and foreign policy objectives of Turkey and EU actors will 
be assessed to determine their degree of convergence or similarity. If 
interests and objectives are convergent, an attempt will be made to assess 
whether and how the existing and future Turkish and EU foreign policies 
could become complementary and mutually reinforcing. In other words, do 
Turkey and the EU have complementary comparative advantages that would 
raise the prospects of tackling jointly and more effectively their shared 
objectives? If convergence and complementarity exist, how could such 
synergies be materialised in practice, thus enhancing the capabilities and 
credibility of EU as foreign policy actor? In some cases, Turkey has special 
interests or legacies of past history, which will call for special efforts to bring 
into harmony with the EU’s initial inclinations, positions and policies. In 
such cases, could Turkey and the Union tackle these special cases, 
transforming challenges into additional assets? A preliminary overview is 
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Box 4.2 Potential convergence, complementarity or otherwise of EU and 
Turkish foreign policies in major theatres of operation 
Balkans  Convergent and complementary 
Black Sea  Convergent and complementary 
South Caucasus  Potentially complementary but not yet convergent: special 
factors – Armenia and Azerbaijan 
Central Asia  Convergent and complementary 
Russia  Convergent but risks of unintended effects 
Mediterranean  Convergent and complementary 
Middle East  Increasingly convergent and complementary 
Iraq  Potentially convergent and complementary but special 
sensitivities – Kurds and Turkomans 
Iran  Convergent and potentially complementary: special 
sensitivities – Kurds and religion 
Saudi Arabia 
and Gulf 
Convergent and potentially complementary: special 
sensitivity – religion 
United States  Turkey is increasingly convergent with EU positions 
 
Balkans.  With Bulgarian and Romanian accession expected in 2007, and 
Croatia also expected to join the accession process, EU interests in the 
Western Balkans are directed towards consolidating the transformation of the 
remainder of the region. Turkey for its part also has a vital interest in the 
stability of this transit region, which separates it from Western Europe. The 
interests of the EU and of Turkey thus seem convergent. In terms of their 
policies, Turkey has already contributed to EU stabilisation efforts by 
participating in EU and NATO operations in Macedonia and Bosnia.  
However EU policy is confronted by an increasingly pressing dilemma: how 
to include the region into its economic and security spaces, without 
premature accession. The dilemma is posed because the borders between 
member and non-member states in the Balkans will be virtually impossible to 
control at the frontiers. Turkey could contribute in three ways. First, during 
the pre-accession period there could be an expansion of the EU-Turkey 
customs union to include the whole Western Balkans. Second, Turkey’s 
experience in training police officers both from Turkey and from the Balkan 
and Black Sea regions represents a major asset. The Turkish International 
Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC) is already a 
valuable professional institute for the entire region. Third, Turkey is well 
positioned to serve as a transit route for rising European energy needs. The 
Greek-Turkish gas Interconnector project, linking to the Tabriz-Erzerum gas 
pipeline (connecting Turkmen and Iranian gas) is expected expand and 
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Black Sea. In early 1990s Turkey was largely responsible for initiating what 
became the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an Organisation with a 
comprehensive institutional structure, which has suffered from the non-
involvement of the EU and the scepticism of Russia. Forthcoming 
enlargements mean that the entire western and southern coastlines of the 
Black Sea will become EU territory. As such, the obligations of Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey to comply with the acquis could provide a stronger 
foundation for regional cooperation on issues like the environment, transport, 
energy, fisheries and combating organised crime.  
Turkey, together with Bulgaria, Romania and the EU itself, might follow the 
model of Finland’s initiative in creating a ‘Northern Dimension’. This could 
either take the form of empowering BSEC with EU human and financial 
resources, and perhaps adding a role as a forum for political dialogue 
between the CIS and EU. Alternatively, there could be an EU-Black Sea core 
group, based on the Black Sea states that are either EU members or 
candidates, and BSEC members that become actively engaged in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  
South Caucasus. The EU has refrained so far from playing a substantial role 
in the South Caucasus, although it expresses the intention to do so. Turkey 
enjoys strong economic, political and military links with Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. Turkey also plays an important role in the development of Caspian 
energy, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline under construction, and 
the planned gas pipeline to run alongside it to Erzerum. Turkey also hosts 
important diaspora communities from the region, including 450,000 Abkhaz 
and 2 million Georgians.  
Turkey’s potential role in the Caucasus and the EU’s recognition of the 
region’s importance but unwillingness to take an active lead could dovetail 
each other. Yet their interests at present are not entirely convergent. Turkey’s 
role in the region has been limited by its relations with both Azerbaijan with 
whom it has close ethno-cultural ties, and Armenia with whom, due to 
historical legacies, relations have not been normalised yet. This partiality has 
been reinforced by the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, which led Turkey to close 
its frontier with Armenia in 1992. In the recent past, Turkey has attempted to 
contribute to progress in Karabakh by pursuing a trilateral forum with the 
participation of Azeri and Armenian officials. But due to its positions, it has 
not been an impartial mediating influence.  
What are the steps through which Turkey’s relations with Armenia could be 
normalised, allowing Turkey to play a constructive role in conflict 
resolution? In a first stage, Turkey could open its eastern border for trade 
with Armenia, and Armenia for its part could amend its constitution to 
remove political ambiguities over its frontier with Turkey. The two countries FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY | 57 
 
could establish a truth and reconciliation committee over the Armenian 
allegations of genocide. The EU could support these steps. For Turkey this 
would occur in the context of the accession process. For Armenia, the EU 
could make the deepening of its relations through the new neighbourhood 
policy conditional on efforts in this direction. A second stage could introduce 
progress on Nagorno Karabakh, involving Armenian withdrawal from the 
occupied territories surrounding Karabakh, together with guaranteed 
transport corridors between Karabakh and Armenia, as well as between 
Nakichevan and Azerbaijan. Turkey would establish normal diplomatic 
relations with Armenia. In a final phase the status of Karabakh itself would 
be settled.  
Also in the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, Turkey could play an 
important role. The existence of large diasporas in Turkey presently 
constrains its involvement. Turkey has also limited influence on Russia, key 
to any breakthrough in the conflict. But in a post-settlement phase Turkey’s 
Abkhaz community (larger than the population of Abkhazia itself) could play 
an important role in reconstruction efforts. Progress in Abkhazia could also 
allow re-opened rail links from Russia to Turkey and the implementation of 
the proposed new oil pipeline from Novorossisk to Supsa, linking to the BTC 
pipeline. The prospect of projects such as these might induce Russia to shift 
its positions.  
Taken together this would mean a transformation of the prospects for the 
region. They would combine with Turkey’s pre-accession status leading the 
way for an enhanced ENP towards the Caucasus. In turn, the seemingly 
utopian vision of a Stability Pact advocated by Demirel in 1999, could have 
greater chances of success a decade later.  
Central Asia. In the early 1990s, the EU established contractual ties with all 
the Central Asian Republics (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements), but 
these have been rather thin relationships. Technical assistance has been 
supplied under TACIS, but this has not been an easy process, partly because 
of the scarcity of relevant experts with Russian or Turkish language skills. 
Financial assistance has been limited also, particularly when compared to the 
aid to Mediterranean and the Western Balkans, not to mention Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
Turkey instead has cultural, linguistic and religious ties with four of the five 
Central Asian Republics. In 1992 after the collapse of the USSR, Turkey 
embarked on an ambitious foreign policy initiative in Central Asia. It 
provided emergency assistance and engaged in numerous projects covering 
trade, investment, business cooperation, training in public administration, 
media and education, communications and transport. However, particularly 
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patronising or as attempting to impose Turkish cultural domination. The 
Republics wanted to assert their own identity and did not wish to alienate 
Russia. In addition, Turkey’s own economic instability meant that Turkey 
did not have the means to assist state-building and development in Central 
Asia.  
However, Turkey’s accession process could offer the potential to strengthen 
both the EU and Turkish roles in Central Asia. The EU could benefit from 
Turkey’s bilateral ties. The deficiencies of technical assistance due to the 
lack of necessary language skills could be rectified to some extent through 
Turkish participation. At the same time, these initiatives would not be tainted 
by pan-Turkic undertones.  
Russia. The implications for Russia of Turkish accession to the EU will be 
very significant, but depending on how EU-Turkish-Russian relations would 
be managed either negative or positive outcomes are conceivable. To take the 
negatives first, Russia could see a set of threats to its interests and security, 
as traditionally conceived, on no less than five accounts. First, it would mean 
harder competition for influence in the South Caucasus. Second, this 
competition would extend even further into Central Asia, with Euro-Turkish 
as well as Chinese interests deepening there. Third, there would be harder 
competition over leadership in Black Sea regional cooperation. Fourth, there 
would be increased challenge to Russia’s domination of oil and gas supply 
routes to Western Europe, with linkages through Turkey both to the Caspian 
and Iran and the Gulf. Fifth, and last but not least, the tightening of visa 
regimes by Turkey in the interests of EU and Schengen compliance would 
restrict access of Russians and all other CIS states to the Turkish market for 
business and tourism. All this, if mismanaged, could be considered by Russia 
as a formidable set of threats. This encirclement by the successors to the 
former West European and Ottoman empires is what Russia has been 
fighting wars over for 400 years.  
On the other hand this could be material enough, if carefully prepared and 
presented, to bring Russia into a deeper mode of cooperation with the 
enlarging EU. The transformation of Turkey as a society and foreign policy 
actor in line with European norms is the essence of the accession process. A 
similar process is partly underway in Russia as the new private economy sees 
the need to move towards modern norms of corporate governance, and in 
terms of the outlook of the growing post-Soviet generation. However Putin’s 
administration is still heavily influenced by ‘sphere of interest’ ideas, 
especially with regard to the CIS states of both Europe and Central Asia, 
given Russia’s weak capacity to project power globally. These are regions 
that will be affected most by the EU’s enlargement to the Black Sea 
coastline. At some point realistic calculations should prevail, and the sight of FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY | 59 
 
the EU organising its foreign and security policies more credibly together 
with Turkey may tip the balance of thinking about foreign policy in Moscow.   
Oil and gas geo-economics will be one of the ways through which the EU-
Turkey-Russia relationship will play out. Already Turkey has signed a 
natural gas deal with Russia and natural gas cooperation between the two 
countries is set to increase with the completion of the Blue Stream pipeline 
under the Black Sea. 
The question of Turkey introducing visas for Russians will be a sensitive 
issue. Two timetables have to be matched in the most constructive way: the 
timing of Turkey’s moves into compliance with EU visa policies, and the 
negotiations about to begin between the EU and Russia over a facilitated visa 
regime at least for certain categories of people. As argued above in more 
detail, the EU should not require Turkey to introduce a much more restrictive 
visa hastily, before it has worked out what elements of flexibility it may 
introduce in the foreseeable future.    
The Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite being the largest donor to the Palestinian 
Authority and enjoying strong contractual ties with most states in the region 
and Israel in particular, the EU has always played a secondary role in any 
peace process in the Middle East. The EU has been unwilling to use its 
primarily economic instruments effectively in the political realm.  
Turkey’s accession process would not alter EU positions towards the 
conflict. In fact, EU and Turkish views are largely convergent. However, 
Turkey’s role could contribute to the EU’s increased ‘actorness’ in the 
region. Turkey has enjoyed good relations with Israel and is constantly 
improving its relations with the Arab world and with Syria in particular. 
Provided the EU became more willing to use effectively its instruments, 
Turkey’s perceived neutrality as well as its proximity could allow the EU to 
act more credibly as a facilitator and mediator between the parties. In view of 
its membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Turkey could 
also act as a bridge between the EU, as a member of the Quartet, and the 
OIC. In May 2004, Turkey together with a sub-group of the OIC met with 
the EU Presidency (as well as with Russia and the UN Secretary General) to 
discuss the institutionalisation of relations between OIC and the Quartet.  
Iraq. In principle EU and Turkish interests in Iraq are convergent. Like the 
EU, and perhaps even more so due to its location, Turkey’s general interests 
are in fostering a peaceful and democratic Iraq. This could include a 
decentralised or federalised Iraq, provided that the emerging governing 
system was both workable and representative. The end of violence and the 
creation of a democratic system are considered the best guarantee of Iraq’s 
stability and its ensuing territorial integrity. Stability and territorial integrity 
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Indeed since the 1980s, Turkey has paid a heavy price for war and instability 
in Iraq, in terms of large-scale refugee flows, the disruption of trade and oil 
flows and perhaps most critically the ability of PKK terrorists to use northern 
Iraq as a base to attack Turkish armed forces.  
However, in view of its vicinity, Turkey’s sensitivities regarding 
developments in Iraq go beyond the general concerns of most EU actors. 
First, the main camps and headquarters of the armed factions of the PKK and 
other groups are still based in Northern Iraq. Minor yet regular skirmishes 
between these militants and Turkish forces continue, reminding Turkey’s 
citizens and state alike of the small yet dreaded possibility of a resumption of 
large-scale violence in the region. Second, continuing instability in Iraq, and 
the aggravation of violence that could escalate into an inter-ethnic and/or 
inter-confessional civil war, could well result in a de facto or de jure 
secession of northern Iraq. For a while Turkey has enjoyed cordial if not 
good relations with the two Iraqi Kurdish leaders: Massoud Barzani and Jalal 
Talebani. However the secession of northern Iraq would no doubt generate 
serious concerns in Turkey, in view of the state’s fears about the possible 
repercussions amongst its own Kurdish population. There is the further 
Turkish concern for the place of the Turkoman (as well as the Arab) minority 
within the Kurdish region of Iraq. Non-Kurds in northern Iraq are currently 
politically under-represented and are likely to remain so in the event of the 
north’s secession.  
The most desirable scenario from both Turkish and EU standpoints would be 
that of a soundly functioning federal Iraq, in which the oil revenues of the 
Kurdish region were distributed according to a federal agreement. 
Furthermore, if the US military occupation and political control were 
replaced by a UN mandated political presence, possibly backed up with a 
NATO/UN military presence, Turkey has extremely important political and 
logistical assets that could become a major feature of the endeavour. In this 
scenario the EU also could establish a common position over Iraq, and an 
EU-Turkish operational and political partnership could be developed. In a 
context in which the reputation of the United States deteriorated so seriously 
over the recent period of military occupation of Iraq, it is all the more 
plausible that in due course the EU with Turkey might come to play a role in 
supporting or dealing with whatever Iraq emerges from the present conflict.  
Iran. In recent decades Turkish-Iranian ties have been strained over the two 
aspects that have been viewed as most critical to Turkish national security: 
namely political Islam and Kurdish separatism. Yet both threats have 
considerably diminished in the last few years, opening the space for EU and 
Turkish cooperation in Iran. Like the EU, Turkey has an interest in a steadily 
reforming Iran, in Iran’s cooperation on terrorism, in restraining Iran’s 
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pursue these aims have converged with those of the EU rather than of the 
US, opting for a policy of engagement rather than confrontation.  
Beyond convergent interests, Turkish and EU policies could be 
complementary. Turkey’s deepening political, social and economic ties could 
act as an asset to EU endeavours to engage in dialogue with Iran. There is 
currently an annual flow of 450,000 Iranians crossing visa free into Turkey 
for tourism, education and business purposes. The Tabriz-Erzerum gas 
pipeline from Iran into Turkey is also of much interest to the EU, as this 
connects with the Turkish gas network, soon to be expanded and then linked 
with that of Greece and thence into the rest of the EU. The Iranian gas 
connection is viewed as particularly important to Europe given that Iran’s 
own network connects with Turkmenistan and that the EU is keen to develop 
alternative energy sources to Russia. 
Gulf. Both Turkey and the EU have an interest in gradual reform towards 
political participation, human rights, and then democratisation in the Gulf 
region. They also have an interest in securing cooperation of the Gulf 
countries in energy security and in the fight against terrorism. However both 
Turkey and the EU have enjoyed relatively thin relations with these 
countries. The EU has attempted in recent years to relate to the Gulf 
countries though multilateral forums, exploring the prospects for deepening 
and institutionalising relations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Turkey instead principally relates to the Gulf through 
bilateral relations, as well as interacting with them in the context of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Particularly through bilateral 
commercial ties, Turkey’s relations with most Gulf states have been steadily 
expanding in recent years. Investors from the Gulf have also shown 
increasing interests in projects in Turkey. 
In principle, a secular and democratising Turkey could offer important 
lessons to the initiation of a reform process in the Gulf countries. Indeed in 
the context of the emerging ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa’ 
initiative of the G8 summit, Turkey has accepted to co-chair the Democracy 
Assistance Dialogue. However, precisely in view of Turkey’s secular nature, 
there are serious limits to its ability and willingness to foster political change 
in the Gulf.  
A final and promising avenue of Turkey’s role in the Gulf is the 
‘Neighbouring Countries Initiative’. The Initiative was born in 2003, 
stemming from the common interest of all of Iraq’s neighbours to prevent the 
war. It includes all of Iraq’s neighbours, with the exception of Kuwait (that 
supported the US invasion and occupation), and also including Egypt. The 
countries of the Initiative have met five times both before and following the 
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the agenda has been Iraq. However, it is conceivable that the Initiative will 
persist and become institutionalised. If so it could become of considerable 
interest to the EU, which is still in the process of developing a concerted 
strategy towards the war-torn country.  
United States. Turkey and the US have been allies for over 50 years, both in 
the context of NATO and through their bilateral relations. The EU, Turkey 
and the US have shared similar strategic interests. This has remained so both 
during the cold war and thereafter. In other words, together with all European 
countries and the US, the Turkish Republic has always firmly placed itself 
within the ‘West’.  
This is not to say that Turkey’s (or indeed the EU’s) relations with the US 
have been static. Particularly in the run-up and with the advent of the 2003 
Gulf war, relations between both Turkey (and several EU member states) and 
the US have been strained. On 1 March 2003, a resolution was brought to the 
Turkish Parliament by the ruling AKP government to allow the temporary 
deployment of 62,000 US troops on Turkish soil. The deployment and transit 
through Turkey would have allowed a second front attack against Iraq. By a 
few votes, the motion failed to pass through Parliament and the American 
troops were re-routed to Kuwait. At the time, the rejection of the motion 
appeared to have plunged US-Turkey relations to their lowest ebb since the 
1974 arms embargo following the partition of Cyprus.  
However the Turkish government is, notwithstanding, positioning itself to 
play a constructive role in the Middle East, in a manner that is convergent 
with both US and European declared interests. Prime Minister Erdoğan 
engaged in highly positive political debate in the US, as evidenced for 
example by his speeches in January 2004 in New York and at Harvard. The 
Turkish leadership is able to deploy arguments about favouring the 
progressive democratisation of the Middle East region, ostensibly supported 
by American as well as European leaderships.  
In conclusion, following Turkey’s stance towards the war in Iraq, Turkish 
policy seems to be settling down into a maturing, rather than a breaking, 
relationship with the US. It has brought also Turkey’s foreign policy closer 
to the underlying ideology of European foreign policy, even if the EU has 
itself been so deeply split over Iraq. The scene is set therefore for a credible 
deepening of Turkish-EU collaboration over future developments in the 
Middle East.  
4.4 Policy  conclusions 
Does the idea of integrating Turkish and EU foreign and security polices 
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Would Turkey be an asset or liability? Our conclusions are unambiguously 
positive. 
This does, however, depend on the EU’s level of ambition for its foreign and 
security policy. Does the EU aspire to become a major actor in the nearby 
southern and eastern neighbourhoods, or does it prefer to retreat into itself 
behind the most secure possible external borders? If the EU truly aspires to 
play a stabilising, pacifying and modernising role in its neighbourhood 
beyond mere token actions, then the incorporation of Turkey into the 
common external policy offers the prospect of real advantages. In the 
contrary case, it would be consistent for the EU to reject Turkey’s future 
membership once and for all. Yet in this case the EU would run the risk of 
destabilising Turkey itself, which could mean adding to the chaos of the 
wider neighbourhood.   
Turkey’s EU accession stands to be of comparable importance for the EU’s 
emerging foreign and security policy as the recent accession of the 10 new 
member states put together, if not more so. Turkey is almost completely 
surrounded by a set of regions that represent the EU’s prime security 
concerns, from the residual instability of the Balkans to the West, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq and Iran to the East, and Israel-Palestine and the 
Mediterranean to the South. The Turkish accession would mark the end of 
the EU’s enlargement to the East, while opening at the same time new 
dimensions to the EU’s relationship to the Middle East and Eurasia to the 
South and East, a region that is unstable and unpredictable.  
The potential advantages for the EU in integrating Turkey as foreign and 
security policy actor are several. Objective factors lie in concrete logistical 
and locational advantages, coupled with military capabilities and civilian 
human resources that can be readily deployed in the Eurasian and Middle 
Eastern neighbourhoods. More subjective but perhaps even more important 
are the prospects for the Turkish experience to be viewed as a positive 
precedent by its neighbours. This general statement has a number of 
versions, some of which have been recently tried and failed (e.g. the pan-
Turkic experiment in Central Asia in the early 1990s). Some other variants 
are also likely to provoke adverse reactions, like over-selling the Turkish 
model of multi-party democracy and secularism in parts of the Arab world. 
Not only does Turkey’s democracy still have important shortcomings. But 
also Turkey’s Arab neighbours, in view of the legacy of Ottoman rule, react 
adversely to arguments suggesting their emulation of Turkey’s political and 
economic system.  
However more subtle arguments seem full of promise. The Turkish case 
suggests that the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and 
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contrary they are universal values with no geographical, cultural or religious 
limitations. Rather than representing a static model of democracy, the 
continuing process of Turkey’s democratisation could act as a source of 
inspiration to its neighbours. The same is true also of the gradual 
transformation of Turkey’s security and foreign policy culture. While in the 
past Turkish foreign policy had focused on the importance of military 
security and balance of power politics, it now increasingly appreciates the 
value of civilian instruments of law, economics and diplomacy, as well as of 
multilateral settings in which to pursue its aims. Related to this, the Turkish 
example demonstrates the value of European integration as a key external 
anchor to domestic processes of modernisation.  
The final point concerns the EU’s own model, recalling our initial contrast of 
the sharply delimited Euro-federal model versus one of differentiated forms 
in relation to its outer edges or neighbourhoods. Turkey’s EU accession and 
integration would vindicate the EU’s ambitions to represent an inclusive 
project and a multi-cultural community of values. If the EU and Turkey were 
to make best use of their joint opportunities in the foreign policy domain, 
Turkey would build on the advantages of its comparative openness as well as 
proximity to the Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighbourhoods. The EU and 
Turkey could thus devise an original blend of openness towards their 
southern and eastern neighbours, with the model of a graduated external 
border of the EU. However Turkey would need to be reassured that this 
would not in any way deprive it of normal political rights as future member 
state. To have a graduated border regime that adds value is not to be 
confused with the negative connotations of a second-class member state.  
Finally, an integration of EU and Turkish strategic cultures could in the 
context of the present turmoil in the Middle East and transatlantic discord 
over Iraq carry a message also to Washington, supporting a shift back 
towards multilateralism, moderation and the rule of law. 
Our conclusions in viewing Turkey as a potential asset to the EU’s foreign 
and security policies can be distilled into two terms used in military security 
studies: bridgehead and spearhead. In the present context these words have 
meaning in terms of the civil values and the objectives of an expanding 
European Union. The democratising Turkey would be the bridgehead of a 
modern, multi-cultural Europe right up to and alongside the ideological 
chaos and violence of the neighbourhood beyond. Its civilian, military and 
human resources could be integrated with those of the EU and serve as a 
spearhead of the EU’s soft and not-so-soft power projection into the region.  
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Chapter 5 
The Economics of Turkey’s Candidacy 
5.1 Introduction 
Understanding and evaluating Turkey is not straightforward – and nor has it 
ever been. One is tempted to paraphrase a famous dictum of J.M. Keynes 
about Russia: “The economic system of [Turkey] has undergone such rapid 
changes that it is impossible to obtain a precise and accurate account of it... 
Almost everything one can say about the country is true and false at the same 
time.” Keynes’ dictum can be applied to Turkey in the past and to some 
degree it still applies today. Views on the future of the Turkish economy 
range across the entire spectrum from the very optimistic to the extremely 
pessimistic (or rather dismissive), depending on whether the recent boom or 
the preceding decade of instability and overall stagnation are taken as the 
point of reference.  
One reason for this uncertainty is that the Turkish economy is essentially 
entering unfamiliar territory – unfamiliar in the sense that after the deep 
structural reforms undertaken since 2001 the outlook for sustained 
macroeconomic stability has never been so favourable. At the same time, 
however, it is clear that many reforms still need to be fully implemented and 
that the economy continues to depend on international financial markets. 
Even small mistakes in economic policy-making could lead to a strong 
reaction in the financial markets (a substantial depreciation and/or an 
increase in interest rates), which could quickly jeopardise stability. Turkey 
should thus be considered a country ‘in transition’, from a highly distorted 
economy subject to macroeconomic instability to a stable market economy 
that is quite open to international trade and investment and has the potential 
for rapid and sustained growth.  
Despite all this uncertainty, some clear trends emerge from our analysis. In 
some respects, the accession of Turkey in the economic area would mean 
‘just another enlargement’, while in others, it implies something different. 
The accession of Turkey would be ‘just another enlargement’ in the sense 
that Turkey resembles the less advanced CEECs that are already, or are about 
to become EU members in terms of relative GDP per capita and the weight 
of agriculture in employment. In terms of economic mass and population, 
Turkey would represent a bit more than double the 2007 enlargement 
(Bulgaria and Romania). The budgetary cost of Turkey’s accession would 
thus also be relatively modest. 
In other respects, however, the Turkish case is quite distinct from previous 
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  Advanced trade integration. Through its customs union agreement, 
Turkey is already now practically part of the internal market (for 
goods) and is scheduled to take over large parts of the acquis 
regardless of what happens on the accession front. In this sense it has 
achieved much greater integrated than had the CEECs prior to their 
accession. 
  Low human capital. In terms of formal education of the population, 
Turkey clearly lags behind, whereas the CEECs are rather close to the 
EU average. This discrepancy has potentially important consequences 
for the country’s growth prospects. 
  Demographic dynamism. The workforce in Turkey will continue to 
grow by more than 1% p.a. for at least another generation, whereas it 
is declining in most CEECs, thereby giving Turkey potentially much 
more dynamism. 
  Dual nature of economy. Turkey’s average GDP per capita is similar 
to that of Bulgaria and Romania, the two CEECs scheduled for 
membership in 2007. But its economy is more dualistic, with a small, 
but rather high-performing modern sector (which is as efficient as its 
counterpart in the new member countries). But approximately half of 
the labour force has essentially not yet been touched by the modern 
economy.  
  Domestic banking system. The banking system in most CEECs is 
dominated by foreign banks, whereas the Turkish banking system has 
been open for some time. Until recently it was not able to function 
properly because of macroeconomic instability and pervasive political 
influence. With continued stabilisation and effective supervision along 
EU-compatible norms, the Turkish banking system might contribute to 
the modern part of the Turkish economy. But expanding its role in 
financing investment is a pre-condition for sustained growth. 
  External debt and capital flight. Turkey has a much larger foreign debt 
than most other candidates or new members. Again in contrast with 
the CEECs, one-half of its debt seems to be the result of capital flight. 
Fostering the repatriation of part of this capital and creating the 
conditions for large FDI inflows will be the key to unlock the huge 
potential for extensive growth. 
  Agriculture. Turkey resembles other CEECs (notably Poland and 
Romania) in that a large part of the work force is officially employed 
in agriculture. However, Turkey is the only candidate to run a sizeable 
trade surplus in this sector with the EU because Turkey specialises in 
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contrast to the CEECs, Turkey has long protected its agriculture in 
some products even more than the EU: membership would thus imply 
a loss of protection for this sector. Agriculture also illustrates the 
dualism of the Turkish economy: A relatively small modern sector 
produces the large exports to the EU, whereas the rest, which employs 
the majority of the workforce, is not competitive. 
  Migration. Our starting assumption is that it is likely that Turkey will 
not be treated any better or worse than the recent new member states in 
terms of labour mobility. The incumbent EU-15 member states gave 
themselves the possibility to keep their labour markets closed to 
workers from the 10 new member states for potentially up to 7 years 
after accession (2 plus 3 plus 2). If Turkey joins say, by 2015, the full 
mobility of workers might thus only come 17 or more years later. By 
that time the labour markets will be strongly affected by the ageing of 
the population (not only among the EU-15, but also the new 
members). There might thus be actually labour shortages, instead of 
the wide-spread unemployment that is the rule today. Moreover, if 
Turkey has progressed far in the convergence process, emigration 
might no longer be so attractive to Turkish workers. For all these 
reasons, it does not make sense to speculate how many Turkish 
workers might move to the EU-15 using today’s labour market data. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows:  We start in section 5.2 
with the question that is on everybody’s mind: how much will it cost?  We 
find that, as in the case of the last enlargement that the cost to the EU budget 
is surprisingly low, around 0.2% of the EU’s GDP. We then deal with the 
one area where EU-Turkish relations are already deeply established, namely 
trade (section 5.3). This is followed by an examination of the human 
potential of the Turkish economy, its dynamic demography, its low level of 
human capital accumulation and its dual employment structure (section 5.4). 
Section 5.5 examines in more detail one sector, namely agriculture, which 
clearly illustrates the dual structure of the economy and the problems it faces 
with human capital formation. Section 5.6 turns to a sector that has been at 
the centre of the last economic crisis, namely banking. Section 5.7 looks at 
the quality of the institutions that govern the Turkish economy and section 
5.8 draws the analysis together for an evaluation of the long-term growth 
prospects. Section 5.9 offers conclusions.  
5.2  How much will it cost? 
How much would Turkish membership cost the then incumbent members? 
This is a question that is at one and the same time straightforward and 
impossible to answer. It is impossible in the sense that the EU is evolving 
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financial consequences of accession of Turkey in, say, 2014 would be. 
However, it is straightforward to calculate how much Turkey would cost the 
EU budget if it were to enter under present rules. 
A key factor limiting the degree of freedom of the EU budget is the fact that 
the financial envelopes are determined in a multi-annual framework called 
the financial perspective. The current framework, which was decided among 
the EU-15 in 2000, and thus long before the current enlargement, runs until 
2006. The next framework, which will be negotiated à 25, will run until 
2012. Turkey is unlikely to have become a member country by that time and 
so will have only a limited influence on the following financial framework, 
which will run until 2018, Assuming accession by 2015, this would imply 
that the financial envelope for the first three years of Turkey’s membership 
would have been decided by the EU-28 (the current EU-25 plus Bulgaria, 
Romania and most likely Croatia). In this respect, Turkey’s situation might 
thus resemble that of Bulgaria and Romania, which are likely to join by 
2007, in the sense that their first years of membership will also be covered by 
a financial framework in whose negotiations they did not participate. 
In terms of negotiations, Turkey would thus be fully part of the EU’s 
financial framework only during the 2018-2024 round. Given that for all 
present and former member states it took between 5 and 10 years before they 
were integrated into all support programmes it is thus likely that Turkey will 
benefit fully from the EU’s budgetary support schemes some time after 2020. 
What will determine Turkey’s share in the EU budget of the 2020s are the 
rules that will by then be in effect for everyone else and the level of 
development reached by the EU and Turkey itself. One cannot know with 
certainty what these rules will be and any long term projections are therefore 
highly speculative. 
In reality, however, the discussion about the financial burden Turkey would 
represent for the EU budget focuses usually on the current rules.
60 
                                                 
60 The experience with the current enlargement process suggests that over time 
the discussion will shift from how much it costs to who will bear the (minor) 
burden. But this point is still some way into the future. Current circumstances 
have another impact, however, in that it is usually assumed that the burden 
would have to be borne by the current EU-15 because it is usually assumed that 
most of the new member countries will remain net beneficiaries for quite some 
time to come. By the early 2020s, this might no longer be the case, but again it is 
impossible to forecast with any precision which of the new member countries 
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For example, the maximum that Turkey would receive after a transition 
period under current rules is a starting point many analysts have chosen, for 
which there are two variants:  
a)  How much would Turkey receive if it were a fully established member 
today? 
b)  How much is Turkey likely to receive under current rules by a likely 
accession date, e.g. 2015? 
The overall calculations for these types of numbers are actually quite simple 
in both cases since the budget of the EU is dominated by two items: 
Structural Funds (destined for regions with a GDP per capita at PPP below 
75% of the EU average) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The 
gross receipts of any member country are to a large extent determined by 
these two items.  
a) Turkey in the EU today. If Turkey were a member country today, it could 
count on Structural Funds allocations which would be capped at 4% of its 
GDP as decided at the Berlin European Council. Given that Turkey’s GDP 
has averaged around €200 billion in recent years, this implies immediately 
that its allocation would be around €8 billion annually. 
It has also been calculated that extending the current CAP to Turkey (with 
per hectare payments based on current yields) would cost around €9 billion. 
This implies that the total receipts of a hypothetical Turkish EU member 
today might be slightly less than €20 billion (Turkey would also receive 
some funding under other programmes). Turkey would then also have to 
contribute as do all other member states to the EU budget. With a current 
contribution rate of around 1% of GNP (the ceiling for the EU budget is 
1.25% of GDP, but the EU spends less than this at present, slightly above 1% 
of GDP), this would mean around €2 billion annually, leading to a net 
financial benefit of around €18 billion annually. Apart from the fact that this 
approach is based on today’s conditions, the sum mentioned also represents 
an upper bound. 
b) Turkey in 2015 in an enlarged EU. One difference with respect to the 
previous calculations is that in this case it does not make sense to calculate in 
current euros since both the EU and the Turkish economies are likely to grow 
over the next decade. Under the growth prospects presented below, Turkey 
will grow much more quickly than the EU over the next decade and the 
Turkish GDP could reach about 4% that of the EU-28 GDP (at present, it 
amounts to only around 2%) by the middle of the next decade. This implies 
immediately that the cost of extending current Structural Funds to Turkey 
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The calculations for agriculture are potentially more complicated since one 
would have to guess the output structure of agriculture in Turkey in about a 
decade and then calculate how this would change if Turkey participates in 
the CAP. This would actually be an exceedingly complex operation as one 
would have to take into account the entire input/output matrix – for example 
some commodities (maize) are used as an input in the production of others 
(meat). This is not necessary, however, as an indirect approach based on the 
support relative to production in this sector can yield a better result.  
The starting point is that Turkish farmers are likely to obtain at most 20% of 
their value added from the EU’s CAP, for the simple reason that this is what 
farmers in the EU-15 obtain today: the CAP costs at present amount to 0.5% 
of GDP and the value added produced by agriculture is about 2.5% of the 
EU-15 GDP.  
Agriculture produces at present around 12% of GDP in Turkey, but taking 
into account that its share has been declining continuously over the last 
decade, a reasonable assumption might be that in about a decade agriculture 
will account for about 10% of Turkish GDP at the maximum. On this basis 
one can easily calculate the potential maximum cost of extending the present 
rate of support of the CAP to Turkey. Assuming, as before, that the Turkish 
economy accounts for 4% of EU GDP (and that agriculture contributes 10% 
to this) the cost of providing an ‘equivalent rate of support’ for Turkish 
agriculture would be 0.08% of EU-15 GDP (=0.2*0.04=02.*0.04*0.1). To 
repeat, this is again an upper bound. Other estimates arrive at much lower 
numbers; see for example Quaisser & Reppegather (2004) who argue that the 
cost of extending the CAP to Turkey should only be around 0.045% of the 
EU’s GDP.
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The gross cost (Structural Funds plus CAP) together might thus amount to 
0.26% of EU-28 GDP (=0.096+0.16). Against the gross receipts one would 
have to set the contribution that Turkey would have to make to the EU 
budget. At present, and this is unlikely to change any time soon, all member 
states contribute at the same rate, or rather at the same percentage of GNP, to 
the EU budget. The contribution rate is equal to the share of the EU budget in 
overall GDP. Assuming that the EU budget will continue to be limited to 
around 1-1.2% of GDP, this implies that Turkey will have to contribute about 
                                                 
61 The number calculated above is again an upper limit, as the CAP is likely to 
change over time, inter alia, because of the commitments made by the EU in the 
context of the WTO to abolish exports subsidies, and the general limitations the 
WTO imposes on various types of domestic agricultural subsidies in general. For 
details, see W. Quaisser and A. Reppegather, EU-Beitrittsreife der Turkei und 
Konsequenzen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft, Working Paper No. 252, Osteuropa-
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1.2% of its own GDP to the EU budget. Under the assumptions made so far 
(Turkish GDP at about 4% that of the EU-15), this would then amount to 
around 0.048% of EU-15 GDP. 
The ceiling for the net cost should thus be around 0.20% of EU GDP 
(equivalent to about €20 billion given today’s EU GDP of around €10,000 
billion) under both illustrative calculations. Table 5.1 below summarises the 
main findings.  
 
Table 5.1 Maximum budgetary cost, full membership 
  Turkey in today’s EU 
(current euro) 
Turkey 2015 in an enlarged 
EU 
(as a % of EU GDP) 
Structural Funds  €8 billion  0.16% 
CAP receipts  €9 billion  0.08% 
Total receipts 
(including other) 
€20 billion  0.25% 
Contributions to 
EU budget 
€2 billion  0.05% 
(Max) Net receipts 
for Turkey 
Roughly 0.18% of EU 
GDP) 
0.20% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on current EU budgetary rules 
and regulations. 
5.3 Trade  integration 
The degree of openness of the Turkish economy has changed radically in 
recent decades if one considers the standard measure of openness, namely the 
share of exports of goods and service in GDP. Figure 5.1 shows the relevant 
data over almost the last half century. It is apparent that until about 1980, 
Turkey was effectively a closed economy, with exports accounting for only 
5% of GDP, much less than even recorded in Franco’s Spain (used here as a 
comparator because it is also geographically somewhat at the fringe of the 
EU). Turkey started to open up to the rest of the world with an initial set of 
reforms during the early 1980s, leading basically to an increase of the 
openness ratio by a factor of three, i.e. to 15% of GDP, similar to the values 
recorded by Spain, which at that time was joining what was then the 
European Community. The conclusion of the EU-Turkey customs union 
treaty of 1995 seems to have been another factor pushing the Turkish 
economy to open to the rest of the world, with export climbing successively 
to almost 30% of GDP, again a value that is close to that of Spain, which had 
by then been part of the internal market for quite some time.  72 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
Economic theory shows that a customs union can act like a double-edged 
sword: the elimination of tariffs among the two partners should lead to 
additional trade, also called trade creation. But if tariff barriers with respect 
to the rest of the world remain high, there is also a danger that trade relations 
that either partner had with the rest of the world before the conclusion of the 
customs union agreement might be substituted by trade between the two 
partners (so-called trade diversion). While trade creation leads to welfare 




The data available for the EU-Turkey case generally suggest that there has 
been considerable trade creation, but little trade diversion. The extent of 
trade creation can be seen in the further increase in the ratio of total exports 
(of goods and services) to GDP over the last years. The absence of evidence 
for trade diversion comes from the fact that the share of the EU in overall 
Turkish trade has remained approximately constant. 
The fundamental reason for this benign effect of the EU-Turkey customs 
union is that the main result of this agreement was a liberalisation of 
Turkey’s international trade. The EU had been already quite open towards 
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exports from Turkey even before the customs union agreement, whereas 
Turkey had retained a rather high degree of protection. Fundamentally the 
EU-Turkey customs union thus meant a small further liberalisation by the 
EU, but a large liberalisation on the Turkish side as the degree of protection 
in Turkey had to be reduced to the rather low EU average.
62 






EU-15  24.5 37.9 
Czech Rep.  57.1 65.9 
Hungary  57.8 67.7 
Poland  22.0 26.8 
Romania  27.8 35.6 
Turkey  14.9 -16.5   26.1 
EU-27  25.2 38.3 
Note: It is difficult to establish the direction of trade for services. The range reported 
for Turkey reflects differing assumption about the share of the expanded EU 
in Turkish exports of services (mainly tourism). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IMF data from Directions of Trade.  
Despite this considerable progress, however, Turkey is somewhat less 
dependent on trade with the EU than even the larger new member countries. 
Exports to the EU account for ‘only’ 15-16% of Turkey’s GDP, compared to 
over 20% for Poland (the least open of the new member states). This 
relatively lower degree of trade integration is the result of two factors. First, 
the share of trade in GDP is still somewhat lower for Turkey than even for a 
country like Poland. Part of this difference might be due to a residual 
protectionist attitude on the part of the bureaucracy that has been noted in 
many Commission reports. But another, perhaps equally important factor is 
Turkey’s geographical position (being located much further away from the 
core of the EU market than most CEECs), which makes it natural that the 
geographical distribution of Turkey’s foreign trade is a bit less focused on 
the EU. 
Given the already existing customs union with the EU, is there anything that 
could be done to foster integration even further in advance of full 
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is equivalent to an export tariff (Lerner symmetry theorem). This symmetry 
explains why a large reduction in protection against imports should lead to a 
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membership? While it is generally agreed that the customs union 
arrangement functions well technically, there are some points of friction that 
should be addressed: its asymmetry, incompleteness and need to extend it to 
the area of services.
63 
Asymmetry. The EU-Turkey customs union is highly asymmetric in the sense 
that the economy of one partner (the EU) is more than 20 times larger than 
the other (Turkey), which makes it impossible to engage in joint decision-
making. This puts Turkey in the politically delicate position that it has no 
influence on agreements the EU might conclude with third countries, 
although these agreements might impact the competitive position of Turkish 
industry, not only in the EU market, but also in Turkey. Moreover, once the 
EU has concluded, for example, a free trade agreement with a Mediterranean 
country, this agreement will open the entire customs union (EU plus Turkey) 
for imports, but any concession by the other side will concern only exports 
originating from EU member states. 
The obvious solution during the pre-accession period would be for the EU to 
take Turkish interests into account when negotiating any new trade 
agreements. It should keep Turkish officials involved in the negotiating 
process and should make sure that any concession the EU obtains from its 
trading partners apply to Turkey as well. Of course, there is no possibility for 
Turkey to have an actual veto right on the final decision of the EU whether 
or not to conclude for example, a new free trade agreement, but it should be 
involved in shaping the details of any future agreement and it should be very 
clear that EU negotiators have to keep Turkey’s interests in mind, not as a 
‘favour’ to Turkey, but as part of the terms of reference of their job.  
Incompleteness. The EU-Turkey customs union entered into force on the last 
day of 1995. But, almost nine years after its entry into force, there are still 
areas where full harmonisation is lacking (well beyond the different 
transition periods envisaged for the approximation of legislation). State aids, 
technical barriers to trade and intellectual property rights are in essence the 
areas where full harmonisation has not been achieved. This may be due to a 
‘hidden protectionism’ practiced by the Turkish administration. It may also 
be due to a lack of effective institutional cooperation between the European 
Commission and the Turkish administration. The Community’s legislation is 
in a flux and Turkey has been trying to meet a moving target. A more 
effective institutional cooperation model, inspired by the example of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), may indeed alleviate this problem. 
                                                 
63 See Sinan Ulgen and Yiannis Zahariadis, The Future of Turkey-EU Trade 
Relations: Deepening vs Widening, EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 4, Centre for 
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Services. This is a delicate area for the EU because services are typically 
labour-intensive and the cross-border provision of services requires in most 
cases the movement of people. Many member states still perceive a strong 
pressure for legal (and sometimes illegal) immigration from Turkey. 
Moreover, Turkey might be in a strong competitive position in a number of 
services sectors. With this mixture of commercial and political motivation, 
many member countries remain reluctant to engage in free trade in services. 
However, the liberalisation of trade in services is expected to have a more 
profound impact on the Turkish economy than the completion of the customs 
union in goods. Services represent 60% of Turkey’s national income whereas 
industry’s share is more limited, at 30%. Moreover, unlike trade in goods, the 
EU’s model in the liberalisation of trade in services is conceptually different 
in the sense that it is coupled with a requirement of regulatory convergence. 
In other words, trade in services between Turkey and the EU can be 
liberalised on the condition that Turkey adopts the EU acquis in the relevant 
fields. This approach has two fundamental consequences. Firstly, the 
liberalisation of trade in services between the parties will accelerate Turkey’s 
integration into the EU’s Single Market. Depending on Turkey’s ability to 
achieve the necessary regulatory convergence, Turkey can therefore become 
a part of the Single Market before the actual date of full membership. In that 
case, three of the four fundamental freedoms, namely the free circulation of 
goods, services and capital, will be achieved in advance of membership.  
We believe that there would be considerable benefits in going down this 
path. By adopting the acquis in services, one of the most critical 
shortcomings of the Turkish economy would be addressed. Now that the 
macroeconomic framework has been stabilised, the challenge for the Turkish 
economy is to increase productivity and reform its regulatory framework. 
The sectoral reforms that will necessarily be implemented as a result of the 
required regulatory convergence should transform the microeconomic 
business environment and introduce a more flexible and more market-
friendly regulatory regime. Increases in productivity in essential business 
services that would trigger additional productivity increases in downstream 
industries may initiate a virtuous cycle for the Turkish economy as a whole. 
Finally, given that these reforms are expected to have a positive impact on 
Turkey’s growth performance, they would also help the convergence process 
between Turkey and the EU.  
Are there any caveats in this respect? The main question is whether the 
services side of the Turkish economy is competitive enough and ready to 
face the challenges of unhindered competition. A paper recently prepared for 76 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
this project examined the state of the banking industry in Turkey,
64 which 
arguably constitutes one of the most sensitive areas, and concluded that “…it 
is hard to argue that the Turkish banking sector is notably less efficient than 
some of its European competitors”. It should also be recalled that a 
sequencing of the liberalisation according to the state of preparedness of each 
individual sector is also possible. The main challenges will not therefore 
stem from the degree of competitiveness but rather from a need to find a 
satisfactory solution to the thorny and politically sensitive issue of the 
freedom of establishment which is an inalienable part of the freedom to 
provide services. The second set of challenges is related to the institutional 
quality and capacity of the independent regulatory bodies in Turkey. 
Assuming that these challenges are met and a proper sectoral sequencing for 
liberalisation is formulated, services trade liberalisation between the EU and 
Turkey should be accelerated. An accelerated calendar for trade liberalisation 
in the services area, not necessarily linked closely to the full membership 
negotiations, would be of benefit to both parties.  
The challenge for the next few years is thus to make the asymmetry in the 
customs union politically acceptable until Turkey’s accession takes place and 
to complete the regulatory convergence, in particular by extending free trade 
to the area of services. The latter will require innovative solutions regarding 
the movement of service workers, an issue closely linked to the set of issues 
that arise in the area of the cooperation in justice and home affairs (see in 
particular the paper prepared for this project by Apap et al., 2004). 
5.4  The human potential of the Turkish economy 
The success of any economy is ultimately based on its people. In this respect 
Turkey shows some remarkable features that distinguish it from most old and 
new member countries. The first, and best known difference is the fact that 
Turkey’s population is still growing, whereas that of most member countries 
is already, or is about to start declining. A second difference concerns the 
educational system, which again sets Turkey apart from most member states. 
Finally, a third difference arises from the dual nature of the Turkish economy 
with a sharp division between those working in a strong modern sector and 
the remainder, whose productivity is very low.
 65  
                                                 
64 See Alfred Steinherr, Ali Tukel and Murat Ucer, The Turkish Banking Sector: 
Challenges and Outlook in Transition to European Union Membership, EU-
Turkey Working Paper No. 4, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August 2004 (available at www.ceps.be). 
65 This section relies heavily on another contribution to this project: see Kemal 
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Demographic dynamics. In contrast to most member countries Turkey’s 
population is still growing, but the rate of increase has already slowed 
considerably compared to the last decades. Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of 
the population of Turkey and that of the four largest member countries. It is 
apparent that the ‘old’ Europe has either been stagnating (Germany and 
Italy), or growing rather slowly over the last 30 years. By contrast, the 
population of Turkey has doubled in this period, although the available 
projections imply that Turkey’s demographic growth will abate in the future. 
For the next two decades the population of Turkey is thus forecast to grow by 
another 25%, which represents a much lower growth rate than that of the 
past, but this should be compared to the declining populations that are 
predicted for Germany and Italy. For the next generation, Turkey will thus 
remain much more dynamic in population terms than all other EU members. 
Whilst being more dynamic, Turkey is also in the midst of a demographic 
transition, reflecting a fairly rapid decline of the population growth rate, from 
the 2.5 to 3% range in the 1950s and 1960s, to less than 1.5% at the 
beginning of the new century. This implies a rising proportion of the 15 to 64 
age group in the total population, as fewer new babies are born to fill the 
below 15 age group, and as life expectation, while lengthening, is not yet 
long enough to result in a large proportion of the total population above age 
64. 
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Figure 5.3 below shows the demographic bonus in the form of the change in 
the share of the total population that could be potentially active (i.e. those 
between 25 and 65). The level of this ratio measures in a certain sense 
potential GDP per capita.  Changes in this ratio show, ceteris paribus, to 
what extent the room for re-distribution is affected by demography. For 
example, if this ratio increases by 1%, potential GDP per capita should go up 
by 1% ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant productivity, employment rates, 
etc. A fall in this ratio indicates the opposite: potential GDP per capita falls, 
implying that there is less to redistribute to pensioners and other interest 
groups. 
Figure 5.3 Demographic bonus: Change in potential labour force (25-65) as 
a percent of total population 
 
The large hump-shaped curve of Turkey puts it well above the average for 
the EU-15, whose curve is declining all the time and will even turn negative 
over the next decade. Turkey is also better off in this respect than all current 
and prospective member countries taken individually, because their 
demographic ‘transition’ happened a generation earlier. Even the poorer 
among the EU-15 had their demographic transition earlier. The Spanish and 
Portuguese curves would be below that of Turkey and anticipate its 
movements by about 20 years.
66 Turkey can thus rely on a strong 
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demographic bonus. The size of this bonus can be read directly from the 
figure: it was about 1.5% per annum in the five-year period preceding 2005, 
implying that each year the working age population increases by 1.5% more 
than the total population (allowing, ceteris paribus, as explained above, for 
an increase in potential GDP per capita of 1.5%). On this count Turkey has 
clearly a strong advantage over the EU-15 (and even the poorer EU member 
countries), whose value, leaving apart the special case of Poland, are usually 
around 0.5%.  
Demographics should thus in principle provide a substantial boost to growth 
over the next decade. But one should not forget that this bonus was already 
available over the last decades. It seems that this bonus has not been used to 
Turkey’s advantage so far in the sense that for two decades the country has 
stopped converging to EU norms in terms of GDP per capita. Turkey’s 
demographic bonus will even increase over the next decade, from somewhat 
below 1% per annum to somewhat above that figure (depending on the exact 
comparator country chosen). 
An expanding population provides economic opportunity only if employment 
increases as well. This does not seem to have been the case for Turkey so far. 
Table 5.3 describes the basic age structure and employment ratios in Turkey 
and selected new member countries which are used here as comparators 
because employment rates tend to go up with income. The key result is that 
the ratio of total employment to total population is substantially below 
(almost one-third lower) that in the comparator countries, because of a lower 
ratio of the 15 to 64 age group as well as a lower participation rate.  Similar 
differences in labour force participation rates also exist among the EU-15, 
with generally the highest value to be found among the Scandinavian 
countries. But Turkey would find itself at the lower end even of the 
‘Southern’ group within the EU. An important part of the lower employment 
ratio of the population in working age in Turkey stems from the very low 
labour market participation rates of women.  
                                                                                                              
of the labour force each year until 2015. Nevertheless, after that year, the low 
birth rates will make themselves felt in a rapidly deteriorating demographic 
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Bulgaria  2998  0.68 0.55 0.37 
Czech  Rep.  4760  0.70 0.67 0.46 
Hungary  3855  0.68 0.55 0.37 
Poland  13782 0.67 0.52 0.35 
Romania  7745  0.68 0.52 0.35 
Turkey  * 20836 0.64 0.44 0.28 
* Year 2000. 
** Equals the product of the previous two columns. 
Source: Calculated from EUROSTAT, SY, SIS. 
 
To sum up, the Turkish population in working age has grown rapidly, but 
employment has not, leading to the low employment ratios documented 
above. This is a pattern that needs to be broken if Turkey is to use its 
demographic bonus. 
Human capital accumulation.  For economic growth, however, it is not 
quantity, but quality that counts. In other words, the economic potential 
depends crucially on the quality of the actual and potential work force in 
terms of its ‘human capital’. On this score Turkey starts from a weak 
position. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the relevant data concerning both how 
investment in formal schooling takes place and the output in terms of 
educational achievements. It is apparent that Turkey is investing relatively 
little in education, less than most EU member states. The difference would be 
even larger if one takes into account that the share of the school age 
population is so much higher in Turkey.  
In terms of educational achievements, the picture is similar: there is only one 
member that has a worse performance. It is not surprising that this is Portugal 
which is showing signs of facing increasing difficulties in adapting to the 
increased competition in the internal market resulting from enlargement. The 
two new member countries for which this internationally comparable data are 
available, Poland and Hungary, are both investing much more in education 
and start from a much better starting point. Turkey is unique in having both a 
very low rate of investment in education and a bad starting point.  THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 81 
 
Table 5.4 Total expenditure on education and adult population with upper 
secondary education 
   
Total expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
 
Adult population 
with upper secondary 
education (%) 
Turkey 3.91  24.3 
Poland  5.31 45.9 
Portugal  5.69 19.8 
Greece  3.86 51.4 
Hungary  5.15 70.2 
Source: OECD. 
The available data on enrolment rates and the educational attainment level of 
the younger generation indicate that the gap in terms of education is not 
about to be closed soon, even in the cohort that just entered the labour force 
(the 25-34 year olds) in which less than a third has finished at least upper 
secondary education. In terms of investment in human capital, Turkey will 
thus face a considerable handicap in a ‘convergence race’ with the new 
member countries. 
Table 5.5  Percentage of the population that has attained at least upper 
secondary education, by age group 
Age group 
  
25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64   
Poland  45.9 51.7 47.5 44.5 36.4 
Portugal  19.9 32.5 19.9 13.6 8.5 
Greece  51.4 72.6 60.3 43.1 27.6 
Turkey  24.3 30.2 23.5 19.2 13.3 
Source: OECD. 
Duality.  Aggregate figures provide important information on national 
averages, but in the case of Turkey, it becomes particularly important to look 
closer at sectoral and regional data because they reveal the existence of two 
economies: a large and poor agricultural (or rather rural) sector, and a 
modern sector that is at the level of the new member states. 
Table 5.6 below shows that Turkish average labour productivity (measured 
by value added per employed person) is close to that of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, the three biggest countries among the new EU 
members. This is so despite the fact that gross value added per person 82 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
employed in agriculture, lowers the Turkish average (with the exception of 
Poland in this case). Productivity in services, construction and, even more so 
in industry, is high in Turkey, when compared to the new member countries, 
reflecting the degree of modernity and sophistication reached by Turkey’s 
“modern sector”. The situation looks even more favourable to Turkish 
industry when productivity levels are compared to Romania and Bulgaria, 
the two remaining candidate countries other than Turkey.  
Table 5.6 Sectoral gross value added per person employed, 2000 
 (thousands of current euros) 
   Agriculture  Industry  Services  Economy 
average 
Bulgaria  4.3 3.7  4.3  4.1 
Czech Rep.  9.7 12.4  12.1  11.7 
Hungary  7.6 12.0  12.1  11.5 
Poland  2.1 11.8  13.5  10.9 
Romania  1.1 5.8  7.5  4.2 
Turkey  4.6 13.5  15.7  10.9 
Source: Eurostat. 
These productivity comparisons show that the Turkish economy is not only 
on average “more developed” than the economies of Romania and Bulgaria, 
but Turkish productivity outside agriculture is close to, or in some cases even 
higher than what we observe in the new member countries.  
The very large sectoral differences in productivity levels are also reflected in 
regional disparities as the modern, productive sector (mainly industry plus 
some services) is concentrated in a small number of regions in the western 
part of the country. With the result that the poorest regions produce less than 
one-fourth of the GDP per capita than the richer ones. 
5.5 Agriculture 
Agriculture still plays a large role in the Turkish economy. This sector 
employs over one-third of the work force (the precise numbers vary) and 
only about 12% of national income. The difference between these two 
figures shows immediately that agriculture is, on average, the weakest sector 
of the economy. In this respect Turkey does not constitute an exception: in 
most member states agriculture produces a much lower share of national 
income than one would expect from the share of overall employment. Turkey 
resembles in particular some other CEECs. In terms of the share of the work THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 83 
 
force officially employed in agriculture, Turkey falls somewhere between 
Poland (where the share is a bit below 20%) and Romania (where it is close 
to 40%).  
An important difference with respect to the CEECs is, however, domestic 
agricultural policy. In contrast to Turkey, most CEECs did not have a 
pronounced policy to support agriculture during the 1990s. Moreover, not 
only did Turkey protect its agriculture, it did so in a particularly inefficient 
and costly way. As Cakmak puts it: “After the middle of the 1980s, Turkey 
may be considered as a perfect example of mismanagement of agricultural 
policies.”
67 This policy contributed to the large fiscal deficits which 
ultimately precipitated the 2001 crisis but did not foster the much-needed 
structural adjustment in the sector. As the fiscal, economic and social costs of 
agricultural policies became unbearable, a radical reform programme was 
enacted, which is still being implemented today. 
This subsection first provides an overview of Turkish agricultural policy as it 
moves, eventually, to an adoption of the CAP. This is then followed by a 
brief evaluation of the economic potential of the sector. 
The domestic policy framework. As in other areas, it is rather difficult give an 
adequate account of this sector within a rapidly evolving policy environment 
as the reform programme enacted in 2000-01 is still being implemented. 
Implementation is sometimes partial and a number of measures have yet to 
be taken. In principle, however, the reform programme foresees a further 
market opening for the sector and a gradual partial replacement of support 
via market prices by income support that is not linked to (‘decoupled’ from) 
production.  
Support to agriculture still amounts to around 4% of GDP (according to 
OECD estimates). This is much higher than in the EU for the simple reason 
that agriculture is so much more important in Turkey. Ultimately the aim of 
support to agriculture is to increase the income of those employed in that 
sector. It is clear that it costs much more to support over 30% of the 
population than the little over 3% that still work in agriculture in the richer 
EU member countries. The political weight of agriculture is high in all 
countries, even in countries with a very small fraction of the population in 
agriculture. Turkey is no exception. The main aim of the reform initiated in 
2001 was to recognise the aim of agricultural policy, namely higher income 
for the rural sector, but to switch to policies (income support) that minimise 
economic distortions (such as the huge subsidies for inputs that had been 
granted until then). 
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Box 5.1 Agricultural subsidy reform of 2000 and beyond 
 
Turkey enacted a radical reform of its agricultural subsidy system in 2000. The 
aim was both to reduce the cost (thus contributing to fiscal stabilisation) and to 
promote allocative efficiency. The reform called ‘Agricultural Reform 
Implementation Project’ (ARIP) focused on three main themes: 
1.  To cut out government intervention in the output, credit and fertiliser 
markets and the introduction of direct income support (DIS) for farmers 
through per hectare payment independent from the crop choice (similar to 
the approach taken over the last years by the EU). 
2.  The commercialisation and privatisation of SEEs (state economic 
enterprises), including TURKSEKER (Turkish Sugar Company) and 
TEKEL (Turkish Alcohol and Tobacco Company); and restructuring of 
TMO (Soil Products Office) and quasi-governmental Agricultural Sales 
Cooperative Unions (ASCUs) which in the past intervened to support 
certain commodity prices on behalf of the government. 
3.  One-time alternative crop payments. This element provided grants to 
farmers who require assistance in switching out of surplus crops to net 
imported products. The programme was intended to cover the costs of 
shifting from producing hazelnuts and tobacco to the production of oilseed, 
feed crops and corn. Participation in this scheme has so far been limited 
outside the tobacco sector. 
The policy framework continues to evolve. The government intends to 
restructure ARIP and to add new components. Starting in 2006, the weight of 
DIS payments in the total budgetary support to agriculture is scheduled to 
decrease. The payments per hectare are planned to remain constant in nominal 
terms, but they should be more targeted. The share of crop-specific deficiency 
payments, alternative crop grants and support to livestock production will 
slightly increase. The new items in the short term are related to environmental 
protection schemes, crop insurance support and a pilot project on participatory 
rural development. Other medium-term policy agenda items of the government 
include promotion of a sustainable rural finance system, increased expenditures 
in rural infrastructure targeted to irrigation, storage and marketing facilities and 
expansion of agricultural extension activities. 
In this general sense, Turkish agricultural policy is moving towards the 
approach used by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, 
the latter is also moving and the initial starting points are so different that 
Turkey will have to undertake further radical opening of its agricultural 
sector before it can join. In principle this would not need to be done until just 
before accession, although it would probably be in Turkey’s interest not to 
wait. One key reason is that even the present (evolving) system implies a THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 85 
 
high burden for the economy. Simulations with large-scale sectoral models 
suggest that Turkey could obtain small, but non-negligible economic gains 
from opening its agricultural sector to the EU and to external trade in 
general. Some parts of Turkish agriculture are quite competitive (fruits, 
vegetables, nuts and flowers) and other parts could be competitive in the 
absence of rich-country subsidies (cotton). A reduction in the rate of 
protection for the non-competitive parts of agriculture would, of course, lead 
to lower production and exports in those sectors that are still most heavily 
protected. There would no doubt also be employment problems which would 
have to be taken into account. But consumers would gain from lower food 
prices. In Turkey households spend a much higher proportion of their 
budgets on food than in richer EU member countries. This implies that 
higher prices for agricultural goods have a rather strong impact on the cost of 
living of most households. Extending the customs union agreement to cover 
agriculture would thus benefit consumers more than it might hurt some 
producers (see Camak, 2004, for details). As the CAP moves more and more 
towards direct income support under the pressure of global trade negotiations 
extending the EU-Turkey customs union agreement would thus be equivalent 
to opening Turkish agriculture to trade with the rest of world as well. 
Potential. Turkey produces a wide variety of products and, given its size, is 
an important producer in a number of products even on a global scale 
(especially some fruits and vegetables in which it is ranked first or second). 
Modern agriculture requires a combination of intensive human and physical 
capital inputs. But the intensive use of capital makes sense only in farms 
above a certain size, which, for certain field crops in the EU, is measured 
usually in hundreds of hectares.
68 All the available indicators show that 
Turkish agriculture lacks in all these aspects. The handicap is particularly 
apparent in terms of human capital and unit size (which is, however, less 
relevant in some sectors which are important for Turkey). 
It is not surprising given the large share of the population engaged in 
agriculture that the average farm in Turkey tends to be small. Depending on 
the exact statistical source used, there are between 3 and 3.5 million farms in 
Turkey. (It is difficult to obtain a precise picture of the contribution of 
agriculture to the overall economy in Turkey because agriculture and ‘rural’ 
tend to get mixed up.)  The average farm size is around 6 hectares, which is 
close to the figures for Poland and Romania. As usual this average hides 
great disparities with 85% of the farms being smaller than 10 hectares, 
occupying around 40% of the land. The remaining 15% of farms thus 
account for the bulk, namely 60% of the land. Most of the value added of the 
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sector is thus produced by a relatively small proportion of larger units. A 
similar trend exists also in most EU member countries, but in Turkey (as well 
as Poland and Romania) the smaller farms are so small that they probably 
can offer little more than subsistence. 
Table 5.7 Job status of agricultural employment, 2000-03 
  Employed (thousands)  Share of total (%) 
  2000-01 2003  2000-01 2003 
Total  7,929 7,165 100.0 100.0 
Wage  earner  393 389 5.0  5.4 
Employer or self-
employed 
3,314 3,130 41.8  43.7 
Unpaid  family  labour  4,223 3,646 53.3  50.9 
Male  4,285 3,719 100.0 100.0 
Wage  earner  274 268 6.4  7.2 
Employer or self-
employed 
2,749 2,552 64.1  68.6 
Unpaid family labour  1,263  899  29.5  24.2 
Female  3,644 3,446 100.0 100.0 
Wage  earner  119 121 3.3  3.5 
Employer or self-
employed 
565 578 15.5  16.8 
Unpaid  family  labour  2,960 2,747 81.2  79.7 
Source: Camak (2004). 
In evaluating these figures one has to keep in mind the great diversity of 
farming in Turkey. For raising grain or extensive meat production, the small 
farm size is a serious handicap. However, in hilly areas devoted to fruits and 
vegetables the situation is quite different. In this type of area the structure of 
farming in Turkey might not be too dissimilar from that in the Mediterranean 
EU-15 countries where 75% of farms use 5 hectares or less.  
As in the EU, Turkish agriculture is dominated by family farms since wage 
earners account for only 5% of total employment in the sector. In the official 
statistics the ±3.5 million farmers are helped by roughly a corresponding 
number of ‘unpaid family labour’ which are mostly female, as illustrated in 
the table below. Since the crisis the overall number of those officially 
employed in the sector has declined by about 10%, mostly because of a 
reduction in the category ‘unpaid family labour’. However, the relative 
shares have not changed a lot with the latter category still accounting for half 
of total employment in the sector. The average family farm thus consists of 
one farmer helped by one female member of the family. This situation seems THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 87 
 
quite different from that in the EU-15, where three-quarters are part-time 
farmers. 
Human capital. This is the area that causes the biggest concerns. The human 
capital in this sector is not only important for its productive potential but also 
for another reason. If average farm size is to increase to a more efficient unit 
size, many farmers will have to find employment in the rest of the economy. 
This can happen only if the surplus labour from agriculture has the human 
capital required by services and manufacturing. Unfortunately, however, this 
does not seem to be the case as the data in Table 5.8 show. 
Table 5.8 Employment and education in agriculture and the rest of the 
economy, 2003 (percent) 















Agriculture  18.1 6.1  65.0 6.0  4.4  0.4  100 
  Male  8.5 6.5 69.7  8.0  6.7  0.6  100 
  Female  28.5 5.8  59.9 3.8  1.9  0.1  100 
Manufacturing  1.2 1.1 51.9  15.1  23.5  7.2  100 
Construction  2.6 2.6 58.2  13.8  15.8  7.2  100 
Trade and 
Services 
1.4 1.1 34.2  13.9  28.2  21.3 100 
Total  7.1 2.9 48.8  11.4  18.8  11.0 100 
Source: Camak (2004). 
Only about 10% of those employed in the sector have completed at least the 
first years of secondary school, compared to over 60% in trade and services 
(and 40% in manufacturing). Moreover, almost a quarter of the workforce in 
agriculture is either illiterate or unschooled (for women the proportion is 
almost one-third). This part of the workforce is essentially unemployable in 
the modern sector of the Turkish economy described above. 
A key difference between Turkey and most other CEECs (e.g. Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria, which also have a rather high share of agricultural 
employment) is that in Turkey most of the ‘farmers’ are young, whereas it 
has been estimated that over one-half of all Polish farmers are close to 
retirement age so that the share of agriculture in employment in the latter 
should diminish rapidly over the next decade even in the absence of any 
structural adjustment. 
The fact that Turkey has a much younger agricultural work force, compared 
to either the CEECs or the EU-15 (where more than half of all farmers are 
older than 55 years), can also be seen as an opportunity. One cannot expect 
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agricultural population. But this need not be the case in Turkey. Educational 
programmes may have a significant impact in raising productivity and 
reducing labour market constraints. This might be an area where future 
SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development) support might be concentrated. 
Turkey is the only candidate to run a sizeable trade surplus in this sector with 
the EU. One reason that this has been possible is that Turkey specialises in 
products for which the EU is relatively open. While Turkey might have been 
lucky in the sense that the EU is relatively open for the fruits and vegetables 
that its climate favours, Turkey has been one of only a few countries that 
have actually been able to take advantage of the EU’s openness. Its large 
exports of fruits, vegetables and nuts show that parts of Turkish agriculture 
have been able to adapt to the requirements of the EU market. 
A second reason is the heavy trade protection on the Turkish side. Given the 
size of the agricultural population, trade protection for agriculture is a deeply 
political issue. As such, it was only after a serious economic crisis that 
agricultural policies were able to be overhauled. As regards trade protection 
in agriculture, the framework agreements reached in Geneva for the 
liberalisation of trade in agriculture under the WTO, would have a serious 
impact on the nature and scope of agricultural protection in Turkey. In sum, 
we would expect Turkey’s trade surplus with the EU to diminish as its 
agricultural reform progresses and once it starts to implement its 
commitments under the Doha Round.  
All in all, one must thus conclude that agriculture illustrates the dualism of 
the Turkish economy and its prospects: A relatively small modern sector 
produces the large exports to the EU, while the rest, which employs the 
majority of the workforce, is not competitive. The outlook for the sector is 
thus also mixed. On the one hand, with access to the EU it has ample growth 
opportunities mainly in the fresh fruits and vegetables subsectors, the few 
areas in agriculture where cheap labour costs can still make a difference. On 
the other hand it is difficult to see how the rest of the sector can adapt to 
stringent EU phyto-sanitary standards and the grades and standards 
demanded by the big EU supply chain systems without major modernisation 
efforts.  
Advantages in organisation, grading and the organisation of the supply chain 
are essentially what made EU food products competitive vis-à-vis CEEC 
products (ignoring export subsidies). Two aspects are worth mentioning in 
this context. One is the role of the government in investing in key public 
institutions and infrastructure (grading and control systems and standards). 
The second is the importance of the private sector. Much of these grades and 
standards are now driven by private companies imposing private standards. THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 89 
 
An increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) would thus be key to diffusing 
the adoption of the grades and standards required for export to the EU.  
In Turkey right now, for example, there are significant investments taking 
place by large retail companies which are developing supply systems with 
local farmers, in particular for fruits and vegetables. These private supply 
systems are very important, in particular because they are able to introduce 
EU standards despite very low human capital on the farms, e.g. by 
introducing their own extension and management advisory systems for 
farms. This is another illustration of the importance of FDI in fostering 
growth, as analysed in Dervis et al. (2004). 
5.6  Financial markets  
From crisis to recovery and the financing of growth. Since the late 1950s, the 
Turkish economy has repeatedly been hurt by macroeconomic instability. 
There have been major crisis episodes in 1958-60, 1970-71, 1978-80, 1994 
and finally in 2001. The earlier episodes were essentially balance-of-
payments crises, during which foreign exchange reserves dwindled and 
foreign payments difficulties led to the need to devalue the Turkish lira (TL). 
The most recent crisis had a somewhat different nature. It followed a decade 
of increasing domestic public debt and premature financial sector 
liberalisation before adequate regulatory mechanisms and supervision were 
developed. It is fears of a ‘debt event’ (involuntary restructuring) and worries 
about the health of the banking system that led to an attack on the TL, rather 
than balance-of-payments problems as such. 
The 2001 crisis was the result of a combination of two factors:  persistently 
high real interest rates on an increasing stock of domestic debt caused by 
chronic macroeconomic and political instability during the 1990s, and an 
accumulation of contingent liabilities in both the public and private portions 
of the banking sector. The ‘recapitalisation’ of this sector during and 
immediately after the 2001 crisis ended up costing the Treasury about 30% 
of the crisis year’s GDP, adding that amount to the ratio of public debt to 
GDP.
69  
One of the root causes of the banking crisis had been a strong politicisation 
of bank management and of the lending ‘culture’ in the public banks that 
took place throughout the 1990s. The public banks were directed to lend at 
interest rates well below the cost of their liabilities, accumulating ‘duty 
losses’ on their balance sheets. These duty losses ended up rising to more 
                                                 
69 In addition to the 30% of 2001 GDP equivalent of recapitalisation costs funded 
by the Treasury, there was another 6 percentage points of GDP equivalent 
funded by shareholders or by the deposit insurance fund. 90 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
than 10% of GDP in the months leading up to the crisis. The situation in the 
private sector was more complex, with many private banks appearing very 
profitable. These high profits were due, however, to an imprudent build-up of 
open foreign exchange positions (the so-called ‘carry trade’) as well as a lot 
of badly supervised connected lending. The 2001 crisis brought down this 
house of cards, aggravated by the exorbitant interest rates that banks had to 
pay on some of their liabilities during the peak weeks of the crisis.  
The depth of the banking crisis and the visible damage the economy suffered, 
however, created an unprecedented political and psychological opportunity 
for comprehensive legal and institutional reforms.
70 These reforms were 
undertaken in three phases. The most urgent first phase was to arrest the 
spiralling losses of the public banks and eliminate the liquidity risk they 
posed to the whole payments system in early 2001, and to take over some of 
the private banks on the verge of failure which were also threatening to 
generate a systemic run on deposits and financial sector panic. This was 
achieved in the spring and summer of 2001, at the same as the launching of 
the new macroeconomic programme and the mobilisation of the foreign 
resources from the Bretton Woods institutions that allowed the imminent 
‘debt-event’ fears to subside. The second phase was to orchestrate a 
comprehensive recapitalisation of the entire banking system and establishing 
much more rigorous regulatory and supervision standards. This was achieved 
in the period from February 2002, the date of passage of amendments to the 
banking law that included detailed provisions on how recapitalisation was to 
proceed, to July 2002, when the recapitalisation was completed. The third 
and last, longer-term phase of the reform, which was launched together with 
the recapitalisation phase, and which is still ongoing, aimed at transforming 
the structure of the Turkish banking system from one with more than 45% of 
its assets in the form of government debt in the immediate post-crisis period, 
to one that can channel savings to private investment and growth. This last 
phase requires i) a continued decrease in the ratio of domestic debt that needs 
to be rolled over and a downward trend in domestic real interest rates ii) a 
recovery in the ‘real’ sector of the economy, including corporate ‘work-outs’ 
reducing the burden of bad loans on the balance sheets of the banks; and iii) 
a new banking sector management and lending culture that sees the main 
source of balance sheet growth and profits in the expansion of lending to 
finance  investment, trade and employment creation.  
The resumption of rapid growth in an environment of drastically reduced 
inflation and the continuous decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio foreseen under 
the ‘stabilising stability’ scenario referred to above provide the environment 
                                                 
70 See Steinherr et al. (2004) for a comprehensive discussion of the 2001 banking 
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that would allow the Turkish banking sector to restructure its balance sheet, 
lowering the share of government bonds in its assets and increasing the share 
of private sector loans. This restructuring has started, with the share of 
private sector loans rising from the extremely low 17.8% at the end of 2002 
to 25% by end-2003, and to a projected 30% by end-2004. Comparable ratios 
in the EU are in the 50 to 120% range and in the new accession countries, in 
the 25 to 40% range. So Turkey has still some ways to go, although the rapid 
rise in the loans to total assets ratio is clearly encouraging and has already 
brought Turkey close to the new accession countries in terms of this 
indicator. 
The combination of the remarkable post-crisis rebound in output followed by 
rapid growth and the real appreciation of the exchange rate, after the 
overshooting in the opposite direction during 2001, has allowed a strong 
recovery in profits and on the balance sheet of important parts of the 
corporate sector. Many enterprises had heavy foreign exchange debts. The 
recovery of the TL greatly improved their balance sheets in 2003 and 2004. 
The recovery in domestic demand that gathered steam in 2004, 
complemented this improvement with increased sales and profits. It is these 
macroeconomic developments rather than targeted corporate ‘work-outs’ that 
have been responsible for a marked improvement in the health of the banks’ 
loan portfolio. It is important to stress, however, that the recovery in the real 
sector has so far been quite uneven. The larger corporations with access to 
reasonable finance, including directly from foreign banks, have been doing 
much better than the smaller enterprises which still face near prohibitive 
interest costs. Because it is these smaller enterprises that have always been 
the main channel of employment creation, the remarkable aggregate 
expansion in output has not, so far, led to an appreciable increase in 
employment. One should also add that the balance sheets of some 
corporations with substantial foreign debt, but with sales still mainly in the 
domestic market, remain very vulnerable to possible exchange rate 
depreciation. Given the increasing export orientation of the Turkish 
economy, these domestic market-oriented and yet foreign exchange-indebted 
enterprises no longer represent a large fraction of the manufacturing or 
service sector. They remain, however, a risk factor on the balance sheets of 
those banks exposed to them. 
In terms of productivity and efficiency indicators, the Turkish banking sector 
has made significant progress over the last three years. Even before the 2001 
crisis, most private  banks had invested in IT infrastructure and new 
distribution channels, including internet-based operations and telephone 
banking. The restructuring and reform effort in the public banks that took 
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areas between the private and public banks and has raised the overall 
productivity of the sector.  
In terms of commonly-used efficiency indicators, such as the ‘non-interest-
cost to total asset ratio’ and the ‘operating-cost to income ratio’, the 
performance of Turkish banks is comparable to the average performance of 
banks in the EU.
71 It is only in the ability to offer sophisticated capital 
market products that the Turkish banks are way behind their EU and 
international competitors.  
On the basis of the much higher capital adequacy ratios that they have now 
attained
72 and provided the macroeconomic environment remains broadly 
stable, it is now time for the Turkish banking sector to become a major 
instrument of growth by stimulating an increase in domestic savings and 
channelling these savings into productive investment, financing not only the 
larger corporations but also the medium- and small-scale enterprise sector 
which could be the vehicle for broader-based, more employment oriented 
and more equitable economic growth. Public policy should steer the banking 
sector in this direction by i) strictly enforcing the tougher restrictions on 
connected lending introduced in 2002, ii) gradually reducing the tax burden 
on financial intermediation while providing incentives for the lengthening of 
maturities on both the asset and liability side of the banks’ balance sheets, iii) 
encouraging more significant foreign capital participation in the sector, and 
iv) implementing a modern, market-based yet strong programme of support 
to the small- and medium-scale enterprise sector. The latter might include a 
reduction in the social security-related charges that act as a tax on formal 
employment, help for education and on-the-job training programmes, 
possibly in close cooperation with European institutions and a focus on 
regional infrastructure improvements in areas of potential growth hampered 
by inadequate infrastructure, again in cooperation with European institutions 
such as the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
These efforts by public policy-makers must be accompanied by a completely 
new strategic focus and management of the banking system, developing risk 
                                                 
71 For details see Alfred Steinherr, Ali Tukel and Murat Ucer, The Turkish 
Banking Sector: Challenges and Outlook in Transition to European Union 
Membership, EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 4, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, August 2004 (available at www.ceps.be). 
72 By the end of 2003, the capital adequacy ratio of private banks had reached 
23.5%, well above the minimum required 8% and above the ratio prevalent in the 
EU or the accession countries. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
international accounting standards give government securities a zero risk 
weighting, so that the still high ratio of these securities in the assets of Turkish 
banks must be kept in mind when making comparisons.  THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 93 
 
management and risk evaluation capabilities encompassing large, medium 
and small enterprises, and including full use of global capital markets. 
Turkish bank managers must encourage the formation of risk capital and 
entrepreneurship and work closely with new foreign partners and 
shareholders while providing the sector with the intimate and in-depth 
knowledge of the Turkish economy that is, and will remain, their natural 
comparative advantage.  
External debt. Turkey suffered from a massive attack on the Turkish lira in 
February of 2001. But were the external accounts of Turkey in such a bad 
state to justify such a speculative attack?  The answer depends on what 
external accounts one looks at: external indebtedness or the current account. 
Turkey has a large external debt, but it is difficult to see where it comes 
from. For the end of the year 2002, the net external debt of Turkey was, 
according to the IMF, about $100 billion (a bit above €80 billion). In recent 
decades, however, the country has not run current account deficits that would 
justify such a large foreign debt. Since 1963, in fact, the sum of the recorded 
current accounts has been only $42 billion. Hence there must have been 
considerable capital flight, on the order of $60 billion.  
This apparent capital flight has been going on until very recently. Table 5.9 
displays some of the relevant data. For example, over the five years between 
1997 and 2002, the net external debt of Turkey as recorded by the IMF 
increased by $40 billion (from $60 billion in 1997 to $100 billion in 2002). 
During the same period, the cumulated current account deficit was only 
around $7 billion, resulting in an estimate of capital flight of around $33 
billion (about 15% of today’s GDP or about 60% of annual exports).  
Table 5.9 Where does Turkey’s foreign debt come from? ($ billions) 
   1963-2002  1997-2002 
Current account deficits  - 42.1  -7.3 
Capital flight*   59.0  33.5 
* Estimated as the difference between debt and the cumulated current account. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the International Monetary Fund and the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (ISF).  
In this respect, Turkey is unique among the other candidates and the new 
members. Most of them had the opposite experience over the last years: 
foreign debt did not increase as much as one would expect given their large 
current account deficits. To take just one example: Romania has had over the 
last decade inflation rates similar to those of Turkey and its governments 
have only recently started to make serious reforms. In spite of all the 
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on the contrary, its foreign debt has increased by less than one would expect 
given the continuing current account deficits Romania has run over this 
period. If one takes all the data since the country started on the road to a 
market economy (i.e. since 1991), the net foreign debt of the country 
increased by about $4 billion less than one would expect given the cumulated 
current account deficits. Over this period, Romania has thus experienced 
‘reverse’ capital flight equivalent to about 8% of today’s GDP. Among the 
new members, Poland provides another example of a country which that ran 
very large current account deficits but did not experience any capital flight, 
since the recorded increase in the net foreign debt is almost exactly equal to 
the cumulated deficits. 
Returning to the case of Turkey, one finds, as usual, that when there is 
capital flight most of the foreign debt is owed by the government. Table 5.10 
shows this as well: almost 70% of the total foreign debt of Turkey is owned 
by the government. This government debt alone is much higher than the 
cumulated current account deficits. (The monetary authorities incurred some 
debt to accumulate reserves. However, since reserves are counted among the 
assets of the government, this type of operation does not influence the net 
debt figures used here.)  This is the classic constellation of capital flight: 
residents do not trust their own government and transfer everything they can 
abroad while the government is saddled with the task of servicing a mounting 
foreign debt. What is puzzling about the case of Turkey is that this process 
continued even over in recent years when real interest rates were extremely 
high. The best explanation might be a parallel to what happened in Russia: 
residents took their money abroad, some of which they then invested as a 
foreign investor in T-bills, which yielded real ex-post returns in the 10-20% 
range. The crisis occurred when it became uncertain whether the government 
could actually continue paying such a high price on its debt. The 2001 crisis 
was primarily a ‘public debt’ crisis, not a balance of payments crisis, as 
already alluded to above. Something similar to what happened in Russia 
seems to have happened in Turkey where until recently about 40% of all 
bank loans originated abroad.  
Table 5.10 Who has to pay for Turkey’s foreign debt? 
Net asset stocks ($ billions)  Level at end 2002  Change 2002-1997 
Overall net foreign assets (debt)  -101.0  -40.8 
Of which:  
       Monetary authorities + 
       government  -70.6  -37.9 
       Banks plus other sectors  -23.5  3.9 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the International Monetary Fund and the 
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The capital flight that has apparently taken place in recent decades is again a 
challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to provide the conditions 
under which this capital can return. The opportunity derives from the fact 
that, if the foreign debt of the country is much lower than generally assumed, 
it will also be able to attract more foreign capital in the future. For example, 
Poland, then widely considered over-indebted, started a sustained period of 
growth coupled with large current account deficits and large FDI inflows in 
the mid-1990s when its net foreign debt was worth about 100% of annual 
exports. By contrast, Turkey’s starting position today would be a ratio of 
debt to exports close to 200% (debt of $100 billion and exports around $50 
billion annually). But the cumulated current account deficits of Turkey over 
the last four decades were only about $40 billion, implying that the true 
foreign debt of the country is probably only somewhat less than one-half the 
figure suggested by official statistics. If most of the capital flight returned, 
Turkey’s debt ratio would thus be only about one-half (around 100% of 
annual exports), affording the country much more room for subsequent 
capital imports. 
5.7  The quality of institutions 
The EU does not have its own apparatus to enforce the acquis, to ensure a 
level playing field in the internal market and see that its principles are 
applied uniformly throughout its vast territory. It does not have its own 
customs officers, nor its own tax policy and only a small judicial system (the 
European Court of Justice), which relies in the end on cooperation from 
national courts. The EU can thus function properly only if the governmental 
institutions in the member states work at a broadly comparable level. 
Improving the quality of the government in this broad sense is thus an 
essential condition for successful membership.  
Preparing for EU membership is of course not the only motive for looking at 
the quality of governance. Improving it should also yield concrete economic 
benefits in terms of growth. The empirical literature on the determinants of 
long-term growth shows conclusively that the quality of the domestic 
institutions is a further key determinant of growth. A lot needs to be done in 
this area. The starting point is not good, even if one compares Turkey not to 
the EU-15 countries, but to the newer member countries. Table 5.11 below 
shows the data on six different indicators of the quality of domestic 
economic governance as collected by the World Bank. It is apparent that the 
score of Turkey is much below that of either the EU-15 average (higher 
values mean a better performance, i.e. more control of corruption, a more 
effective government, etc.), or indeed of all the new member states in all of 
the indicators used here. Only Romania and Bulgaria have similar values to 
Turkey. 96 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
















EU-15   Mean  1.70  1.67  1.15  1.57  1.58  1.42 
 STDEV  0.52  0.43 0.31  0.26  0.42  0.20 
             
EU-27           
             
Bulgaria BGR  -0.17  -0.06  0.56  0.62  0.05 0.56 
Estonia EST  0.66  0.78  0.98  1.35  0.8 1.05 
Hungary HUN  0.6  0.78  1.08 1.21  0.9  1.17 
Poland POL  0.39  0.61  0.71  0.67  0.65  1.11 
Romania ROM  -0.34  -0.33  0.42  0.04 
-
0.12 0.38 
Turkey TUR  -0.38  -0.2  -0.61  0.08  0  -0.47 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on World Bank data. 
Dervis et al. (2004)
73 provide a brief statistical analysis of the same data, 
which shows that (in statistical terms) the values for Turkey as of 2002 in 
most cases were so far from the EU average that it should be considered 
belonging to a different set. They also show that if one compares Turkey to 
the EU-27 average, one sees that the distance separating Turkey from the 
EU-27 is about as large as the distance that separates the CEECs from the 
EU-15. This implies that even in an enlarged and thus more diverse EU-27, 
Turkey would be far behind the average with respect to the low quality of all 
indicators of the quality of governance that have been measured and 
quantified. However, Turkey would not be totally alone as its values are 
generally quite close to that of Bulgaria and Romania, which are scheduled 
to join in 2007, which is well before Turkey’s probable accession date.  
While the quality of domestic governance is undoubtedly low, one might ask 
whether this does not represent simply the level of development of the 
country. Poorer countries in general have weaker institutions. Perhaps these 
institutions will improve as income grows and the country develops. Figure 
5.4 shows that if one measures the indicator concerning the ‘rule of law’ 
relative to GDP per capita, the performance of Turkey appears to be closer to 
the general ranking of the Turkish economy. Turkey is clustered together 
with Romania and Bulgaria at the lower end of the scale. Its value is, 
however, clearly below the regression line. This implies that Turkey, with 
Bulgaria and Romania, perform even worse on the ‘rule of law’ indicator 
than one would expect given their low present GDP per capita. 
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Has the problem of poor governance become less severe over time? 
Unfortunately the indicators used so far are not available for a longer time 
period. Hence it is difficult to go beyond snapshots. A recent publication by 
the World Bank
74 allows one, however, to make at least a comparison over 
half a decade, namely from 1996 to 2002. Figure 5.5 below shows thus the 
change registered by an average of the five governance indicators established 
by the World Bank. On this score it appears that Turkey is the only one 
among the new member countries (and some poorly performing ‘old’ 
member countries) to have registered deterioration in this composite index of 
the quality of governance. The 2002 data cannot, of course, reflect the 
reforms that started after the 2001 crisis, but the record so far shows that at 
least until very recently Turkey has fallen behind the countries one could 
take as comparators.  
The general improvement one observes for the new member states (before 
they actually became members) occurred during a period that was dominated 
by accession negotiations. The opening of membership negotiations with 
Turkey could thus provide a similar impetus for improvement in the quality 
of governance. 
                                                 
74 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset, 1996-2002 
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Source: World Bank (2002). 
One area where this process might have started already is that of the 
independent regulatory authorities. The Competition Authority for instance 
was established in Turkey in 1997. Since then competition policy has been 
applied in a way that is very similar to the EU. The functioning of this 
agency was also lauded by the Commission in its progress reports. Sectoral 
regulatory authorities have also been established recently such as the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and the Energy Regulatory 
Authority. Although their performance record varies, the general view is that 
the quality of decision-making has increased considerably compared to the 
previous situation where the relevant ministry had been entrusted with this 
task. The two factors that led to this improvement are the higher-quality and 
better paid and trained personnel employed by these authorities and their 
greater independence from the body politic. The success of regulatory reform 
and the good performance of these regulatory bodies should also translate in 
time into better government effectiveness, less corruption, more respect for 
the rule of law and higher regulatory quality. It would therefore be important 
to support these relatively new institutions and introduce a cooperation 
programme that would enable the EU to provide support to the Turkish 
regulatory authorities. 
One particular aspect of the quality of institutions that is very important for 
the proper functioning of the EU is the role of corruption. Putting the acquis 
on the rule books is meaningless if it is not properly enforced because of 
widespread corruption. There is no easy solution in the fight against THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 99 
 
corruption, however. It must be fought on many fronts; an increase in 
enforcement effort helps, as does paying public officials to make it possible 
for them to live decently while remaining honest. But a sustained effort is 
required to change the perception and make the pendulum swing the other 
way.  
A key problem in the fight against corruption is that a low starting position 
can make progress extremely difficult. Consider first a country where 
corruption is close to zero. Then the effectiveness of even a small 
enforcement effort is very high because the few cases that exist can be dealt 
with thoroughly. As a result corruption is likely to remain controlled. By 
contrast, consider a country with a very high level of corruption. In this case 
even a strong enforcement effort cannot achieve a lot because there are so 
many cases to deal with. Once corruption has crossed a certain level, it 
becomes difficult to contain it over time. Unfortunately, Turkey, as well as 
some countries from Central and Eastern Europe seem to be close to this 
situation: the starting point was bad and, in the case of Turkey, the situation 
seems to have deteriorated in the late 1990s. Given its relatively bad starting 
point the efforts to control corruption might thus have to be much stronger to 
start pushing the country towards the better equilibrium with low corruption, 
which can then be maintained at a lower effort. 
Curbing corruption is important, but it is not everything. A growing economy 
needs a bureaucracy that enforces laws and regulations in a way that allows 
the market to work. How can this be achieved? Gros and Steinherr provide a 
simple model of the extent of autonomy in decision-making by bureaucrats 
that is consistent with minimising corruption and the social objective of 
making bureaucrats act responsibly and flexibly, in the interest of 
efficiency.
75 The model suggests that better education and better pay for civil 
servants are the keys to success. Better-educated officials can be given more 
leeway to interpret decisions because they are also less likely to use 
discretion for their own personal advantage as their prospects outside the 
public sector would also be tarnished by corruption. 
This analysis suggests ways to improve a poor public sector performance in 
poor countries beset with financial difficulties. At the start of the ‘clean-up’ 
campaign, it might thus be necessary to enact strict laws and regulations that 
leave little leeway for interpretation. Over time, with better training (in 
which governments should invest more) and higher remuneration, civil 
servants should be able to use discretionary power more responsibly. They 
may then be given more discretion.  
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A necessary pre-condition is that the social goals are clearly defined and 
widely shared by society, thereby increasing the probability that discretion is 
used in a way that enhances social welfare and that deviant behaviour 
becomes socially unacceptable. Only then will it be possible to rely on the 
discretion of public sector employees.
76   
5.8  The outlook for growth 
Sustained rapid growth will be essential to create a positive background for 
the membership negotiations that might last for quite some time. If Turkey 
can start narrowing the gap in terms of GDP per capita over the next decade, 
the perception that the EU is about to take in ‘yet another poor country’ will 
be weakened. Moreover, a solidly-growing economy will make it easier for 
Turkish policy-makers to adopt all the domestic changes that will be required 
in the run-up to membership. 
Over the last three years, Turkey has experienced a strong rebound, with 
growth rates in the 6-8% range. But how durable is this boom? Can Turkey 
grow at these rates for the next decade? Assessing the longer-run growth 
prospects of the Turkish economy is rather difficult. Even a cursory 
examination of the Turkish growth record leads one back to the fundamental 
difficulty of judging the prospects of a country whose past performance has 
been so variable. Indeed one finds periods of extraordinary dynamism 
followed by deep slumps (and vice-versa) in both a longer-run and a shorter-
run perspective. 
Since we are concerned with the outlook for the Turkish economy over the 
next decades, it might be useful to start with the longer-run perspective. The 
longest period over which comparable data are available is since 1960. If one 
takes such a long-run perspective, one could say that the performance of 
Turkey has not been bad in absolute terms, since GDP per capita grew at 
more than % over these four decades. But, compared to the other poorer 
European countries for which long-term data are available, Turkey’s 
performance has been disappointing. The difference between Turkey and 
Greece in particular is not large, but the difference, for example, between 
Turkey and Portugal or Romania is more substantial – close to one half a 
percentage point. 
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Table 5.12 Turkey’s long-term growth performance in a long-term 
perspective 
  GDP per capita at PPP  Compound growth rate 
 1960  1999  1960-1999 
Turkey 1.847  6.126  3.07 
      
Romania 1.375  5.647  3.62 
Greece 4.329  14.595  3.12 
Portugal 3.538  15.417  3.73 
Spain 4.460 16.73  3.39 
Source: GDP per capita measured in 1999 dollars at PPP adjusted exchange rates. 
The average over 40 years is, however, composed of two quite distinct sub-
periods: one with an average close to 4% and another one with an average 
only slightly above 2%. The first two decades (roughly 1960-79) constituted 
a period of more rapid growth, but they were followed by two decades of 
relative stagnation, in the sense that during this period (approximately from 
the mid-1980s to the present) Turkey failed to catch up to the OECD 
average. This latter period was characterised by significant macroeconomic 
instability, including in these two decades, three episodes of serious financial 
crisis i(1978-1980, 1994 and 2001) and very high real interest rates. The 
combined effect acted as a break on growth, particularly during the 1990s. 
Turning to the shorter-run perspective, one notices that Turkey has 
undergone booms and bust of unusual magnitudes, with GDP falling by 8% 
one year, only to rebound the next year by a similar amount. No EU member 
country has experienced such fluctuation. The record of Poland and Portugal, 
both of which underwent turbulent periods over the last decade with deep 
structural change, seems positively stable when viewed against that of 
Turkey. 
A first conclusion must thus be that Turkey has a potential for strong growth, 
but that macroeconomic volatility has made sustained growth impossible so 
far. In other words, the patient must have a very strong constitution given 
that he has survived all the mistreatment administered in the past!   
Looking towards the future, all of the factors that inhibited growth during the 
last two decades should improve, especially when compared to the 1990s.  102 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 














































In particular, the new economic and political anchor provided by the start of 
EU membership negotiations should ensure the consolidation of the 
structural and governance reforms undertaken in the 2001-03 period. The 
consolidation of the deep reforms of the banking system and fiscal policy 
whose implementation has already started should now allow a growth path 
without episodes of financial collapse. Together with the prospect of 
membership in medium term, this should encourage FDI flows of the order 
of 2-3% of GDP, helping to increase the investment rate in a sustainable 
way. A high investment rate would then allow Turkey to unlock its vast 
potential for extensive growth by drawing the remaining half of the 
population into its modern sector. Over time, the qualification of the new 
entrants into the labour force could also increase considerably if the EU 
provides some financial support for Turkey’s own efforts in this area. 
What are the magnitudes of the factors? How fast could Turkey converge 
once the major impediment to growth, namely macroeconomic instability, 
has been removed?  
The accumulation of factors of production can take mainly three forms: 
investment in physical capital, investment in human capital and population 
growth. 
The strongest factor working in Turkey’s favour is the demographic trend. 
The key point here is not the (declining) growth rate of the overall 
population, but the favourable evolution of its composition with an THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 103 
 
increasing proportion in working age. As illustrated above, this factor alone 
should lead to an increase in the potential GDP per capita of around 1.5% per 
annum over the next decade. Since the proportion of the working age in 
overall population is not rising in the EU-15 (in some cases, it is actually 
falling due to ageing), this factor should thus, on its own, allow Turkey’s 
GDP per capita to grow 1.5% per annum faster than that of the EU-15.  
Moreover, Turkey has the potential for a large-scale absorption of 
underemployed labour, especially from the rural areas and among women, 
into higher productivity activities in industry and services. Over a decade it 
should be possible to shift about one-third of those currently employed at 
extremely low productivity rates in the rural areas into industry and services. 
This would on its own constitute about a 10% increase in the effective 
workforce. Although the productivity of these migrants from the rural areas 
might be somewhat lower than the existing workforce, this factor should 
provide for an additional increase in potential GDP per capita of almost 1% 
per annum. This differentiates Turkey again from the eight Central and 
Eastern European countries of the class of 2004 and should thus allow for 
some narrowing of the difference in GDP per capita with respect to the new 
members. Only Romania shares with Turkey the potential of deriving 
substantial growth from the internal transfer of labour from low productivity 
to much higher productivity sectors. 
Drawing from the pool of those currently outside the workforce (mainly 
women) would provide an additional boost to growth. As documented above, 
only about 44% of the population in working age is currently employed in 
Turkey, compared to about 55% on average for the new member countries 
(and an even higher 64% for the EU-15). Even if only one half of the current 
difference between Turkey and the new member is eliminated over the next 
decade this would mean an increase in the labour force of about 1% per 
annum. This factor could provide for another boost to GDP per capita of 
close to 1% per annum (less than 1% because the new entrants are likely to 
have a somewhat lower productivity than those already working). 
Finally, with an increasing transfer of technology (partially via higher FDI), 
total factor productivity should accelerate. For the new member countries 
one has observed in recent years that labour productivity has consistently 
increased by between 3 and 4% per annum. This is substantially more than 
the meagre 1-1.5% achieved by the EU-15. If Turkey were to match the 
performance of the new member countries (during their pre-accession 
period) in this respect, its TFP should grow faster than the EU by up to 2.5% 
per annum.  
What does it all add up to? If one compares Turkey to the EU-15, one finds 
that the total effect of all the growth-enhancing factors could be between 3 104 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
and 6% per annum, suggesting that rapid convergence should be possible. 
Compared to the new member countries Turkey would mainly have the 
labour supply working in its advantage, which amount to somewhere 
between 1 and 3% per annum. This suggests that if Turkey were to be able to 
take full advantage of its potential labour supply, it might even catch up with 
respect to them. Table 5.13 summarises this brief evaluation of the factors 
that should boost potential growth in Turkey, compared both to the EU-15 
and to the new member countries. 
Table 5.13 Factors boosting potential growth in GDP per capita (in % per 
annum) 




Higher proportion in working age  1.0-1.5  0.5-1.0 
Transfer from rural sector to 
industry and services 
0.5-1.0 0.5  -1.0 
Increasing labour force participation 
rate 
0.5-1.0 0-0.5 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)  1.0-2.5  0-0.5 
       Total  3.0-6.0  1.0-3.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
The arguments and data presented so far suggest that Turkey’s biggest 
potential advantage could lie with a better utilisation of its human resources. 
But increasing employment without lowering productivity levels too much 
can only be done if investment is high enough to provide the new 
participants in the labour force with an adequate amount of capital. In other 
words, high rates of extensive growth also require high rates of investment.  
Until recently Turkey did have respectable investment rates. The poor 
growth performance over the last decade, however, suggests that this 
investment was perhaps not very productive, most probably because it was 
distorted by macroeconomic instability and political interference. The 
reforms undertaken since 2001 combined with the ongoing disinflation 
process should change this radically. The cost of capital should increase for 
those sectors that in the past relied on the political process to obtain cheap 
credit (a ‘credit’ at a single-digit interest rate with inflation close to three 
digits is more a gift than a credit), but it should fall for those sectors 
(probably the bulk of the economy) that were cut off from credit because the 
government absorbed so much of it. One would thus expect over time a 
rebound in investment and a higher productivity of capital. This is indeed 
what seems to have happened since 2002. THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 105 
 
Where can the increase in the investment effort be found that is needed in 
order to equip the new entrants into the expanding modern sector with the 
capital stock that can keep their productivity close to that of those few 
already employed? While part of the capital will come from abroad, it is 
clear that most of the effort has to be raised domestically. This implies that it 
will be essential to increase domestic savings. This should be possible in an 
historical perspective, but the starting point is again rather difficult. Figure 
5.7 below shows how national savings have declined from a respectable 
average of around 24-25% of GDP until the end of the 1990s to only 16% in 
2002. A sustained high growth rate will be possible only if Turkey goes back 
to the historical pattern of savings.  
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What does the illustrative quantification of the growth-boosting factors imply 
for convergence? Dervis et al. (2004)
77 pursue two approaches, which arrive 
at a similar result: within the next decade, the gap in GDP per capita could be 
substantially narrowed so that by the time of its potential accession Turkey 
could have about the same GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 as the 
new member countries had when they joined in 2004. Over an even longer 
perspective, say up to the year 2025 (when transition periods for the full 
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mobility of labour might expire) GDP per capita in PPP terms might increase 
from the present 25% to about 60% of the EU-15. 
5.9 Conclusions 
‘Health not wealth’ should be the decisive criterion when considering 
Turkey's prospects for membership of the EU. Viewed this way, the outlook 
is promising. Turkey is still very poor, compared to the present EU members, 
but is also more dynamic. Full catch-up in terms of GDP per capita might 
take more than a generation, rather than years, but full catch-up is not the 
relevant criterion if one is concerned about the impact of the accession of 
Turkey on the EU. Experience has shown that problems are much more 
likely to arise from established rich member countries with stagnant 
economies (Belgium in the 1980s, Italy and Germany today) than from 
poorer, but more dynamic states (e.g. Spain and Greece in the recent past, 
Hungary and other CEECs today). The fact that most of the so-called 
‘periphery’ is now growing more strongly than the ‘core’ confirms that 
within an enlarged EU, the poorer member countries are likely to prosper and 
thus cause fewer problems than widely anticipated. 
Our evaluation of the growth prospects for Turkey is quite optimistic. In our 
view, Turkey should now be able to embark on a sustained period of 
convergence which should reduce the huge differential in GDP per capita of 
today to a more (politically) acceptable level by the time Turkey joins the 
EU. This optimism is not based on the growth performance of the Turkish 
economy in the decade of the 1990s, which was rather weak. We observe 
that the macroeconomic instability over that decade was so severe that it is 
actually surprising that there was any growth at all. With the structural 
reforms launched in 2001, with inflation now at a 30-year low and with the 
negotiations process providing an anchor for the political system, these vital 
forces should come to the forefront, provided that there is no backsliding on 
the reforms and that the rules-based transparent system that these reforms 
aimed to establish does not again fall victim to political populism. 
Any evaluation of the Turkish economy is made difficult by its extraordinary 
heterogeneity; parts of which are very modern and productive, but other parts 
of which are close to subsistence level and cannot compete. The productive 
and modern sector is still small, but if it can expand by absorbing the surplus 
labour from the rural part of the country, the Turkish economy should be able 
to reach the level of the new member countries in the not too distant future.  
Provided the Turkish economy can be set on a balanced and rapid growth 
path, are there any particular areas in which EU-Turkey cooperation could 
start before membership? THE ECONOMICS OF TURKEY’S CANDIDACY | 107 
 
Our examination of trade relations, in particular the discussion of the EU-
Turkey customs union in force since 1996, suggests one such area. The 
challenge for the next years is to make the asymmetry in the customs union 
politically acceptable until accession takes place and to extend free trade to 
the area of services. The former will require the EU to take Turkish interests 
into account when negotiating trade agreements with third countries; 
agreements that Turkey will have to accept without being able to exert any 
influence in the negotiations. The latter will require innovative solutions 
regarding the movement of service workers, an issue closely linked to the set 
of issues to be addressed in the area of justice and home affairs. 
A further conclusion emerges from our analysis of Turkey’s human 
resources. Given the large gap in human capital formation between Turkey 
and the EU, any financial support during the pre-accession period should be 
focused on human capital formation, rather than the standard ‘hard’ 
infrastructure projects. About €3 billion per annum would be comparable to 
the support received by other candidates and would allow spending on 
education to be increased by about 1% of GDP, thereby bringing Turkey 
closer to the European standard in this area. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
There is a tide in the affairs of men 
Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; 
Omitted, all the voyage of their life 
Is bound in shallows and in miseries. 
Julius Caesar, Act iv, Sc. 3 
here are some truly important moments in history. A decision by the 
European Council in its December 2004 meeting in the Netherlands, 
to start negotiations towards full membership with Turkey without 
delay, some time in 2005, would be an historic step for Europe, for Turkey 
and indeed for the world. It would be a signal that Europeans want to build 
the new world of the 21
st century on the basis of common values and with a 
will to be major actors shaping this century, looking forward, not backward, 
driven by hope and confidence, rather than by fear. For Turkey, it would be a 
crucial step forward on the road to fulfilling the Republican dream of joining 
the family of modern and prosperous nations. For the world as a whole, such 
a decision would show that past conflicts belong to history and that there are 
no religious barriers to modernity, freedom and the consolidation of peace. In 
an age of new threats and new tensions, Europe can again show the way 
forward, as it did when the European Community was created and as it did 
after the fall of the Berlin wall.  
The aim of this study was to look in detail at the issues likely to emerge 
during the process of negotiations, on the assumption that they will start 
soon. The working papers prepared as part of the project analysed the 
challenges and opportunities arising in the fields of foreign policy, security 
policy, justice and home affairs, domestic governance, macroeconomic 
policy and income convergence, energy, banking and agriculture. In some 
areas, such as trade integration, Turkey is actually already today more 
advanced than some of the new member countries. In other areas, Turkey 
lags behind and needs to catch up over the coming years. There is no doubt 
that the negotiations will be difficult. European governance is complex and 
in transition, and Turkey is comparable, in size, to the 10 new member states 
put together. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that both Turkey and the 
European Union would need a period of between seven and ten years before 
Turkey’s full membership is achieved.  
During this period, the ‘new’ Europe of the 21
st century will emerge. The 
process of negotiations will be affected by what happens to the new 
Constitution, by a likely reformulation of the Growth and Stability Pact and 
the functioning and size of the eurozone, as well as by developments relating 
to common foreign, security and defence policies. It is also very likely that it 
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is during this period of negotiations with Turkey that the process of including 
the Western Balkan countries in the European Union will begin. 
The ‘end point’ aimed at by the negotiations with Turkey would be full 
membership in the Union. No other objective can meet the challenge that 
Europe and Turkey face together and no other outcome can be acceptable to 
Turkey. As discussed in the introduction, however, the Europe of 2012 or 
2015 will no doubt contain various forms of enhanced cooperation and 
partially overlapping circles and groupings of countries, allowing for 
flexibility in multi-level governance and different speeds in the degree of 
integration. This is already the case today when we consider, for example, 
the Schengen arrangements and the eurozone. 
It would be natural, therefore, for the EU and Turkey to consider certain 
opportunities for ‘enhanced cooperation’ even before full accession, given 
the likely length of the negotiation period. Turkey could commit to certain 
EU policies in advance of membership while the EU could provide Turkey 
with some role in the Union’s decision-making process. Foreign and security 
policy, justice and home affairs as well as trade are areas where there could 
be scope for such, ‘virtual’ membership. The studies were able to identify 
clear mutual benefits in each of these areas. In the area of foreign policy, a 
close, structured cooperation could allow the EU and Turkey to achieve 
foreign policy objectives that neither side could achieve alone. Such 
cooperation could be most useful in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Central 
Asia and the Middle East. Much greater cooperation would also seem 
possible on defence matters, without giving up the overall framework of 
NATO. Similarly, in the domain of justice and home affairs, a more 
integrated model of cooperation would ensure a smoother transition for the 
crucial issues of border regimes and immigration policy. Finally, the 
widening of the customs union to allow progressively freer trade of services 
could provide very substantial economic benefits to Turkey and to the EU. 
Imaginative thinking is needed so that the appropriate cooperation formulae 
can be designed. Turkey must realise that there is a European acquis 
communautaire to which it must conform, even if some details seem 
cumbersome or even unreasonable. On the other hand, the EU negotiators 
must act in the spirit of trying to find joint solutions to common problems 
and behave as they did during the negotiations with the Central and Eastern 
European countries, not forgetting that the goal is indeed to solve transition 
problems and move towards full membership. 
It is also apparent that in other policy areas such as energy, agriculture and 
especially education, implementation of joint and specific transition policies 
could be very useful. In agriculture, for example, Turkey constitutes a 
particular case given the absolute size of its agricultural population. A 
gradual and coordinated reform and investment programme, however, would 110 | THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 
 
certainly enable the two parties to manage the transition process successfully. 
The energy sector presents another similar opportunity. Given Turkey’s geo-
strategic position, there is an urgent need for the two sides to closely 
coordinate their future energy policies. Energy is an area where Turkey needs 
the EU to fulfil its ambitious objectives to become a major bridge for the 
supply of energy to Europe and where Europe needs Turkey to help ensure 
the viability and security of its energy supplies in the long run. Finally, 
Turkey’s education sector should be the primary focus of pre-accession EU 
assistance. Turkey must upgrade the way it produces skills in its labour force. 
At the same time, education, trade in services, well-managed migration and 
the resolution of social tensions in the EU are all parts of a common 
challenge and should benefit from an integrated policy approach whose 
implementation should not be delayed until full membership is achieved. 
In the macroeconomic domain, Turkey has to ‘stabilise the stabilisation’ it 
succeeded in establishing after the 2001 crisis, while accelerating growth to 
be able to converge towards European income levels. As explained in the 
section on macroeconomics and growth, demographic factors and the high 
level of labour productivity already attained in the modern sector of the 
Turkish economy create a great opportunity for rapid growth and steady 
convergence. It is important that the EU accession negotiations provide an 
anchor for stable convergence policies. These will have to be set in the 
context of the final objective of Turkey joining the eurozone. A large country 
like Turkey succeeding in growing at a rhythm of 6 to 7% a year for a 
number of years, would soon be able to contribute to the acceleration of 
European growth as a whole, although Turkey embarks on this process with 
a small GDP. In this context, it would be useful for Turkey to start 
participating as an observer in some of the economics and financial affairs-
related meetings of the European Council, perhaps not immediately, but 
some time during the progress of the negotiations. 
The European Union and Turkey today, jointly, stand before a great 
opportunity. To seize this opportunity, Turkey must continue decisively its 
process of modernisation, economic reform and full democratisation, with 
great emphasis on education and skill formation. While asking Europe to 
respect the separation of church and state and not to allow the introduction of 
religion as a new barrier between people, Turkey must itself cherish the 
secular nature of the Republic and the separation between private faith and 
public policy. Europe must realise that the world needs it as a power for, and 
an example of, peace, and that it can only be safe and prosperous in a world 
that overcomes all fundamentalisms. Together, Turkey and Europe can set an 
example that will carry hope and confidence in our century across the globe 
and put new passion and vitality into the great European adventure.   | 111 
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